If the persons responsible for the hijacking of the commercial
jets and the subsequent intentional crashes into the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 can be identified
and apprehended, they could face prosecution in virtually
any country that obtains custody of them.
Moreover, the widely ratified Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft makes
aircraft hijacking an international criminal offense. It
applies to accomplices as well as to the hijackers themselves.
The Convention requires each contracting state to take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the offense when the offense is committed on board
an aircraft registered in that state, or when the aircraft
lands in that state with the offender on board, or when
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it
does not extradite him to one of the other states just mentioned.
The offense is deemed to be extraditable under any extradition
treaty in force between contracting states.
The use of the hijacked aircraft as lethal
weapons, resulting in the deaths of hundreds if not thousands
of persons, may be a crime against humanity under international
law. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, which
is in the process of obtaining the necessary ratifications
to enter into force, defines a crime against humanity as
any of several listed acts "when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack." The acts include
murder and "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health."
Even though the International Criminal Court
is not yet functioning, terrorist acts amounting to crimes
against humanity would be subject to prosecution in domestic
criminal courts around the world. The United States would
have jurisdiction under customary international law to proscribe
such terrorist acts that occur within its own borders and
to prosecute the offenders under federal anti-terrorism
statutes already in force. Other countries could exercise
what is known as universal jurisdiction. This means that
any country may make such terrorist acts criminal offenses
under its own law, and may prosecute the offenders if they
are within its custody.
The United Nations Security Council has tried
in the past to facilitate the surrender of suspected terrorists
for prosecution. It has imposed sanctions on Libya to induce
the surrender of suspects in the bombing of the Pan American
aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland, and on Afghanistan to
induce the surrender of Osama bin Laden to the United States
or any other country where he has already been indicted
for alleged terrorist activities.
International law issues could arise if and
when the United States or any of its allies takes countermeasures
against a country suspected of harboring the persons responsible
for the terrorist acts of September 11. The issues would
be particularly acute if the countermeasures are in the
form of armed action. Armed reprisals are highly questionable
under the United Nations Charter (a treaty to which the
United States is a party) because of its strong emphasis
on peaceful resolution of disputes. Nevertheless, article
51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes "the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." Thus, if the coordinated
use of force to hijack and use large airliners loaded with
fuel to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon can
be classified as an armed attack against the United States,
and if it is necessary to take countermeasures involving
the use of armed force in order to prevent further attacks,
the United States arguably could use force under article
51 until such time as the Security Council can act to maintain
international peace and security.
The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) parties,
by invoking article 5 of that Treaty, have expressed their
understanding that an armed attack against the United States
occurred. Article 5 requires the NATO parties to assist
the attacked country in the exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter,
but it does not specify the action to be taken. It does
say that the action could involve the use of armed force.
If the party responsible for the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is not the government
of the country from which the terrorists operate, a question
could arise whether use of armed force that causes injury
to that country is lawful. The UN Charter was not drafted
with such situations in mind. An argument can be made,
however, that the principle of article 51 could extend to
such a case if the government is knowingly harboring the
terrorists.
Any use of force in self-defense would have
to be roughly proportional to the use of force defended
against.
About the Author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law School Association Alumni Professor
at Washington and Lee University School of Law. He has written
a book and several articles on United Nations law, and is
a member of the Board of Editors of the American Journal
of International Law.
Addendum to ASIL Insight on Terrorist
Attacks By Gregory H. Fox
September 2001
I would like to add a short addendum to Professor Frederic
Kirgis's very useful ASIL Insight on the terrorist attacks
against the World Trade Center and Pentagon. President
Bush has stated that in considering its response to these
acts, the United States will make no distinction between
perpetrators of the acts and the states that harbor them.
As Professor Kirgis rightly points out, absent authorization
by the Security Council, any armed reprisal by the United
States against "harboring" states could only
be justified as an act of self-defense. However, the UN
Security Council appears to be on record as having rejected
such a justification.
On October 1, 1985 Israeli planes bombed the headquarters
of the Palestine Liberation Organization at Hammam-Plage,
near Tunis, Tunisia. In explaining its action to the Security
Council, Israel argued that the bombing was justified
by Tunisia having knowingly harbored terrorists who had
targeted Israel:
A country cannot claim the protection of sovereignty
when it knowingly offers a piece of its territory for
terrorist activity against other nations, and that is
precisely what happened here. Tunisia knew very well what
was going on in this extraterritorial base, the planning
that took place there, the missions that were launched
from it, and the purposes of those missions: repeated
armed attacks against my country and against innocent
civilians around the world. Tunisia, then, actually provided
a base for murderous activity against another State and,
in fact, the nationals of many States who are the objects
and victims of this terrorist organization.
The protection of sovereignty cannot be claimed by any
Government when it makes available such facilities, especially
against the State that must protect itself.
UN Doc. S/PV.2615, at 86-7 (Oct. 4, 1985) (statement
of Mr. Netanyahu).
The Security Council evidently rejected this claim and
voted in Resolution 573 to condemn the Israeli action
by a margin of 14-0, with the United States abstaining.
The resolution condemned "vigorously the act of armed
aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory
in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations,
international law and norms of conduct." It described
the air raid as a "threat to peace and security in
the Mediterranean region." The resolution further
requested UN member states "to take measures to dissuade
Israel from resorting to such acts against the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all States." Finally,
it stated "Tunisia has the right to appropriate reparations
as a result of the loss of human life and material damage."
