Authority of the
Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers from International
Criminal Court Proceedings
By Bryan MacPherson
July 2002
On 30 June 2002, the U.S.
vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have extended
a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
The veto was prompted by the concern that U.S. personnel
could be subject to unwarranted, politically motivated
prosecutions by the new International Criminal Court (ICC).
As a condition for extending the peacekeeping mission,
the U.S. sought approval of a resolution that would, in
essence, have permanently barred the ICC from initiating
proceedings against peacekeeping personnel from states
not parties to its statute without the Security Council's
consent. [1]
Many states opposed the U.S.
effort as an attempt to amend the ICC Statute in excess
of the Security Council's authority. As a result, the
Security Council convened an open meeting on 10 July 2002
at which representatives of 39 states participated. Nearly
all opposed the U.S. position, but many recognized that
compromise could preserve essential peacekeeping operations.
[2] The U.S. then proposed a resolution that would
defer proceedings against peacekeepers for one year.
At the end of that period, if the resolution were not
renewed, the prosecutor could proceed. A variation of
this draft was approved by the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, on 12 July 2002.
The Bosnia peacekeeping mission was extended on the same
date. In the operative provisions of Resolution 1422,
the Security Council:
1. Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article
16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises
involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome
Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United
Nations established or authorized operation, shall
for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not
commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution
of any such case, unless the Security Council decides
otherwise;
2. Expresses the intention to renew the request in
paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1 July
for further 12-month periods for as long as may be
necessary;
3. Decides that Member States shall take no action
inconsistent with paragraph 1 and with their international
obligations; . . . .
This controversy raised serious
questions concerning the scope of the Security Council's
powers. Although the immediate crisis was resolved, the
underlying dispute between the U.S. and ICC supporters
over the proper role of the Court continues.
I. Consistency with the ICC Statute
The ICC Statute (treaty) was
approved in Rome on 17 July 1998. The court has jurisdiction
over the most serious war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. [3]
It can exercise jurisdiction where a situation is referred
to it by the Security Council or the crime is committed
on the territory of, or by a national of, a state party.
[4] The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July
2002. Former President Clinton had signed the treaty
on 31 December 2000, the last day it was open for signature.
President Bush effectively renounced the signature on
6 May 2002, by declaring that the U.S. has no intention
of ratifying it. [5]
A. Blanket Deferral of Proceedings
Paragraph 1 of Resolution 1422
asserts that is consistent with Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, which states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced
or proceeded with under this Statute for a period
of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that
request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions.
The consistency of Resolution
1422 with Article 16 is hotly disputed. Opponents contend
that Article 16 was intended to be applied on a case-by-case
basis to specific situations, where ICC proceedings could
interfere with efforts to restore or maintain international
peace and security. They maintain that it was not intended
to be applied prospectively to provide a blanket immunity
from the Court. They assert that the Resolution constitutes
an unauthorized "amendment" of the Statute.
Resolution 1422 reflects an
interpretation of the Statute that may be at odds with
the intent of the parties, but it does not rewrite the
words of the Statute or affect its application in other
circumstances. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of its terms in light of its
object and purpose. [6] If the language is ambiguous, resort may be had to
supplemental means of interpretation, including the record
of the negotiations leading to the treaty. [7]
Arguably, Article 16 is ambiguous.
There is nothing in its language to exclude the approach
taken in Resolution 1422. Nor has anything been cited
from the preparatory work to so indicate. It appears
that the prospect of a resolution prospectively deferring
ICC proceedings may not have been considered. Nevertheless,
the statements made by parties and signatories to the
ICC Statute at the 10 July Security Council meeting were
nearly uniform in rejecting the U.S. interpretation, and
are evidence of the intent of the parties.
2. Permanent Deferral
The earlier U.S. attempt obtain
a near-permanent exemption from the ICC was in the form
of a draft resolution that contained the following provision:
2. [The Security Council] decides by this resolution,
acting consistent with Article 16 of the Rome Statute,
that, on July 1 of each successive year, the request
not to commence or proceed with investigations or
prosecutions as set forth in paragraph 1 shall be
renewed and extended during successive twelve-month
periods thereafter unless the Security Council decides
otherwise . . . .
[8]
This provision would have automatically
renewed the deferral of proceedings until the Security
Council made an affirmative decision not to renew. Opponents
asserted that this provision was clearly inconsistent
with the intent of Article 16. That Article was the subject
of intense negotiations. Some states, including the U.S.,
wanted the ICC to be under the control of the Security
Council and able to initiate proceedings only with the
Council's consent. Since any permanent member of the
Council could then veto proceedings directed against it,
many states objected. Article 16 arose as a compromise
recognizing that suspension of ICC proceedings might be
essential to allow the Council to maintain international
peace and security. An essential element of this compromise
was the requirement that any extension of the deferral
would require a new decision by the Security Council that
any permanent member could veto. Thus, Article 16 was
intended to any permit permanent member to veto extensions
of resolutions suspending ICC proceedings, while the U.S.
proposal would have reversed this by allowing permanent
members to veto any decision ending the suspension of
proceedings.
