Status of Detainees
in International Armed Conflict, and their Protection in
the Course of Criminal Proceedings
By John Cerone
January 2002
Introduction
In light of the recent detentions of members
of the Taleban and Al-Qaeda, questions have been raised
as to what protections they are afforded under international
law. At the same time, attempting to apply existing
international law to the novel circumstances presented
by their cases yields substantial controversy and reveals
possible gaps in the law.
Analysis of those circumstances requires
resolution of questions for which international law
does not provide definitive answers or about which there
is no general agreement. Simply to determine the applicable
law, it is necessary to consider: which law applies
to an armed conflict between a state and a non-state
armed group based within another state or states; the
extent to which Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 (Protocol I) represents customary law; whether
human rights law continues to apply in full alongside
humanitarian law; and whether the law of international
armed conflict applies between a state and a de facto
government that has not attracted international recognition,
while the supposed de jure government has retained
its seat at the United Nations. If it is determined
that the law of international armed conflict applies,
one must then attempt to resolve a variety of issues
arising from the application of that law, such as whether
diversity of nationality is required for a combatant
to be entitled to Prisoner of War (POW) status; whether
individuals detained in the US by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service could be deemed internees under
the relevant provisions of humanitarian law; whether
US forces are occupying any part of Afghanistan for
the purposes of the Fourth Geneva Convention; and whether
Taleban fighters may be deemed "armed forces of a Party
to the conflict" under the Third Geneva Convention.
The purpose of this ASIL Insight is to
provide the basic legal framework surrounding some of
the controversial issues arising in the determination
of the applicable law, the status of detainees, the
relevant legal rights afforded under the applicable
law, and the operation of the proposed military commission(s).
I. Applicable Law
Whether or not international humanitarian
law, or the law of armed conflict, applied as from September
11, it clearly began to apply once the US started bombing
Afghanistan. Further, the conflict between the United
States and the Taleban, as de facto government of Afghanistan,
is international in nature. It is arguable that the
law of international armed conflict should also govern
relations between the Unites States and Al-Qaeda. [1] Thus, the remainder of this analysis proceeds on the assumption
that the law of international armed conflict applied
as between the United States and the Taleban and Al
Qaeda from October 7, 2001, if not before.
The primary sources of law relevant for
this analysis are the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
[2] The Conventions provide standards for the
treatment of persons not, or no longer, taking active
part in hostilities during a state of armed conflict
or occupation. The trial rights of detainees in the
present conflict are provided in the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions, dealing respectively with POWs and
civilians.
II. Status of detainees
The Geneva Conventions provide different
regimes of protection depending upon the status of a
particular individual under the Conventions. Special
rights in judicial proceedings are expressly provided
for those having the status of POW under the Third Convention
and, in certain circumstances, for "protected persons"
under the Fourth Convention.
POWs
Article 4 of the Third Convention sets
forth the requirements for POW status. [3] In order to qualify, captured
individuals must fall into one of the enumerated categories,
the first two of which are particularly relevant here.
The first category is members of the armed forces of
a party to the conflict.
[4] While this may cover Taleban fighters, it
would probably not include members of Al Qaeda. The
second category includes members of other militias or
volunteer corps "belonging to a party to the conflict"
so long as they fulfill certain additional conditions,
including having a distinct sign, carrying arms openly,
and complying with the law of war. Given the types
of activities for which Al Qaeda has been alleged to
be responsible, it is unlikely that it fulfills these
conditions. However, Article 5 of the Third Convention
provides that in the event of "any doubt" as to whether
an individual is entitled to POW status, that individual
shall be treated as a POW "until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal."
Article 4 is silent on the issue of nationality. [5] While certain provisions of the Third Convention seem to imply
that a POW will necessarily have a different nationality
than that of his or her captors, there is no express
requirement of a diversity of citizenship. In addition,
there is precedent in US case-law for holding that US
nationals fighting with the enemy are not deprived of
POW status by virtue of their US citizenship. [6] There is however a line of cases from other jurisdictions
holding that nationals fighting for the enemy are not
entitled to POW status.
[7] A third possibility would be that such individuals
could be tried for treason, but otherwise retain the
protections of the Third Convention. [8]
The rights of POWs may not be renounced,
and the protection of the Third Convention continues
to apply to them until final release or repatriation.