Gregory H. Fox
Assistant Professor of Law
Chapman University School of Law
Addendum: War and Responses to
Terrorism
By Jordan Paust
September 2001
Under international law, we could not be at "war"
with an entity that has a status less than that of an insurgent
(which status pertains during an insurgency or armed conflict
not of an international character within the meaning of
common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions), unless
that entity is directly involved with others engaged in
a "war". If we are fighting insurgents, we would
be at "war" in at least one sense-regarding application
of certain laws of war. We would clearly be at "war"
if we are fighting a "belligerent" (which must
have outside recognition as an entity with such a status,
as in the case of the U.S. Civil War upon recognition of
the Confederate States of America as a "belligerent"
by Great Britain), and all of the laws of war would apply
to such an armed conflict. We could also be at war with
a state (e.g., Iraq) or nation (e.g., a group of people
recognizably having such a status even though they have
no territorial base and there is no recognition of relevant
statehood status, as in the case of certain U.S.-Indian
wars in the 18th or 19th centuries). We could not be at
"war" with Osama bin Laden, since he and his entourage
are in no way representatives or leaders, et al., of an
"insurgency" within the meaning of international
law. He is also not a recognized leader of a "nation,"
"belligerent," or "state". We are in
fact engaged in an armed conflict of an international character
with Iraq, a continual use of force during which all laws
of war apply even though there is no formal US declaration
or recognition of "war".
Assassination during an armed conflict is a war crime,
subject to universal jurisdiction and nonimmunity from
criminal or civil sanctions. However, the US Army Field
Manual 27-10, para. 31, recognizes that selective targeting
of individual soldiers or officers (proper military targets)
is not assassination, although "putting a price upon
an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy
'dead or alive'" is a war crime. In times of armed
conflict or relative peace, assassination is also impermissible
extra-judicial killing that constitutes a serious violation
of customary and treaty-based human rights law, also implicating
universal jurisdiction and nonimmunity.
In case of an armed attack or process of armed attacks
on the United States, whether or not a war or armed conflict
exists, the targeting of nonstate or state leaders and
entities in charge of or directly engaged in the attack
is a permissible measure of self-defense under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, a treaty of the United
Sates. A self-defense military mission to capture and
arrest those ordering and directly engaged in ongoing
processes of attack would also be permissible under the
Charter.
Jordan Paust is Law Foundation Professor and the Law Center
of the University of Houston.
Comment: Acts of War and State
Responsibility in 'Muddy Waters': The Non-state Actor Dilemma
By John Cerone
September 2001
In his remarks above, Professor Kirgis has identified
issues of state responsibility and individual criminal
responsibility under international law that arise in the
wake of the horrific events of September 11. Indeed,
it is the link (or lack thereof) between these two types
of responsibility that makes this case particularly complex.
If the perpetrators were state agents sent by their government
to carry out these attacks, then calling this an "act
of war" and holding that government responsible for the
attacks would not be particularly remarkable. However,
as it appears that the acts were committed by non-state
actors, novel legal issues arise.
Framework
Traditionally, public international law governs relations
between states. However, with the development of international
criminal law in the 20th century, international
law has been applied directly to individuals (i.e. human
beings) in very limited criminal contexts. It is clear
that the individuals who perpetrated the attacks committed
a crime under international law. This fact, however,
is separate from the questions of whether those attacks
were acts of war or whether any state bears responsibility
for the acts of the perpetrators.
The bulk of the laws of war, embodied in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocols thereto, are predominantly concerned
with interstate armed conflict. Among the four Conventions,
only 'Common Article 3' expressly applies to non-interstate
armed conflict. [1]
In cases falling within Common Article 3, the government
and the non-state armed groups who are parties to the
conflict are bound by the standards contained therein.
However, that article essentially contemplates internal
armed conflict, i.e. conflict occurring within the territory
of one state. In this case, we appear to have neither
interstate armed conflict nor internal armed conflict
but a group or groups of non-state actors who are likely
based abroad, possibly in several countries, launching
an attack against a state. It doesn't fit the model that
international law provides. While there is some historical
precedent, the law is far from clear in such a situation.
At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that
international law is highly adaptive and subject to dynamic
interpretation.
Is it 'war'?
The Geneva Conventions do not speak in terms of war.
The phrase used is armed conflict. One of the strengths
of the Geneva Conventions is that they apply on the facts.
Thus, a formal declaration of war is not necessary to
trigger their application so long as an armed conflict
in fact exists. However, the Conventions themselves do
not set forth a definition for armed conflict.
Certain factors provide a basis for arguing that a state
of armed conflict has arisen. First, the US considers
itself to have been the victim of an act of war. This
is supported by the fact that NATO has activated Article
5 of its Charter, which commits the member states to assist
if any member state has been subjected to an armed attack.
Article 5 requires each NATO member state, "in exercise
of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations," to assist the attacked state by taking "such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force," to restore and maintain security. Clearly, NATO
has determined that the US has been subjected to an armed
attack sufficient to give rise to the right of self-defense
under international law as recognized in the UN Charter. [2] In this regard, it is also noteworthy that the UN Security
Council, in its resolution condemning the attacks, "recognize[d]
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
in accordance with the Charter."
Ultimately, to determine whether a state of armed conflict
has arisen, it may well be necessary to wait and see if
the US responds with armed force. For example, if the
US were to respond to these events with a purely criminal
justice approach (i.e. a criminal investigation seeking
extradition and not involving the use of military force),
albeit transnational, then it would not amount (or have
amounted) to an armed conflict. If the US employs military
force against the perpetrators, then it may amount to
armed conflict. If the US uses military force against
a state in its efforts to obtain the perpetrators, then
an interstate armed conflict will have arisen between
the US and that state.
