Weapons of Mass
Destruction and International Law
By David P. Fidler
February 2003
Introduction
The perceived threat from weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) has become one of the most important
issues on foreign policy and national security agendas.
The WMD threat has, for example, profoundly influenced
the Bush administration's national security and homeland
security strategies.
[1] For the United States and like-minded allies,
Iraq's alleged possession of WMD has become a casus
belli. The rise to prominence of the WMD threat
raises questions about the role of international law
concerning WMD in this new environment.
Traditional International Legal Approaches to WMD
In security and foreign policy analyses,
"weapons of mass destruction" is a term that generally
encompasses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
with radiological weapons occasionally included. Contemporary
international legal analysis generally follows this
conventional definition of WMD, even though neither
treaty law nor customary international law contains
an authoritative definition of WMD. The reason such
a definition does not exist is that states have historically
used international law to address each category of weapons
within the WMD rubric. International law specifically
on WMD is, thus, composed of three different sets of
rules for each WMD technology. General rules of international
law, such as international humanitarian law, also apply
to WMD; [2] but these general principles were not developed
specifically to address WMD.
The dominant international legal activity
on WMD has been the negotiation and implementation of
arms control treaties. This arms control approach reflected
three objectives-to deter the use of WMD by states (e.g.,
nuclear arms control treaties between the United States
and the Soviet Union
[3] ), to prohibit the emplacement and testing of
WMD in certain areas (e.g., treaties prohibiting WMD
in orbit or on the sea-bed or ocean floor
[4] ), and to produce WMD disarmament (e.g., treaties
prohibiting development and use of biological and chemical
weapons [5] ). Although arms control treaties contributed
to the development of customary norms restricting or
prohibiting the use of WMD, development and possession
of WMD was not, outside the treaty context, illegal
under customary international law.
The Transformation of the WMD Policy and Legal Environment
In the post-Cold War period, political
and technological developments created three WMD challenges
that rendered the historical reliance on arms control
treaties suspect. First, in the 1990s, concern mounted
about WMD proliferation by states and terrorist groups,
suggesting the world confronted increasing interest
in WMD by state and non-state actors. In light of these
increasing motivations to possess WMD, the traditional
arms control approach seemed insufficient to address
either kind of proliferation.
Second, experts argued that the technological
difficulties traditionally confronted in developing
WMD were diminishing for state and non-state actors.
Advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering revolutionized,
for example, the technological context of bioweapons.
The arms control approach had long struggled with the
challenges posed by the dual-use nature of all WMD technologies;
and the transformed technological contexts exacerbated
the dual-use problem and complicated verification efforts
in arms control for all three WMD areas. The perceived
increase in the technological feasibility of WMD development
combined with concerns about growing state and terrorist
interest in WMD to compound fears about the WMD threat.
Third, the political and technological
developments described above forced governments to confront
the vulnerabilities their societies faced from terrorism
involving WMD. Events, such as the chemical terrorism
perpetrated by Aum Shinriyko in Japan in 1995, stimulated
efforts to improve domestic preparedness for catastrophic
terrorism. The September 11th and anthrax attacks accelerated
attempts in the United States and other countries to
improve "homeland security." The arms control approach
to WMD did not address the vulnerability crises countries
faced in the post-Cold War period.
International Law in the New WMD Environment
The transformation of the WMD policy and
legal environment has produced awareness that the arms
control approach does not adequately address the political,
technological, and preparedness challenges countries
now confront with WMD. Although arms control remains
important, the new WMD environment is witnessing a diversification
in how states and international organizations use international
law in connection with the WMD threat.
In connection with the perceived increase
in WMD proliferation by states and non-state actors,
new international legal efforts and proposals aimed
at strengthening deterrence against WMD development
and use have appeared. These include: (1) Security Council
action against Iraq concerning its alleged WMD programs; [6] (2) U.S. efforts to extend the right of anticipatory
self-defense to justify military action in "pre-emptive
self-defense" against a hostile regime armed with or
pursuing WMD; [7] (3) criminalizing WMD terrorism in treaty law; [8] and (4) proposals to make the
development, retention, acquisition, or transfer of
biological and chemical weapons a crime under international
law. [9]
International cooperation and legal activity
has also begun to address the increasing technological
feasibility of WMD. International efforts to improve
national control and regulation of access to, and transfer
of, WMD materials have started, for example, within
the Australia Group and through the Biological Weapons
Convention. Multilateral initiatives, such as the G-8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, [10] also contribute to international activities designed to protect
WMD materials from malevolent appropriation. In the
same spirit, experts have proposed new treaties on improving
the safety and security of biological agents.
[11]
The challenge of domestic preparedness
is also the subject of international diplomatic and
legal activities. Strengthening domestic preparedness
against WMD terrorism has become, for example, an agenda
item in a number of multilateral forums, including NATO,
the World Health Organization, World Customs Organization,
and the International Maritime Organization. In addition,
specific multilateral initiatives, such as the Ottawa
Plan, [12] have made improved domestic preparedness for WMD terrorism
the focus of diplomatic attention.
Conclusion
In the new WMD environment, states and
international organizations are diversifying the role
international law plays in connection with the WMD threat.
The traditional arms control approach no longer monopolizes
the international legal strategy against WMD. This development
suggests that the need for international law in connection
with the WMD threat may be higher now than in previous
historical periods. The dangers and uncertainties confronting
the use of international law in this new WMD environment
may also be historically unprecedented, as U.S. interpretations
of international law to justify military action against
Iraq and the worsening crisis with North Korea both
demonstrate.
About the Author:
David P. Fidler is Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman
Faculty Fellow at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
[3] See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of
American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,
Oct. 3, 1972, at http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16332.htm.
[4] See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January
27, 1967, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm;
and Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5187.htm.
[5] See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4718.htm;
and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, at http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16286.htm.
[9] Harvard/Sussex Program on CBW Disarmament and
Arms Limitation, Draft Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing,
Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring, or
Using Biological or Chemical Weapons, http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~hsp/crim01.pdf.
[12] Department of Health and Human Services, Press
Release, Secretary Thompson Joins Health Ministers
in "Ottawa Plan": Countries Forge New Partnership
to Strengthen Public Health and National Security,
Nov. 7, 2001, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011107a.html.
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