II. Powers of the Security Council
The legality of Resolution
1422 under the U.N. Charter does not depend upon whether
it is consistent with the ICC Statute. The Security Council
has a broad mandate to maintain international peace and
security. It may make recommendations for the pacific
settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter
and may make binding decisions, as well as recommendations,
under Chapter VII. Pursuant to Articles 25 and 48, member
states are obligated to carry out decisions taken under
Chapter VII. As discussed below, they may be required
to do so even if the decision is inconsistent with a treaty
obligation.
A. Limitation Posed by Article 39
The principal objection to
Resolution 1422 is that the Security Council action was
ultra vires. Article 39 provides as a prerequisite for
action under Chapter VII that the Council find a "threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."
Resolution 1422 addresses this prerequisite by stating
in the preamble that "it is in the interests of international
peace and security to facilitate Member States' ability
to contribute to operations established or authorized
by the United Nations Security Council." Critics
contend that increased reluctance by a few states to contribute
to peacekeeping operations is hardly the type of threat
to the peace contemplated by Article 39. They also assert
that the ICC should not deter states from participating
in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
would have primacy over the ICC. [9] On the other hand, it is arguable that the Security
Council is at least presumptively its own judge when it
interprets its powers under the Charter. [10]
B. Authority to Act Contrary to International
Law or Treaty Provisions
Critics of the Resolution also
maintain that it exceeds the Security Council's authority
by interfering with the sovereign right of states to enter
into treaties and violates an asserted jus cogens principle
of customary international law that perpetrators of serious
violations of humanitarian law must either be prosecuted
or extradited to a state that will prosecute.
The Security Council's authority
is not unlimited. It must act in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the U.N.
[11] These principles include respect for obligations
arising from treaties and international law, and solving
problems of a humanitarian character. Paramount among
them is maintenance of international peace and security.
[12] Since the ICC is intended to deter violations
of international humanitarian law and thus would contribute
to the maintenance of peace, presumably the Security Council
would be expected to respect the integrity of its Statute.
However, the Council must often consider many conflicting
factors in deciding how best to maintain or restore peace.
How it does so is largely within its discretion.
There is nothing in the Charter
to suggest that the Security Council cannot, where there
is an actual threat to the peace, take an action inconsistent
with a treaty or customary international law. On the
contrary, the Charter implies that such actions might
be necessary. Article 2(7) prohibits the U.N. from intervening
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,
but indicates that the prohibition does not apply in the
case of enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII.
The argument that the Security Council must act consistently
with jus cogens norms finds some support in the Vienna
Convention which provides that treaties violating jus
cogens norms are void. [13] The Charter, however, is not like other treaties,
and a strong argument can be made that this provision
does not apply to it. Moreover, whether the duty to
extradite or prosecute is one of the few jus cogens norms
is debatable. In any event, customary international law
does not require that violations of humanitarian law be
tried by the ICC. They could be prosecuted in other courts
instead.
With respect to treaties, the
Charter provides in Article 103 that in the event of a
conflict between a state's obligations under an international
agreement and the U.N. Charter, the obligations under
the Charter shall prevail. Many Chapter VII resolutions
have required modification or suspension of trade or mutual
defense agreements. Thus, the obligation to comply with
Security Council decisions made under Chapter VII would
seem to prevail, for states parties to the ICC Statute,
over their rights and obligations under the ICC Statute.
This does not mean that the Security Council has amended
the Statute, as some have argued, but that in every treaty
it is implicit that its terms are subject to overriding
U.N. obligations.
C. Consistency of Article 16 with the
U.N. Charter
The discussion above concerning
whether Resolution 1422 is consistent with Article 16
of the Statute begs the question whether Article 16 is
consistent with the U.N. Charter. A situation might arise,
for example, where the Security Council finds it expedient
to grant amnesty to a leader who is committing war crimes,
genocide, or crimes against humanity, as an inducement
for that leader to surrender power and cease committing
the crimes. That leader might be willing to step down
only if he were assured that the amnesty would be permanent,
and Article 16's limitation of a one-year, albeit renewable,
suspension of proceedings might not be a sufficient inducement.
