Hybrid War as Strategy and Policy
The best way to boil a frog, the adage goes, is to turn the heat up slowly enough that the frog doesn’t realize it is being cooked. If the perpetrators hacked the stove’s software, denied their culpability, and bombarded bystanders with fake news before annexing the kitchen, one might have a workable analogy for hybrid warfare.
The first automatic exchanges of tax information took place in September 2017 and implementation will continue through 2018 based on Common Reporting Standards (CRS) among 102 countries and jurisdictions through the framework of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Forum).[1] The automatic exchange of information (AEOI) allows tax authorities to receive financial account information about their taxpayers from foreign authorities without having to send a specific request.
Introduction
Introduction
On May 1, 2017, as the United States Supreme Court delivered its decisions on many of the term’s divisive questions, a unanimous opinion in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co.[1]slipped through the headlines largely unnoticed.
In July 2017, a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of United Nations member states agreed to take the next step toward negotiating an international instrument to govern the marine biodiversity of the high seas.
The chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria, reported on April 4, 2017, produced 86 deaths and more than 300 injuries according to the initial reports.[1] The Fact-Finding Mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was able to deploy in less than twenty-four hours, and later confirmed the incident,[2] even though Syria “categorically reject[ed] the false accusations and allegations of the Syrian Arab Army’s use of toxic chemical substances a
On June 15, 2016, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, after decades of laborious negotiations.[1]
Introduction
In 2008, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged the need to establish a mechanism to carry out essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) after their closure.[1] The Security Council underscored that impunity for individuals indicted by the Tribunals and still at large would be unacceptable, recognized the critical importance of continuing witness protection, and stressed that the archives of the Tribunals are UN pro
