The Concept of
Market Contestability and
New Agenda of the Multilateral Trading System
March 1996
--Thomas J. Schoenbaum is the Dean and Virginia Rusk Professor
of International Law and Professor of Political Science
at The University of Georgia. He is also the Executive
Director of the Dean Rusk Center for International and
Comparative Law at The University of Georgia, and is of
counsel to the law firm of Dow, Lohnes, and Albertson.
The successful completion of the Uruguay
Round of international trade negotiations in 1994 and
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
January 1, 1995 marks an unprecedented expansion of the
international law relating to international trade. The
rules of international economic law now extend into many
new substantive areas, such as services, intellectual
property, and investment. In addition, the revamped binding
international dispute resolution process administered
by the WTO will create a lively new jurisprudence in this
field.
There is no time, however, for the WTO and
its patrons to rest on their laurels; the widening and
deepening of the international trading system under the
Uruguay Round agreements have set in motion a dynamic
process which calls for further improvements. As a result,
the first WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled for Singapore
in December 1996 will face a busy agenda. The world trading
community not only must continue the implementation of
the Uruguay Round Final Act, but also must work on a new
program of action to grapple with the new realities of
the post-Uruguay Round global economy.
Renato Ruggiero, WTO Director-General, recently
stated that there are three major challenges facing the
multilateral trading system. The first task is to consolidate
what was accomplished in the Uruguay Round, especially
making sure that the new dispute settlement system "works
in a legally and politically credible manner." On this
score the WTO seems to be doing quite well. The seven-member
Appellate Body -- which will serve as the World Trade
Court -- has begun to function. Its first case will be
an appeal by the United States from a WTO panel decision
that the Environmental Protection Agency's reformulated
gasoline program denies national treatment to gasoline
imports from Venezuela and Brazil. Over a dozen additional
dispute settlement cases now are pending.
A second task of the WTO is to finish the
leftover business from the Uruguay Round. This includes
important ongoing negotiations in the field of services,
such as financial services, telecommunications, and maritime
transport services.
Third, the WTO will have to deal with a
new agenda of subjects that were not dealt with in the
Uruguay Round. Many at the WTO and the OECD (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development) are advancing
a new focus for future trade policy: the objective of
international contestability of markets.
The theory of contestable markets was advanced
by William J. Baumol, an economist, in 1982. He argued
that the optimal form of industrial organization is a
perfectly contestable market characterized by costless
entry and exit. In such a market the entrant would encounter
no obstacles in terms of production techniques or perceived
product quality relative to the incumbent. Thus, entry
would be judged simply on the basis of the incumbent's
prices. In such a market, p (price, which is the
same as marginal revenue for a perfectly competitive firm)
would equal mc (marginal cost) and there would
be no monopoly profits. Costless entry and exit mean that
neither p>mc nor p<mc would be compatible with equilibrium,
even for a short period. In theory, p>mc immediately would
attract new entrants, and p<mc would result in market
exit by excess incumbents. Baumol concedes that in the
real world costless market entry and exit is not possible,
but improving market contestability should, nevertheless,
be an important policy goal.
Trade theorists now carry over the concept
of contestable markets to the international context. They
advocate the international contestability of markets as
an important new objective of the multilateral trading
community. In particular, two new ideas are emphasized:
first, a market is deemed internationally contestable
when the conditions of competition allow unimpaired market
access for foreign goods, services, ideas, investments,
and business people; second, the investment mode of doing
business is as important as trade because trade and investment
are complementary means of contesting markets. Together,
these ideas place a new emphasis on market access and
presence as a touchstone of future trade policy.
The theory of contestable market holds that
ease of entry and exit to markets (without intervening
anticompetitive barriers due to government of private
restrictions) leads to efficiency, even if there are only
a few firms in an industry, because they will be forced
to price their products competitively because of the ease
of market entry. An internationally contestable market
is one in which "the competitive process -- the rivalrous
relationship between firms -- is unimpeded by private
or public anticompetitive conduct."1
Two major initiatives are being prepared
to implement the market contestability objective. First,
both the WTO and the OECD are examining the linkages between
trade and competition policies. As tariff and other trade
barriers have diminished, private market restraints have
become a principal factor blocking access to international
markets. In order to deal with this problem, a program
of convergence of antitrust policies likely will be formulated,
probably in the form of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement
at the WTO.
The new common competition policy will not,
however, constitute a World Antitrust Code; something
much less ambitious will be offered because there is less
agreement on the economic foundations of competition policy
than on the economies of free trade. For this reason,
it is difficult or impossible to harmonize the major antitrust
systems of the world. Nevertheless, the outlines of a
possible Agreement on Competition Policy are becoming
clear:
Restrictive business practices such as cartels,
monopoly power, and vertical restraints that foreclose
or impede market access should be prohibited when
such conduct harms consumers and the competitive process.
Enforcement cooperation should be granted to provide
trading partners with reasonable access to each other's
enforcement system.
There should be a procedure for notification and
information about proposed mergers and other agreements
between enterprises.
National antidumping laws should be modified to
bring them into harmony with antitrust laws concerning
price discrimination and predatory pricing.
International disputes over such matters as the
transnational reach of national enforcement jurisdiction
should be submitted to an international dispute settlement
system.
A second, much-discussed initiative is the negotiation
of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that will
constitute a general policy framework for international
direct investment. The importance of this undertaking
reflects the increasing role played by investment in the
world economy. In 1993, the production of foreign investment
goods and services totaled $5.5 trillion compared with
$4 trillion in world exports of goods and non-factor services.
