Addendum to Armed
Force in Iraq: Issues of Legality
By Mary Ellen O'Connell
April 2003
On March 20, 2003, the United Kingdom and the United
States sent letters to the United Nations Security
Council reporting on their use of force against Iraq
and their legal justifications for doing so. The
UK letter invokes a right to enforce Security Council
resolutions requiring Iraqi disarmament. [1] The US letter argues that the basis of the
1991 ceasefire with Iraq was removed, reviving authorization
to use force against Iraq found in resolution 678
(1990). [2] The US letter also says the
US was acting in its own defense and the defense of
the international community. International law scholars
have raised serious issues regarding all three justifications.
The UK letter states the "action follows a long
history of non-cooperation by Iraq.with disarmament
obligations imposed on it by the Council, including
in resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002)."
"The objective of the action is to secure compliance
by Iraq with its disarmament obligations as laid down
by the Council." The UK and US have long argued that
they have the right to use force to enforce Iraqi
obligations in Security Council resolutions.
Of the resolutions cited in the UK letter, only resolution
678 authorizes the use of force, but it was adopted
on November 29, 1990, to effect the liberation of
Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and before Iraq had disarmament
obligations. [3] Disarmament obligations were not placed on
Iraq until resolution 687, the ceasefire resolution
of April 3, 1991. Resolution 687 affirms the "sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of
Kuwait and Iraq" and the intention of Members
to "bring their military presence in Iraq to
an end as soon as possible." The resolution
then establishes several measures to realize the "objective
of restoring international peace and security in the
area." These measures included demarcating the
common Kuwait-Iraq border, creating a ten-mile demilitarized
zone between the two states, as well as placing disarmament
and financial obligations on Iraq. To enforce these
measures the Council decided it would leave economic
sanctions in place until Iraq was in full compliance.
In the resolution's final paragraph the Council decided
to "remain seized of the matter and to take such
further steps as may be required for the implementation
of the present resolution and to secure peace and
security in the area." Resolution 687 contains
no express authority for any state to use force.
A week after the adoption of resolution 687, the
Security Council adopted a third resolution--resolution
688--calling on Iraq to end the repression of the
Kurds and other citizens "as a contribution to
removing the threat to international peace and security
in the region" and to "allow immediate access
by international humanitarian organizations."
Within days of the adoption of resolution 688, US,
French, British, Dutch and German troops established
the Kurdish protection zone in northern Iraq. The
US adopted the UK's argument justifying the legality
of this force: that because resolution 688 referred
to "peace and security in the region" and
resolution 678 referred to peace in the area, reading
resolution 678 together with resolution 688, allowed
force to be used to enforce 688. [4] A similar argument was made to justify the
subsequent imposition of no-fly zones over northern
and southern Iraq by the US, UK and France. [5] In 1998, however, when the US and UK used an intense bombing
campaign to attempt to induce Saddam Hussein to re-admit
UN weapons inspectors, a majority of the Council condemned
the action as unlawful.
[6] It might be argued that the US/UK interpretation
of resolutions 688 and 678 was acquiesced in by the
Council with respect to the Kurdish and no-fly zones. [7] No similar argument can be made respecting
the use of force to enforce Iraqi disarmament obligations
under resolution 687.
The Council passed resolution 1441 on November 12,
2002, but it provided no new authorization for using
force. It states in paragraph 12 that a meeting of
the Security Council will be the first step upon a
report by inspectors that Iraq obstructed their activities.
Russia, France and China have all stated they understood
resolution 1441 permitted no automatic use of force.
Subsequently, in fact, members of the Council were
unwilling to adopt a proposed resolution that would
authorize force to enforce Iraqi disarmament. Resolution
1441 states affirmatively that in the event of a material
breach by Iraq of its obligations to cooperate, serious
consequences would follow. But, again, the resolution
does not say what serious consequences would follow.
Nor did it provide any right of unilateral US/UK enforcement.
The argument in the March 20 US letter to the Security
Council that Iraq's failure to fulfill its obligations
under resolution 687 resulted in the termination of
that resolution is also problematic. Analogizing
to multilateral treaties, the argument is that a material
breach of the obligations terminated the formal cease-fire
in resolution 687 and returned the parties to the
pre-ceasefire legal situation, specifically the situation
created by resolution 678. Resolution 678 allowed
the use of "all necessary means," including, presumably,
taking the defense of Kuwait to Baghdad and ending
the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Scholars raise at least three problems with this
argument: first, resolutions are not treaties and
do not automatically terminate upon material breach.