Implications of classifying the events as 'acts of
war'
If a state of armed conflict has arisen, then the parties
to that conflict would be bound by the laws of war. The
laws of war would place additional legal restraints
on the US in the conduct of its operations and in its
treatment of the perpetrators. However, if they were
acts of war and if the responsibility of a state
can be established with respect to those acts, as will
be discussed below, then military force could lawfully
be used against that state. [3]
Is the US entitled to "make no distinction between
the terrorists who committed these acts and those who
harbor them"?
While the phrase "those who harbor them" is amenable
to a variety of interpretations, it likely was intended
to refer to states that harbor terrorists. If
the phrase merely referred to the harboring of terrorists
by other non-state actors and the treatment of the latter
before US courts, then it would simply be a restatement
of accomplice liability under American criminal law.
If the phrase does indeed refer to the harboring of terrorists
by states, then it may illustrate a conflation of the
international responsibility of the state with the criminal
responsibility of individual perpetrators.
In order for the US to take countermeasures, it must
first establish that the state against which it is taking
countermeasures has committed an internationally wrongful
act (e.g. the breach of an international legal obligation).
Even if the commission of an internationally wrongful
act is established, such countermeasures must be proportionate
and may not involve the use of armed force. [4] In light of the UN Charter's prohibition on the use
of force, recourse to armed force may only be made in
self-defense under Article 51.
There are different modes in which the responsibility
of a state can arise with respect to the acts of non-state
actors. For example, if a state is harboring one or more
of the terrorists, then it will be in breach of its international
legal obligation to prosecute or extradite the offender(s).
Such a breach would entitle the US to take proportionate
countermeasures, not involving the use of force, against
the offending state.
In some instances, the acts of non-state actors may be
attributed to a state. In such cases, the state may be
treated as having committed the acts perpetrated by the
non-state actors. While it is well established that an
international obligation may be breached through an act
or an omission, mere inaction would likely be insufficient
to give rise to state responsibility for the acts in this
case. According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
"The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct."
[5] However, international law, and human rights
law in particular, is moving toward lowering the threshold
for holding states accountable for the failure to prevent
violations by non-state actors. It is possible that the
US will argue that state acquiescence in a pattern of
conduct of non-state actors will be sufficient to attribute
such conduct to the state.
If the terrorist attacks can be attributed to a state,
then that state would be in breach of international law
and the US would be entitled to take countermeasures.
Further, as an armed attack, the US would be entitled
to use military force pursuant to Article 51 of the UN
Charter. [6]
Conclusion
In general, the system established by the UN Charter,
as with the bulk of public international law, does not
take cognizance of individuals and, as such, is not well
designed for responding to monstrous acts committed by
non-state actors.
It is highly unlikely that the use of these phrases by
high government officials was the result of carelessness.
If the acts committed were acts of war, and if states
harboring perpetrators may be deemed to be themselves
perpetrators, then the legal groundwork has been established
for the use of armed force against those states. The
use of these phrases is part of the process of developing
international law, and specifically, of adapting it to
the changing nature of warfare.
John Cerone is Executive Director of the War Crimes Research
Office at American University Washington College of Law.
He can be reached at jcerone@wcl.american.edu.
___________________________________________ [1] While Protocol II also applies to non-international armed
conflict, it provides significantly less protection to
individuals than does Protocol I, which is applicable
only in international armed conflict or occupation. Note,
however, that the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, such as in the Tadic case,
has greatly expanded the scope of norms applicable in
non-international armed conflict. [2] It should be noted, however, that several European NATO
members have evinced a reluctance to refer to the attacks
as acts of war. [3] In addition, action taken by military forces during armed
conflict is expressly excluded from the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
which might otherwise impose restrictions on states responding
to terrorist attacks. While the United States is not a
party to this convention, it has signed the convention,
thus undertaking the obligation not to defeat the object
and purpose of the convention. [4] The International Court of Justice has elaborated other
conditions for the employment of counter-measures. The
state seeking to employ countermeasures must have first
called upon the state committing the wrongful act to discontinue
its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. In
addition, the purpose of the counter-measure must be to
induce the wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations
under international law. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project
(1997). [5] While the Draft Articles are not binding law, they are
largely in accord with decisions of the International
Court of Justice and are highly persuasive evidence of
the state of customary law. [6] If a state of armed conflict arises, we would no longer
be in the realm of countermeasures and the laws of war
would apply. Hence, the US would not be limited to a
single response and, while the US would have to abide
by the proportionality requirements of humanitarian law,
the proportionality requirement of countermeasures would
not apply.
Referring to Prof. Kirgis' thought provoking views on
the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington
D.C., I wish to make the following friendly observations
concerning his reference to the Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970. While
it is certainly correct to make reference to that convention,
it might also be worthwhile to consider its jurisdictional
limitations, and for that matter also those of some of
the other related treaties he did not cite, such as the
1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
committed on Board Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation. All of these may be relevant to the
question of the hijacking and subsequent destruction of
the four aircraft. However, these treaties relate primarily
to acts committed either on board or to the aircraft itself
and not necessarily to the possibility of the aircraft
being used as a weapon of broader destruction. Therefore,
extending the scope of these treaties to cover the destruction
of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon, as
well as the massive loss of life in those buildings and
the causing of a state of terror in the general public,
could only be done with difficulty.