"Protected Persons" Under the Fourth
Convention
While the Fourth Geneva Convention provides
a minimum of protection to all individuals throughout
the territories of all parties to the conflict, the
bulk of its protections are applicable only to "protected
persons" as defined in Article 4 of that Convention.
Article 4 defines protected persons as "those who, at
a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves,
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of
a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals."
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 excludes from
this definition nationals of a co-belligerent state,
as well as nationals of neutral states in the home territory
of a party to the conflict, so long as such states have
normal diplomatic representation in the state in whose
hands they are. This exclusion does not apply to nationals
of neutral states who find themselves in occupied territory.
Such individuals qualify as protected persons irrespective
of the status of diplomatic relations between their
state of nationality and the state in whose hands they
are.
Generally, individuals not qualifying
for POW status under the Third Convention will qualify
as "protected persons" so long as they meet the nationality
requirement. Thus, those persons taking part in hostilities
who do not qualify as lawful combatants will qualify
for the protection of the Fourth Convention if they
fall within Article 4.
Further, notwithstanding the diversity
of nationality requirement, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has developed a doctrine
whereby individuals who do not technically meet the
nationality requirement of Article 4 may still qualify
as protected persons in situations where they may be
assimilated to an enemy state. As opposed to relying
on formal national characterizations, this interpretation
of nationality turns on the "substantial relations"
between an individual and an enemy state, taking into
consideration such factors as ethnicity, allegiance,
and other bonds with the enemy state. [9] This doctrine is particularly important in light of the number
of foreigners alleged to be fighting with the Taleban
or Al Qaeda. If such individuals are determined to
be ineligible for POW status or do not meet the nationality
test for protected persons, [10] there would be an argument for assimilating
them to enemy nationality for the purpose of protection
under the Fourth Convention.
Finally, the rights afforded to protected
persons will vary depending upon their circumstances.
While some rights are afforded generally to protected
persons in the home territory of a party to the conflict,
a more extensive catalog of rights is provided to such
individuals if they have been interned. [11]
Extensive protection is also afforded
to protected persons in occupied territory. In this
regard, it is important to note the low threshold for
application of the provisions of the Fourth Convention
concerning occupied territory. The ICRC Commentary
appears to take the position that these provisions apply
to the extent a party to the conflict exercises control
over protected persons in the territory of the other
party. [12]
According to this interpretation, any protected
persons taken into custody by US forces in Afghanistan
would be covered by these provisions, and this analysis
proceeds on that assumption.
Others
Individuals ineligible for POW status
who also fail to qualify as protected persons benefit
from the protection of Article 75 of Protocol I to the
extent that it may be regarded as customary law. [13] Article 75 is intended to be a residual provision applying
to all persons who do not receive greater protection
under other provisions of international law.
III. Trial Rights Afforded
Crimes under domestic as well as international
law [14] were clearly committed on September 11. Criminal proceedings
based upon those attacks have already commenced. In
the event a detainee is prosecuted, the accused is afforded
trial rights under both human rights
[15] and humanitarian law.
Human Rights Law
For the United States, the relevant provisions
of human rights law would include, inter alia,
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. That article provides comprehensive
protection, guaranteeing such rights as: equality before
courts and tribunals; the right to a fair hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law; the presumption of innocence; the right to counsel
of the accused's choice; the right to appeal to a higher
tribunal; the right to call and examine witnesses; the
free assistance of an interpreter; and freedom from
compelled self-incrimination.
As human rights law is subject to derogation,
it is imperative to consider also the rights provided
under humanitarian law, which is not generally [16] subject to derogation.
Humanitarian Law
Trial rights afforded under humanitarian
law depend upon the status of the accused and the nature
of the crime for which he or she is being tried.
a. POWs
POWs benefit from the customary law of
combatant immunity. As combatants have been authorized
to use force, they may not be prosecuted for common
crimes committed in the context of hostilities. Thus,
they may be prosecuted only for violations of the law
of armed conflict or for crimes that are unrelated to
the hostilities.