Under such circumstances, the Security Council might well
be acting within its authority to decide that a permanent
ban on ICC proceedings was necessary, notwithstanding
the limitation contained in Article 16. Whether or not
that would be a wise decision, it would appear to be within
the Security Council's discretion to take such an action
if it decided that it was the best way to restore peace
and security.
D. Whether Resolution 1422 Binds the
ICC
Critics of Resolution 1422
have advanced two arguments that it does not bind the
ICC. They note that not all Security Council resolutions
are binding, but only "decisions" made under
Chapter VII. As a result, when the Council intends to
bind states, it invariably uses the word "decides."
They contend that since paragraph 1 of Resolution 1422
uses "requests" and not "decides,"
it is not binding. The countervailing argument is that
the Council used "requests" only because that
is the term used in Article 16 of the Statute, and that
the intent was to bind the court (shown by the Council's
express reliance on Chapter VII of the Charter and its
use in the operative part of the resolution of the words
"shall . . . not commence or proceed").
The other argument is that
the U.N. Charter places the obligation to comply with
Security Council decisions only on states and not international
organizations or other entities. [14] In this regard, Article 48(2) specifies that decisions
of the Security Council shall be carried out both by members
directly and through their actions as members of international
organizations, but the ICC prosecutor is independent,
and his or her decisions on whom to prosecute are not
controlled by the states parties. Thus, while parties
could be required to vote in the Assembly of States Parties
in a manner consistent with Resolution 1422, the Resolution
might not bind the prosecutor in his or her decisions.
This argument raises the question whether international
organizations can be endowed with powers beyond those
of the states which created them. To the extent the parties
to the ICC Statute are bound by Security Council determinations,
it might be argued that the court itself, as a creation
of states, should also be bound. In any event, paragraph
3 of the Resolution is directed at states and would prohibit
them from turning suspects over to the court or from cooperating
with it in any way that would be inconsistent with the
Resolution.
III. Conclusion
The dispute over the scope
of the Security Council's authority to defer proceedings
under Article 16 of the ICC Statute raised strong emotions.
The U.S. expressed satisfaction. It stated that it would
allow time to negotiate agreements under Article 98, which
provides that the ICC may not require a state to surrender
an individual if an agreement between the requested state
and the sending state requires the sending state's consent.
However, it angered many states and others who support
the Court, some suggesting either that the ICC is not
bound by the Resolution or that it should seek through
the General Assembly an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice.
Disputes concerning the ICC
are likely to arise again, and a better solution must
be found. One might be based upon Article 124 of the
Statute, that allows parties to opt out of ICC jurisdiction
over war crimes for seven years. The U.S. sought, unsuccessfully,
an interpretation from the ICC Preparatory Commission
that this provision could be used by non-parties. Some
argue that it was an oversight not to treat non-parties
the same as parties under Article 124, while others maintain
that it was intentional and intended as an incentive to
states to become parties. A resolution by the ICC Assembly
of States Parties extending the benefits of this provision
to non-parties might address the concerns of the U.S.
while being consistent with the integrity of the ICC statute.
About the Author
Bryan MacPherson is with the World Federalist Association
where he has worked toward an International Criminal Court
since 1991. He has published several articles on the
subject.
[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
17 July 1998, 37 ILM 999 (1998).
[2] U.N. SCOR, 4568 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002),
at
http://www.un.org/Docs/pv4568e.pdf and http://www.un.org/Docs/pv4568e1.pdf.
The number of states represented was greater than the
number of speakers as the ambassador from Denmark spoke
on behalf of the European Union and Costa Rica on behalf
of the Rio Group.
[4] Id. arts. 13-14. A non-party state may
file a declaration accepting jurisdiction over a particular
crime. Id. art. 12(3).
[5] See Curtis A. Bradley, ASIL Insight:
U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal
Court Treaty (May 2002), athttp://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
[6] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23
May 1969, art. 31 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The
U.S. is not a party to the Convention. However, the provisions
cited in this paper probably reflect customary international
law and are cited for that reason.
[8] This provision was included in drafts circulated
by the U.S. on 2 July and 3 July. The first paragraphs
of these drafts differ in their wording, but not significantly
in substance, from paragraph 1 of Resolution 1422.
[9] See Article 9 of the ICTY Statute, S.C.
Res. 827 (25 May 1993). Although this Article refers
to primacy over national courts, there does not seem to
be any dispute that it would also apply to the ICC. The
U.S. also has little exposure in the other U.N. established
peacekeeping missions in which it participates, as the
states involved are not parties to the Statute, making
it unlikely the ICC would have jurisdiction over U.S.
forces. The concern of the U.S. may be with respect to
U.N. "authorized" missions, e.g., Afghanistan.
[10] Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
ICJ Rep. 151, 168.
[14] U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48.
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