There are, however, two additional, more recently adopted,
treaties that may be of some relevance. The first is the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1997. The treaty recently entered into force
(on 23 May 2001), and currently has 58 signatories and
25 parties. The United States signed the treaty on 12
January 1998, but has not yet ratified it. The treaty
shares many of the attributes of the Hague Convention,
including an extradite or try regime. Indeed, many of
its provisions were modeled on prior conventions like
the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal conventions, to name a few.
Under article 2, a person commits an offence within the
meaning of the convention if "that person unlawfully and
intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates
an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against
a place of public use, a State or government facility,
a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility.with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury..or..with
the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,
facility or system, where such destruction results in
or is likely to result in major economic loss." While
it is granted that the drafters had in mind the more (I
daresay) common bomb or other explosive device, it is
arguably not too much of a stretch to consider a plane
filled with tons of jet fuel and used as an explosive
missile as an "explosive device" within the scope of article
2. What is also of particular interest is its focus on
international mutual cooperation, including the sharing
of information (see article 15) and mutual legal assistance
(see article 10). Furthermore, the treaty itself forms
a basis for extradition in such cases, and, significantly,
it expressly excludes the application of the political
offence exemption in the context of extradition and mutual
legal assistance. Its scope also covers attempts, and
those participating in the acts as accomplices or by organizing
or directing others to commit such acts, and even includes
groups of individuals linked to the act by a common purpose.
Furthermore, much has been made of the vast international
networks that provide material and other assistance to
terrorists. In 1999, the General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, which, for the first time, does not focus
on any one particular manifestation of terrorism (hijacking,
bombing etc.), but rather is aimed at those individuals
that "by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully
and willfully, [provide] or [collect] funds with the intention
that they should be used" to commit terrorist acts (article
2). While notionally covered by the accomplice liability
provisions of the various existing "sectoral" anti-terrorism
treaties, the issue of the material support provided by
these networks was considered to be of such importance
in the fight against terrorism that it warranted its own
treaty. The treaty, which was in part modeled on the Terrorist
bombings convention, includes the now "standard" anti-terrorism
provisions, but also contains new provisions specific
to the financing of terrorism with a view to providing
States with the capability to counter these vast networks
which commonly traverse two or more international boundaries.
For example, provision is made for the possibility of
the criminal liability of legal persons (article 5), as
well as for the freezing and seizure of funds (article
8), and the prohibition on reliance on bank secrecy laws
as a ground for declining mutual legal assistance (article
12). The treaty also includes detailed provisions on the
conduct of financial institutions, based on the OECD's
FATF regulations on money laundering. While the Financing
of Terrorism treaty is not yet in force (it currently
only has 4 parties, and needs 22 for entry into force),
it is hoped that it will enter into force in the near
future, and that it will provide States with further muscle
in the fight against terrorism.
Arnold N. Pronto is an Associate Legal Officer in the
Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs of
the United Nations. The views expressed herein are entirely
those of the author and do not reflect the position of
the United Nations.
Addendum Relating to Self-Defense
By B. Welling Hall
September 2001
At a press conference on September 18, 2001, US Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the statement that nothing
prevents the United States from defending itself against
terrorism. This language alludes to Article 51 of the
UN Charter, recognizing that "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense . . ."
There are, however, authoritative views in international
law about what constitutes legitimate self-defense. One
of these arises from the Caroline case (1837).
In response to a border raid attack that killed two persons
when the US ship Caroline plunged over Niagara
Falls, Secretary of State Daniel Webster made the now
classic formulation that there must be "a necessity
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation" and that
responsive measures must be neither "unreasonable"
nor "excessive." The Caroline test, that
of "instant and overwhelming necessity," was
employed in the deliberations of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In affirming that Tribunal, the UN General Assembly voted
in favor of codifying the principles recognized in its
Charter and judgment.
Various sources of international law provide insight
into what constitutes "excessive force." In
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996), the International
Court of Justice held in paragraph 78:
States must never make civilians the object
of attack and consequently never use weapons that are
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military
targets. . . States do not have unlimited freedom of choice
of means in the weapons they use.
The principles and rules of humanitarian law include
specific prohibitions on causing "unnecessary suffering"
through activities such as starving noncombatants and
torturing prisoners to gain confessions. Article 48 of
the First 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention, Relating
to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed
Conflicts states a basic rule:
In order to ensure respect for and protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives.
The United States signed this Geneva Protocol on December
12, 1977, but has not yet ratified it. According to Article
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) States are required not to defeat the purpose of
a treaty that has been signed, but not yet ratified, unless
said treaty is explicitly renounced. It may additionally
be argued that the Geneva Protocols are a codification
of widely accepted customary law emanating from several
hundred years of just war theory, military practice, and
diplomatic exchange.
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (if not
the Pentagon) on September 11, 2001 pose the legal dilemma
of how to respond proportionally when the initial attack
was itself unreasonable, excessive, and against civilians.
Nonetheless, the suggested policy of holding entire nations
accountable for the acts of a few would not appear to
be lawful since collective punishment would, by definition,
entail the unnecessary suffering of innocent populations.
B. Welling Hall
Professor of Politics and International Studies
Earlham College
Clarification of Insight on Terrorist
Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
By Frederic L. Kirgis
September 20, 2001
The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft does not require a contracting state
to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses mentioned
in the Insight of September 12 unless the place of take-off
or the place of landing of the aircraft is outside the
territory of the state of its registration. The aircraft
in the September 11 attacks took off and ended their flights
in the state of their registration, the United States.