In any prosecution, they are guaranteed
the protections outlined in Articles 82 to 108 of the
Third Convention. These provisions require, inter alia,
that POWs be tried by the same courts according to the
same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power; that they only be sentenced
to the same penalties that would apply to members of
the Detaining Power's armed forces for the same acts;
that capital punishment not be carried out prior to
the expiry of a waiting period of at least six months;
and that accused persons be granted the same right of
appeal as that open to members of the armed forces of
the Detaining Power. Article 105 provides for the rights
of defense including: the right to counsel of the accused's
choice, the right to confer privately with counsel,
the right to call witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.
b. "Protected Persons"
Under the Fourth Convention
In the course of judicial proceedings,
protected persons who have been interned or are in occupied
territory are entitled to the protection of Articles
71 to 76 of the Fourth Convention. These rights include:
the right to a regular trial; the right to counsel of
the accused's choice, who must be able to visit the
accused freely and be provided with the necessary facilities
for preparing the defense; the right to call witnesses;
the right to an interpreter and to request replacement
of an interpreter; the right of appeal "provided for
by the laws applied by the court"; the right to be visited
by the delegates of the Protecting Power [17] and the ICRC; and the right
to be detained and serve sentences in the occupied territory.
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article
70, protected persons in occupied territory may not
be prosecuted for acts committed prior to occupation,
with the exception of war crimes. Protected persons
in the home territory of a party to the conflict who
are not interned are not provided any specific judicial
guarantees.
c. Others
All those who do not benefit from greater
protection under the Third or Fourth Conventions are
entitled to the protection of Article 75 of Protocol
I to the extent its provisions embody customary law.
The trial rights contained therein apply to any penal
proceedings arising out of offenses related to the armed
conflict. Article 75(4) requires that proceedings be
conducted before an "impartial and regularly constituted
court respecting the generally recognized principles
of regular judicial procedure." Those principles are
deemed to include a range of procedural rights, such
as provision of "all necessary rights and means of defence";
the right to be presumed innocent; freedom from compelled
self-incrimination; and the right to be advised of remedies.
Article 75(4) also prohibits ex post facto application
of criminal law and requires respect for the principle
of non bis in idem.
The inclusion of the presumption of innocence
in Article 75 is particularly significant, as it is
absent from the Third and Fourth Conventions. While
POWs and protected persons receive greater protection
generally under the Third and Fourth Conventions, they
are not precluded from availing themselves of this or
any other additional protection provided by Article
75. [18]
d. Anyone prosecuted
for violations of the Geneva Conventions
Any person prosecuted for violations of
the Geneva Conventions, [19] irrespective of his or her
status under humanitarian law, must be provided with
"safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall
not be less favorable than" those outlined in Articles
105 and following of the Third Convention.
[20] These include the same rights of defense
and appeal as those afforded to POWs. [21] The relevance here of whether the law of
international armed conflict applied as of September
11 is clear. Any individuals prosecuted for violations
of the Geneva Conventions arising from the September
11 attacks must be provided these rights.
IV. Implications for the Operation
of the Proposed Military Commissions
Notwithstanding the fact that the proposed
military commissions will be specifically authorized
to prosecute violations of the laws of war, very few
of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under humanitarian
law are expressly provided for in the Military Order
authorizing their establishment. While further elaboration
of the rights of the accused may be expected in the
rules of procedure to be issued by the Secretary of
Defense, certain provisions of the Military Order may
already be problematic if they are construed to limit
the capacity of the Secretary to enact rules conforming
to the requirements of human rights and humanitarian
law.
The failure to guarantee the rights enumerated
above may itself constitute a war crime. Indeed, if
this failure amounts to willfully depriving a POW or
a protected person of the rights of a fair and regular
trial "prescribed in the present Convention," the person(s)
responsible for such failure will have committed a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions.
[22]
About the Author: Executive
Director, War Crimes Research Office, American University
Washington College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Ewen Allison and Cecile Meijer for research assistance.
The author can be reached at JCerone@wcl.american.edu.
[1] It is not clear under international
law whether the law of international or non-international
armed conflict should govern hostilities between a
state and a non-state group residing abroad. It is
arguable that by waging battle on another state's
territory and simultaneously targeting, if not conflating,
Al-Qaeda and the Taleban, the US should be bound by
the law of international armed conflict in relation
to both groups.
[2] The United States is not a
party to either of the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions. Relevant portions of Protocol
I will, however, be mentioned to the extent that they
may be deemed to represent customary law.
[3] While Article 44 of Protocol
I broadens entitlement to POW status, that provision
has been specifically rejected by the US and most
likely does not represent customary law.