It seems clearly appropriate to negotiate
an MAI that would deregulate and harmonize the rules relating
to international investment. There is a remarkable convergence
on foreign investment standards and regulations. An MAI
could build upon the Uruguay Round agreement on Trade
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) to embrace the following
principles:
Market access. Foreign firms should, in
general, be accorded the right of establishment. Criteria
for rejection of foreign direct investment should
be standardized.
Most-favored nation treatment. Foreign investment
regulations should not discriminate among businesses
from different countries.
National treatment. Once admitted, foreign
firms should be guaranteed national treatment.
Free choice of means. Government policies
should not seek to influence a foreign company's choice
of means of doing business. Business should be free
to employ trade, direct investment, cross-border licensing,
joint venture, or strategic alliances in order to
enter foreign markets.
Transparency. Foreign investment regulations
should be published and applied consistently.
Dispute resolution. An international regime
for resolving disputes over investment issues should
be established.
Reducing barriers that impede access to foreign markets
long has been a key objective of U.S. trade policy. In
recent years, regulatory barriers and restrictive business
practices have emerged as the most important foreign trade
barriers. To combat these, the U.S. Department of Justice
has announced a policy of using extraterritorial application
of the U.S. antitrust laws to open foreign markets, and
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) increasingly
has invoked the right to take unilateral retaliatory action
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended).
Two recent examples stand out. In May 1995,
the USTR invoked section 301 against Japan by raising
tariffs 100 percent on six varieties of Japanese luxury
cars. The tariffs were removed when Japan agreed in June
to modify regulations on autos and auto parts that inhibited
the sale of foreign cars in Japan.
A second controversy is still unresolved.
In July 1995, a section 301 action was initiated on behalf
of the Eastman Kodak Company on the grounds that Fuji
Film Company was monopolizing the sale of photographic
film in Japan, through private restrictive business arrangements
tolerated by the Japanese government, that excluded Kodak
from all but a tiny share of the Japanese market. Both
Kodak and U.S. officials favor the use of section 301
over the antitrust laws in this case because of the difficulty
of gathering evidence and enforcing any judgment against
Fuji in Japan.
In taking these unilateral actions, the
United States is treading a fine line between the need
to assert its interest in removing foreign trade barriers
and undermining the new WTO system, which places constraints
upon unilateral action even by powerful states. Multilateral
agreements on new international standards relating to
competition policy and foreign direct investment would
give U.S. policy an important boost and lessen the need
for unilateral measures.
Nonetheless, there are distinct limitations
to the theory of international market contestability.
First, certain social issues such as labor standards and
protection of the environment are not sufficiently addressed.
Even though these matters are properly left to other international
agencies, there will be a continuing need to address their
trade-related aspects. The WTO has created a Committee
on Trade and the Environment (CTE) in order to make recommendations
concerning the environmental issues, such as border adjustment
of eco-taxes, trade restrictions in multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs), process and production methods (ppm
s) and eco-labeling. Work on these controversial issues
is proceeding very slowly.
The subject of trade and labor standards
is even more difficult. The Marrakesh meeting at which
the Uruguay Round was approved rejected a United States
proposal to establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Labor
Standards. At present, there is no agreement among WTO
members even on the issues involved, and until an consensus
is reached, the matter will not be included in the future
WTO Work Programme. Although the International Labor Organization
addresses labor standards worldwide, it has not adopted
specific recommendations on interrelated trade and labor
issues.
Second, contestable markets theory does
not exhibit any special concern for developing countries
and their special problems; these issues will require
special treatment.
Third, the contestable market objective
may increase public anxiety over the effect of "globalization"
on jobs and incomes. Although there is little evidence
of a cause and effect relationship here, policy makers
may have to compromise the competitive markets ideal to
assuage this concern.
Fourth, increasing market access through
contestable markets should not be viewed as a device to
correct trade imbalances between nations. Although the
popular perception is that closed foreign markets are
responsible for the U.S. trade deficit, studies show that
increasing market access would make only a marginal difference.
Thus, trade imbalances must be addressed in other ways.
Despite these limitations, international
contestability of markets is an increasingly prominent
policy tool to set a new trade agenda that would seek
to broaden and deepen the multilateral trading system.
It remains to be seen, however, whether ambitious new
initiatives in international trade will be accepted by
an ever more skeptical Congress and the American public.
1 Americo Beviglia Zampetti and Pierre
Sauve, "Onwards to Singapore: The International
Contestability of Markets and the new Trade Agenda, "
1 OECD Trade Directorate (1995).
Further Reading
William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in
the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 American Economics
Review (Mar. 1982).
John H. Jackson, Alternative Approaches for Implementing
Competition Rules in International Economic Relations,
49 Aussenwirtschaft 177 (1994).
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Negotiating International
Competition Rules in the GATT/WTO World Trade and Legal
System 49 Aussenwirtschaft 231 (1994).
Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation
of Foreign Direct Investment, 26 Law and Policy in International
Business 673 (1995).
Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement
Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment,
26 Law and Policy in International Business 633 (1995).
Eleanor Fox and Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of
Competition and Trade Law, 19 World Competition 5 (1995).
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Theory of "Contestable Markets"
in International Trade: A Rationale for "Justifiable"
Unilateralism to Combat Restrictive Business Practices?
30 Journal of World Trade (1996).
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