But the Convention does require a contracting state either
to extradite an offender (including an accomplice) or
to submit the case to its authorities for the purpose
of prosecution, whatever the place of takeoff or landing,
if the offender is found in a state other than the state
of the aircraft's registration. This latter provision
would thus apply to accomplices in the September 11 attacks,
if they are found outside the United States.
Addendum: Prosecution of Mr.
bin Laden et al. for Violations of International Law and
Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims By Jordan J. Paust
September 21, 2001
Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden and others acting outside
the United States in connection with the September 11th
terroristic attack on the United States and US nationals
is possible under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2331 et seq.). Section 2332 (a) is not applicable
to homicide as such because the section applies to "Whoever
kills a national of the United States" but adds the
limiting phrase "while such national is outside the
United States." Yet, such language would cover prosecution
of homicide against US nationals abroad in the case of
the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Section 2332 (b) does not
contain the limiting phrase noted above regarding the
location of US victims and can cover attempts and conspiracy
in connection with the killing of a national of the United
States (apparently anywhere) although the accused must
be "outside the United States at the time of the
attempt or engagement in a conspiracy to kill. Section
2332 (c) should also be applicable, since it reaches an
accused "outside the United States" who "engages
in physical violence-(1) with intent to cause serious
bodily injury to a national of the United States; or (2)
with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to
a national of the United States." Section 2332 (d)
requires written certification by the US Attorney General
"or the highest ranking subordinate" that such
offenses were "intended to coerce, intimidate, or
retaliate against a government or a civilian population"-a
certification that would be relatively easy to make.
Prosecution is also possible under US legislation implementing
the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 U.N.T.S.
177 (1971) (which in Article 7 thereof also requires all
signatories to bring into custody those reasonably accused
of international crimes covered by the treaty and either
to initiate prosecution of or to extradite such persons,
without any exception or limitation of such duty whatsoever).
18 U.S.C. § 32 (a) should be applicable to "[w]hoever
willfully-(1) ...destroys, disables, or wrecks, any aircraft
in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States"
and to whoever "(5) performs an act of violence against
or incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft....",
and such persons should include coconspirators who were
involved in the wilful destruction of US commercial aircraft
flying within US airspace.
Since international terrorism and crimes against humanity
are international crimes over which there is universal
jurisdiction and a universal responsibility either to
initiate prosecution of or to extradite those reasonably
accused, the United States should also be able to enact
new legislation that operates retroactively for prosecution
of what were already recognizable international crimes
under customary international law and such legislation
should not be challengeable under prohibitions of ex post
facto laws. The permissibility of such retroactive legislation
was affirmed, for example, in the Eichmann case in Israel
(1962) (also addressing similar rulings in the Netherlands
and Germany), the US extradition decision in Demjanjuk
v. Petrovsky (1985), and by the Executive officials applying
the 1863 Lieber Code to acts that were already war crimes
under customary international law (see DIGEST OF OPS.
OF JAG, ARMY 244 (1866); Paust, Bassiouni, et al., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 244-48 (2 ed. 2000)). Certain persons accused
of international crimes before the International Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far East made claims
that Charters of the Tribunals incorporating such crimes
were violative of ex post facto or nullum crimen sine
lege precepts, but the Tribunals correctly ruled that
the crimes existed under international law at the time
of their commission and no such precepts were violated.
Civil lawsuits are also possible under the Antiterrorism
Act, assuming that Mr. bin Laden or others outside the
US are captured and brought to the United States and process
has been served. Section 2333 allows civil remedies in
a lawsuit brought by "[a]ny national of the United
States injured in his or her person, property, or business,
by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his
or her estate, survivors, or heirs, ... and [such plaintiff]
shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains
and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees."
The latter provision is one always of interest to plaintiffs'
lawyers who might handle such lawsuits on a contingent
fee basis. The main problem after winning such a lawsuit
will involve execution of a judgment on any properties
of the defendant(s) located within the United States (no
real problem) or execution abroad (at the discretion of
some foreign court). Perhaps bank accounts of Mr. bin
Laden and his entourage could be frozen not merely for
purposes of preventing the financing of terrorism, but
also for recompense and other damages for victims.
Foreign plaintiffs can also sue under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for any wrong
in violation of customary international law and/or treaties
of the United States (such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights or the Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation). Punitive damages are recoverable in
such lawsuits. Under the ATCA, they could also sue any
companies or corporations complicit in relevant violations
of international law, e.g., companies or corporations
used to finance terroristic attacks in violation of human
rights. Whether lawsuits by US or foreign plaintiffs are
possible under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),
106 Stat. 73 (1992), depends on interpretation of phrases
such as "extrajudicial killing" and whether
Mr. bin Laden and his entourage were acting "under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation" (such as Iraq). Of course, Mr. bin
Laden is not a leader of any foreign nation, state, belligerency,
or insurgency within the meaning of international law.
For reasons noted in another statement, if relevant
acts were committed by Mr. bin Laden and his entourage
without direct participation in any armed conflict, the
acts would not be war crimes. Also, they may not trigger
"war" exclusion clauses in various contracts
or insurance policies, depending on the language used.