[4] The lack of recognition of
the Taleban by the US would not appear to deprive
Taleban fighters of POW status. Article 4(A)(3) includes
"Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recognized by
the Detaining Power."
[5] Contrast Article 4 of the Fourth
Convention which expressly requires a diversity of
nationality in order for civilians to qualify as "protected
persons" under that Convention.
[6] In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142
(1946) (US citizen who was member of Italian armed
forces captured during WWII retained POW status).
[7] See, e.g., P v. Oie Hee Koi,
1 All ER 419 (1968).
[8] Support for this position may
perhaps be inferred from ICRC Commentary to art. 70
of the Fourth Convention, p.351. In this regard,
it should be noted that even those convicted of war
crimes retain their status as POWs. See Third Geneva
Convention, art. 85.
[9] See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-96-21-A, 20 February
2001. As that doctrine was applied in the context
of inter-ethnic conflict, it would require some extension
to apply in the present situation.
[10] For example, an Al Qaeda member
of Italian citizenship residing in the US and alleged
to have participated in the September 11 attacks would
not technically qualify as a protected person. Nor
would aBritish national fighting with Al Qaeda
in Afghanistan, since the UK may be regarded as a
CO-belligerent However, nationals of neutral countries
present in Afghanistan are protected persons.
[11] As the Geneva Conventions apply
to factual situations independent of the labels attached
to those situations by Parties to the conflict, it
may be argued that the recent INS detentions constitute
de facto internment for the purposes of the Fourth
Convention.
[12] ICRC Commentary to art. 6 of
the Fourth Convention, p. 60 ("Even a patrol which
penetrates into enemy territory without any intention
of staying there must respect the Conventions in its
dealings with the civilians it meets. When [the patrol]
withdraws, for example, it cannot take civilians with
it, for that would be contrary to Article 49 which
prohibits the deportation or forcible transfer of
persons from occupied territory. The same thing is
true of raids made into enemy territory or on his
coasts. The Convention is quite definite on this point:
all persons who find themselves in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals are protected persons. No loophole
is left.")
[13] Support for the proposition
that the fair trial provisions of Article 75 are declaratory
of customary law, see ICRC Commentary to art. 75 of
Protocol I, para. 3084 (Article 75 regarded as elaboration
of fair trial provision of Common Article 3, the customary
nature of which is well-established).
[14] It may be possible to classify
the attacks as crimes against humanity or, if the
law of armed conflict is deemed to apply to those
attacks, war crimes. The attacks could constitute
murder as a crime against humanity if the scale and
coordination of the attacks could be deemed to fulfill
the required element of a "widespread or systematic"
attack. Possible war crimes would include: perfidious
attack, murdering civilians, and targeting civilian
objects.
[15] It is arguable
that human rights law fully applies in times of armed
conflict in the absence of a legitimate and formally
pronounced derogation by the state or states concerned.
See, e.g., Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137,
Report Nș 55/97, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95
Doc. 7 rev. at 271 (1997). While states may derogate
from certain human rights obligations when faced with
a public emergency that threatens the life of the
nation, strict limitations apply. See General Comment
29 (2001) of the Human Rights Committee. Further,
the US does not appear to have lodged any derogation
with respect to the present conflict.
[16] While states may derogate from
certain obligations with respect to particular individuals,
general derogation is not permitted. Even where selective
derogation is permitted, trial rights are regarded
as non-derogable.
[17] A Protecting Power is a neutral
state appointed by a party to the conflict to help
monitor compliance with the Geneva Conventions and
to protect the interests of that state vis-a-vis the
enemy state.
[18] See ICRC Commentary
to art. 75, para. 3142 ("In case of doubt, the defendant
can always invoke the most favorable provision.")
[19] It is unclear whether this obligation
could be avoided by charging the accused with common
crimes based upon conduct that constitutes a violation
of the Geneva Conventions. Given the little weight
accorded to labels by the Geneva Conventions, the
better view may be that the obligation turns not on
the precise charge but on the nature of the underlying
offense.
[20] See Fourth Convention, art.
146, common to the four conventions. See also ICRC
Commentary to art. 75 of Protocol I, para. 3142.
[21] Accused persons must also be
allowed the benefit of assistance from the Protecting
Power, should one exist. Third Convention, art. 105
and 107.
[22] Third Convention, art. 130; Fourth
Convention, art. 147.
_________________________________________________________________________
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