U.S. Announces
Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty
By Curtis A. Bradley
May 2002
On May 6, 2002, the Bush Administration
announced that the United States does not intend to become
a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. John Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, sent a letter
to Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
stating that "the United States does not intend to become
a party to the treaty," and that, "[a]ccordingly, the
United States has no legal obligations arising from its
signature on December 31, 2000."
[1] In a press briefing the same day, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld explained that the Administration had
"a number of serious objections to the [International
Criminal Court] - among them, the lack of adequate checks
and balances on powers of the [Court's] prosecutor and
judges; the dilution of the U.N. Security Council's authority
over international criminal prosecutions; and the lack
of any effective mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions
of American service members and officials."
[2] Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, expressed additional concerns about the treaty
in a speech to the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. [3]
The Rome Statute, which calls for the establishment
of a permanent international criminal court, was signed
by 120 nations at a conference in Rome in July 1998.
Although initially a supporter of the proposed Court,
the Clinton Administration did not sign the treaty at
the Rome conference because of a variety of concerns,
including a concern that the treaty contained insufficient
protection against politicized prosecutions. The Administration
eventually did sign the treaty, however, near the end
of President Clinton's term in office. President Clinton
explained that the treaty had "significant flaws," but
that "[w]ith signature . . . we will be in a position
to influence the evolution of the court." [4] He also stated that he would not recommend that the next President
submit the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent
"until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."
[5] As discussed in last month's ASIL
Insights, the Statute recently received sufficient
ratifications to take effect and, pursuant to Article
126 of the treaty, will enter into force on July 1, 2002.
While
the policy merits of the Bush Administration's announcement
are of course open to debate, the announcement appears
to be consistent with international law. There is nothing
in international law that obligates a signatory to a treaty
to become a party to the treaty,
[6] and the Rome Statute itself (in Article 125)
states that it is "subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval by signatory States." In addition, Article
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that, upon signing a treaty, a nation is "obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of
the treaty "until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty." The Vienna
Convention thus contemplates that nations may announce
an intent not to ratify a treaty after signing it.
If
the United States had not clearly announced its intent
not to ratify the Rome Statute, it would have, according
to the Vienna Convention, been "obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the
treaty. The Vienna Convention does not define "object
and purpose," so it is unclear what this obligation entails,
especially in the context of a treaty, like the Rome Statute,
that creates and regulates a new international institution.
Nor is it clear how long the object and purpose obligation
lasts after a nation has signed a treaty. It could be
argued that a long delay in ratifying a treaty would signal
a clear intent not to become a party to the treaty. On
the other hand, it is worth noting that the United States
has sometimes ratified treaties long after signing them.
A notable example is the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the United
States signed in 1948 but did not ratify until 1988.
Nevertheless, there may
be at least two ways in which the Administration's announcement
will have legal significance. First, Article 86 of the
Rome Statute provides that parties to the treaty shall
"cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court,"
and other articles in the treaty provide that the Court
may formally request even nonparties to provide assistance
to the Court and to surrender suspects to the Court.
One possible effect of the Administration's announcement
will be to preclude an argument that the United States
would be violating its duty not to defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty if, in some future case, it rejects
a request for assistance by the Court. In fact, the same
day that the Bush Administration made its announcement,
Pierre-Richard Prosper, the State Department's ambassador
for war crimes, stated that the Court should not expect
assistance from the United States. Another possible effect
of the Administration's announcement concerns the Court's
jurisdiction. Article 12 of the treaty allows the Court
to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party
countries if the crime is committed in the territory of
a party country. The Administration's announcement might
remove any basis for parties to the treaty to argue that
the United States, by signing the treaty, has waived objection
to the trial of US citizens in this situation.
Contrary
to some press reports, the Bush Administration, in announcing
its intent not to ratify the Rome Statute, did not renounce
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Although
the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention,
US officials have often indicated that they accept at
least much of the Convention as reflecting binding customary
international law.
[7] Moreover, Mr. Bolton's contention that the
Administration's announcement would mean that the United
States "has no legal obligations arising from its signature"
appears to have been an implicit reference to the object
and purpose requirement in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention.
Of course, it is open to question whether Mr. Bolton's
statement reflected an acceptance of Article 18 or merely
an abundance of caution on the part of the Administration.
Under either interpretation, however, the statement was
not a renunciation of the Vienna Convention. Finally,
in Mr. Grossman's remarks to the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, he stated that the Administration's
actions were "consistent with the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties." As discussed above, this statement
appears to be correct.
About
the Author:
Curtis Bradley is a Professor of Law and the Hunton &
Williams Research Professor at the University of Virginia.
He has written numerous articles on international law
and U.S. foreign relations law, and he is the co-author
of a forthcoming casebook, Foreign Relations Law:
Cases and Materials (Aspen Press 2002).
[6] See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 83 (2000).
[7] As far as I am aware, however, the United States has not expressly
accepted Article 18 of the Convention, and it is not clear
whether that Article reflects customary international
law. See Aust, supra, at 94; Lori F. Damrosch et al.,
International Law: Cases and Materials 476 (4th ed. 2001).
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