If they were committed in direct connection with an armed
conflict (e.g., as an extension of the armed conflict
between Iraq and the US and other countries), prosecution
is possible under 10 U.S.C. §§ 818 and 821,
as supplemented for purposes of jurisdiction in the federal
courts by 18 U.S.C. § 3231, whether or not other
war crimes legislation is available alternatively. When
"grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(including "wilful killing, ...wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health...."
to persons protected by the Conventions) have been committed
by any person "inside or outside the United States"
against a US national, the War Crimes Act of 1996 (18
U.S.C. §2401) is operative.
Mr. bin Laden and others are also under indictment for
various other crimes in connection with the first bombing
of the World Trade Center, including conspiracy to murder
US nationals, to use weapons of mass destruction against
US nationals, to destroy US buildings and property, and
to destroy US defense utilities. See United States v.
Usama bin Laden, et al., 92 F. Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Jordan J. Paust
Law Foundation Professor
Law Center, University of Houston
Comment on Fox Addendum
By Said Mahmoudi September 24, 2001
Professor Fox's addendum to Professor Kirgis's comments
on the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC,
gives rise to further observations. Professor Fox refers
to the Security Council's Resolution 573 (1985) where
Israeli invocation of self-defense argument to justify
its attack on Tunisia for harboring Palestinians was vigorously
rejected by the Council. The Security Council, as a political
organ and unlike courts of law (in common law countries),
is not bound by its previous decisions. Each resolution
reflects the political conditions surrounding that specific
case. The ultimate goal of resolutions is expected, at
least formally, to keep or restore international peace
at the time of the adoption of the resolution.
The Security Council is now obviously faced with a situation
that profoundly differs from the situation in 1985 when
Palestinian groups carried out individual attacks on Israeli
targets, normally with limited casualties. That is why
the members of the Security Council, in their resolution
1368 (2001), in contradistinction to Resolution 573 (1985),
unanimously recognize the right of each State to individual
and collective self-defense in situations like the present
one in the US. The Security Council seems to equate terrorist
acts, or at least those that claim a great number of civilian
victims, with armed attacks in the sense of Article 51
of the UN Charter. Reference to the recent catastrophe
as "a threat to international peace" and talking
of "all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001" reinforce this impression.
We are probably witnessing a development of international
law, which, given the objectives of the UN Charter in
strict restriction of the use of force, does not necessarily
have to be a positive one.
Said Mahmoudi, LL.D.
Professor of International Law
Faculty of Law, Stockholm University
Addendum: Inter-American Regional
Security Against Terrorism: A Shield and a Sword By Montserrat Gorina-Ysern
Professor Kirgis and John Cerone have identified two
international law approaches to the terrorist acts of
Sept. 11. One approach adheres to legal process, considering
that the instigators of the hijackings, if apprehended,
could be charged for offenses committed under international
criminal law and "could face prosecution in virtually
any country that obtains custody of them." The other
approach involves the use of force on the understanding
that the US and its NATO allies consider that an armed
attack sufficient to trigger the exercise of the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense has occurred
within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The response by OAS member states against terrorism in
the hemisphere combines a shield and a sword, using legal
process as well as measures of a military nature. Two
issues that arise are whether OAS regional measures are
compatible with the principles and purposes of the UN
Charter and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and
whether the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty), [1] preeminently designed to combat communism in the Western
Hemisphere, can be effectively used to combat terrorism.
The OAS is a regional arrangement or agency within the
meaning of Article 52 of the UN Charter. At its special
session on Sept. 11, 2001, held in Peru, the OAS General
Assembly condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist
acts, which it regarded also as an attack on all the democratic
and free states of the world, and reiterated the need
to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat this scourge.
The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the OAS,
with extensive decision-making powers to determine the
organization's general action and policy in pursuance
of its essentially economic cooperation and human development
purposes.
A Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
convened by the Permanent Council (PC) of the OAS on Sept.
21 yielded a 12-point resolution.
[2] Points 1 to 4 restate earlier OAS statements
condemning the tragic events of Sept. 11. Point 5 asserts
that "actions to combat terrorism must be undertaken
with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and
democratic institutions in order to preserve the rule
of law, liberties and democratic values in the Hemisphere."
Point 6 urges members "to promote widespread tolerance
and social harmony within their societies in recognition
of the racial, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity"
of Hemispheric communities, "whose fundamental rights
and freedoms were reaffirmed most recently in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter." Ratification of the 1999 International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
is recommended (Point 7). Institutional arrangements involving
OAS-based specialized conferences and bodies with plans
of action against terrorism are dealt with in Points 8-12.
The PC will convene a meeting of the Inter-American Committee
Against Terrorism (CICTE), with support from the OAS Secretary-General
(Point 11), and produce a draft Inter-American Convention
Against Terrorism. The Committee on Hemispheric Security
is to expedite preparations for a Special Conference,
with input from CICTE, and make specific recommendations
to the PC (Point 10). The Inter-American Defense Board
is to provide advisory services to the Committee on Hemispheric
Security (Point 12).
The resolution's rights-based language, its broad endorsement
of institutional cooperation and its emphasis on "the
imperative need to expedite the extradition process"
of those responsible, appear to be compatible with the
purposes and principles of the UN and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter in combating international terrorism.