Second, the argument that resolution 687 lapsed and
resolution 678 revived is inconsistent with the legal
position staked out by the US and UK for the last
12 years, and, third, resolution 678 never authorized
the forcible change of Iraq's regime in the first
place.
While it is true that in some cases of material breach
of a multilateral treaty, the nonbreaching parties
may suspend the treaty's operation or terminate it, [8] the analogy to resolutions is
inapposite. Security Council resolutions are not
treaties. They are not agreements among equals reached
through negotiations, aimed at achieving consensus
and binding on all parties alike if they give their
consent. Council resolutions, by contrast, are mandates
imposed on certain states that must be respected whether
those states consent or not. [9] Resolutions are enforced, modified, or terminated
by the Security Council acting under the terms of
the UN Charter. The Charter does not authorize either
states in general, or individual or groups of Security
Council members, to take enforcement action on their
own.
An additional problem with this line of argument
is that it is unclear exactly when and how resolution
687 lapsed and 678 was revived. As of March 17, 2003,
the US and UK were still looking for authority to
use force to enforce it. Indeed, until March 19,
2003, the US and UK acted consistently in the belief
that resolution 687 was a viable Security Council
mandate that imposed obligations on Iraq to comply
despite Iraq's consistent failure to do so; moreover,
the resolution was receiving full Security Council
attention toward getting Iraq to comply.
Even if resolution 687 could lapse and resolution
678 could revive, resolution 678 never authorized
the use of force to forcibly change Iraq's government.
Resolution 678 was about liberating Kuwait and providing
security in the area. The US has acknowledged that
the coalition had authority only for these purposes. [10] This fact is also evident
in the terms of resolution 687 affirming both Kuwait's
and Iraq's territorial integrity and political independence.
Resolution 687 established a demilitarized zone between
Kuwait and Iraq and disarmament obligations on Iraq,
without calling for regime change in Iraq.
The final argument made by the United States in its
March 20 letter to the Security Council is that the
coalition's actions against Iraq in 2003 were "necessary
steps to defend the United States and the international
community from the threat posed by Iraq and to restore
international peace and security in the area."
The US appears to argue it may use force in self-defense
because it perceived a threat of future harm from
Iraq. The pre-emptive use of military force absent
an armed attack violates the plain terms of the United
Nations Charter and the prevailing interpretation
of those terms. Under the Charter, states may use
force in self-defense if an armed attack occurs.
[11] For all other security concerns, states
are to go to the Security Council. The Council may
then authorize all necessary means to respond to what
it determines is a threat to international peace and
security. [12]
About the Author: Mary Ellen O'Connell, William B. Saxbe Designated
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University
[1] Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security council, UN Doc.
S/2003/350 (Mar. 21, 2003).
[2] Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21,
2003). The lapsing ceasefire argument also appears
in a statement to the House of Lords by the British
Attorney General and in Iraq: Legal Basis for the
Use of Force, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 17
March 2003 (on file with the author.)
[3] The resolution has only five operative paragraphs:
1.) Demands that Iraq comply
fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all
its decision, to allow Iraq one final opportunity,
as a pause of good will, to do so:
2.) Authorizes Member States co-operating
with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or
before 15 January 1991 fully implements as set forth
in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions,
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area;
3.) Requests all States to provide appropriate
support for the actions undertaken in pursuance
of paragraph 2 above;
4.) Requests the States concerned to
keep the Security Council regularly informed on
the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs
2 and 3 above;
5.) Decides to remain seized of the matter.
[4] Author interview with Edwin Williamson, State
Department Legal Adviser, Washington, D.C. (Apr.
19, 1991), reference to the interview first published
in Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on
UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 Ind. L.J. 903
(1992).
[5] See House of Commons debates excerpted
in 65 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 683 (1994); 64 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 728-29 (1993); see also, Christine
Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International
Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 Eur.
J. Int'l L. 1, 9 (2002).
[7] For more on implicit authorization, see
Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the
Security Council, Ambiguous Authorization to Use
Force, Cease-Fires, and the Iraqi Inspection Regime,
93 Am. J. Int'l L. 124 (1999).
[8] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155 UNTS 331.
[10] Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State John
Kelley and Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry
Rowen before the Europe and Middle East Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Federal News
Service, June 26, 1991, at 151, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File, cited in Lobel
& Ratner, supra note 7 at n. 61. See
also, Marack Goulding, Remarks, 91 ASIL
Proc. 132, 157-58 (1997).
[12] For more on preemptive force, see Frederic
Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism,
ASIL Insights (June 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh88.htm;
see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of
Preemptive Self-Defense, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf
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