The OAS Charter has two further key purposes: to strengthen
peace and security on the continent and to provide for
common action in the event of aggression. [3] ''An act of aggression against one American State
is an act of aggression against all the other American
States"(Article 3h). Chapter VI provides for measures
of collective security based on the principles of continental
solidarity or collective self-defense, to the effect that
"Every act of aggression by a State [emphasis
added] against the territorial integrity or the inviolability
of the territory or against the sovereignty or political
independence of an American State shall be considered
an act of aggression against the other American States"
(Article 28). Though Article 28 refers to "aggression
by a State," the terms of Article 29 dealing with
armed attacks, acts of aggression falling short of an
armed attack, and "any other fact or situation that
might endanger the peace of the Americas" may cover
acts of aggression by non-State actors. The OAS Permanent
Council's specific reference on Sept. 19, to Article 65
("in case of an armed attack on the territory of
an American State"), indicates that the terrorist
acts of Sept. 11, apparently committed by non-State actors,
are regarded nonetheless as an "armed attack"
on US territory in the context of the OAS Charter. This
interpretation is reinforced by UN Security Council resolution
1368 (2001) and by NATO's invoking its Article 5, which
also refers to armed attacks.
The Rio Treaty (RT) was activated on September 21, when
the RT's Organ of Consultation,
[4] adopted a 9-point resolution. Points 1 and 3,
treating the terrorist attacks against the US as attacks
against all American States, call on all States Parties
to provide effective reciprocal assistance, including
additional assistance to each other, to address such attacks
and the threat of any similar attacks against any American
state, and to maintain the peace and security of the continent.
Point 2 obligates States to "use all legally available
means to pursue, capture, extradite and punish"
[emphasis added] any persons found in their territory
and believed to have been involved in or in any way to
have assisted the Sept. 11 attacks, or to be harboring
the instigators or otherwise involved in terrorist activities.
RT parties shall keep the Organ of Consultation properly
informed (Point 4), "for the purpose of ensuring
the prompt and effective implementation of this resolution
and, if necessary, of taking appropriate additional measures"
(Point 5). The newly created committee will be composed
of OAS representatives to the PC of each State Party to
the RT, "for the purpose of engaging in additional
consultations and of taking measures in furtherance of
the foregoing" (Point 6). The PC is charged with
implementing the measures adopted under the OAS Charter
(Point 8), and the UN Security Council shall be kept informed
of any resolutions adopted under the RT (Point 9).
If the rudder of respect for democracy, the rule of law,
and fundamental rights and freedoms that has steered Latin
American leaders in the last decade prevails, the shield
and sword of the Inter-American regional security system
may be transformed into a post-Cold War effective mechanism
against terrorism. For the time being, the reference to
the use of "all legally available means to pursue,
capture extradite and punish" the instigators under
the Rio Treaty, is reassuring.
Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, PhD
Adjunct and Research Assistant Professor,
School of International Service,
American University
[1] 21 UNTS 77, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947.
[2] Twenty-Third Meeting of Consultation OEA of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs/Ser. F/23. RC.23/RES.1/01, September
21, 2001, Washington, DC Original: Spanish. Adopted subject
to review by the Style Committee.
[3] The Charter of the Organization of American States, done
at Bogota on April 20, 1948, entered into force on December
13, 1951. The text used here reflects subsequent amendments
in 1967 (Protocol of Buenos Aires), 1985 (Protocol of
Cartagena de Indias), 1992 (Protocol of Washington), and
1993 (Protocol of Managua).
[4]
Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation in Application
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
RC.24/RES.1/01, September 21, 2001, Washington, DC, Original:
Portuguese.
Addendum: Security Council Adopts
Resolution on Combating International Terrorism By Frederic L. Kirgis
October 1, 2001
On September 28, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1373 on steps to combat international
terrorism. [1] Acting under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, the Security Council decided that all
states (not just United Nations member states) shall prevent
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalize
the willful financing of such acts, freeze the financial
assets or economic resources of persons and entities involved
in the commission of such acts, and prohibit their nationals
or any persons or entities within their territories from
making financial assets or economic resources available
for the benefit of persons involved in such acts. It
also decided that all states shall refrain from supporting
anyone involved in terrorist acts, take necessary steps
to prevent such acts (including early warning to other
states and exchange of information), deny safe haven to
those involved in such acts, prevent those involved in
such acts from using their territories for terrorist purposes,
ensure that any person who participates in such acts is
brought to justice, afford assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or other criminal proceedings
relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts,
and prevent the movement of terrorists by effective border
controls and other means.
Because the Security Council adopted these
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, all UN member
states are legally bound to implement them. Non-member
states, such as Switzerland, would not be formally bound
as a matter of treaty law, but would have adequate incentive
to comply.
Resolution 1373 also "calls upon" all states
to cooperate in several other ways to combat terrorism,
including by becoming parties to existing treaties relating
to terrorism. The resolution specifically mentions the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism of 9 December 1999. It is likely that this
part of the resolution will be considered recommendatory
rather than legally binding on member states, but in any
event they would be under considerable pressure to cooperate. [2]
Resolution 1373 also reaffirms that terrorist
acts constitute a threat to international peace and security,
and reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense as recognized by the Charter. This is not
a Security Council approval of the use of armed force
in self-defense as a response to the events of September
11, but it may be taken as an indication of the Security
Council's recognition that the right of self-defense could
arise from those events.
Resolution 1373 concludes with an expression
of the Security Council's determination to "take all necessary
steps" to ensure its full implementation. The quoted
words are reminiscent of the Council's authorization to
member states in Resolution 678 to "use all necessary
means" to restore international peace and security after
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. But Resolution 1373 does
not authorize states to take all necessary steps
to implement it. Instead, it stands as a warning that
the Council itself stands ready to take further steps,
which presumably could involve an authorization of some
form of armed force that would not necessarily be limited
to self-defense, to ensure that the measures taken in
the resolution are adequately implemented. Any further
Security Council resolution to that effect would have
to obtain the approval or acquiescence of all five permanent
members of the Council.
[1] Security Council Resolution 1373 may be found
on the United Nations web site, <www.un.org>.
[2] In a 1971 advisory opinion dealing in part with
a Security Council resolution that "called upon" all states
to refrain from dealing with the then-apartheid government
of South Africa when it acted on behalf of Namibia, the
International Court of Justice treated that part of the
resolution as binding on all UN member states. But the
Court said that the legal effect of each resolution must
be considered case by case, in light of all the circumstances.
The advisory opinion is Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia .
. . , 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16.
Comment: Security Council Authorization
to Combat Terrorism in Afghanistan
By Jordan J. Paust
October 23, 2001
My reading of Security Council Resolution 1373 is
different from that offered by Professor Kirgis. I do
not believe that use of the phrase "all necessary
means" is absolutely required in order for the
Security Council to authorize the use of armed force.
The Council can use any words it prefers to authorize
military and other action, although it is correct that
the phrase appears in a far earlier authorization of
armed force with respect to Iraq in Resolution 678 (29
Nov. 1990) and in Resolution 816 (31 Mar. 1993) regarding
the authorization to use military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Particularly relevant is the preambular reaffirmation
of "the need to combat by all means, in accordance
with the Charter," terroristic threats to international
peace and security. The reaffirmed "need to combat
by all means" (a phrase close to "all necessary
means") is at least relevant to interpretation
of paragraph 3 (c) of the resolution, which "Calls
upon all States to... Cooperate, particularly through
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements,
to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take
action against perpetrators of such acts."
I believe that such a call to action to prevent and
to suppress ongoing attacks can be fairly interpreted
to authorize military action to prevent and to suppress
and that the call to "take action against perpetrators"
is a broad enough call to include military action against
terrorist perpetrators. Further, this is a decision
of the Council in accordance with Article 39 of the
UN Charter.
As such, I believe that the President of the United
States also has an enhanced power to execute the authorization
on behalf of the United States, since the President
has both a constitutional duty and power faithfully
to execute law of the United States, which includes
UN Security Council decisions authorizing armed force
(especially in view of Articles 25 and 48 of the UN
Charter).
Jordan J. Paust
Law Center, University of Houston
100 Law Center
Houston, TX 77204-6060
If the United States had wished, it could have incorporated
into Resolution 1373 (28 Sept. 2001) language specifically
authorizing the use of force following, e.g., the language
used in Res. 678 (1990) and (as Professor Paust pointed
out in his Insight of October 23) in Res. 816 (1993).
Given the coalition of States which has emerged in support
of the fight against terrorism after the events of September
11, it cannot be assumed that a resolution containing
such language would have been vetoed or would have failed
to obtain the necessary majority.
It is reasonable to assume that the United States,
as a matter of choice, refrained from seeking such language
in Res. 1373. Obviously, the "inherent" right of self-defense
does not require prior authorization of the Security
Council. This right subsists "until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security" (Article 51). It would have been
felt unnecessary and, perhaps, to constitute an undesirable
precedent, to require specific Security Council authorization
in such a context.
The letter of 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of the US to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/946)
supports the foregoing analysis. This letter, which
specifically invokes Article 51, and presumably is in
compliance with the reporting obligation under Article
51, states inter alia that "United States armed forces
have initiated action designed to prevent and deter
further attacks on the United States." There is no
call for any action on the part of the Security Council.
The question whether Res. 1373, standing alone, is
authority for the use of force in and over Afghanistan
may now be academic in view of Res. 1378 of 14 November
2001. The latter inter alia supports "international
efforts to root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter
of the United Nations," and in this context reaffirms
Res. 1373. It also condemns "the Taliban for allowing
Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism
by the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and
for providing safe haven to Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida
and others associated with them," and in this context
supports "the efforts of the Afghan people to replace
the Taliban regime."
Surya Narayan Sinha
Poes Garden
Chennai -600086 India
Comment: Inter-American Regional
Security Against Terrorism: A Shield and a Sword By Andres E. Montalvo
November 30, 2001
Professor Gorina-Ysern portrays the responses of the
Inter-American System to the terrorists attacks, as
a combination of a "shield and a sword, using legal
process as well as measures of a military nature."
Actions following the Resolutions adopted under the
Twenty-third [1] and Twenty-fourth
[2] Meetings of Consultations of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on September 21, seem
to confirm this view.
In that context two aspects of each Resolution adopted
by the Ministers deserve further examination: (a) Paragraph
9 of RC 23 calling upon member States "[t]o entrust
the Permanent Council with preparing a draft Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism [.]," and (b) Future
actions taken by the Committee created under paragraph
6 of RC 24, "for the purpose of engaging in additional
consultations and of taking measures in furtherance
of the foregoing."
To start with the latter, the above-mentioned Committee
convened on October 16, and reassured its "willingness
to provide additional assistance and support to the
United States," and "to prevent future armed
attacks by terrorists." Of particular relevance
was the decision to fully support "the measures.
applied by the United States of America and other states
in the exercise of their inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense," creating a moral
coalition parallel to the US military campaign. The
Resolution underscores the legal pertinence of invoking
the Rio Treaty as a means to adopt actions not merely
in response to September 11, but to eventually tackle
future attacks.[3]
Some diplomats and international lawyers have not only
questioned the effectiveness of the Rio Treaty to effectively
combat terrorism but contested also its legal applicability.
They note that Article 3 refers to attacks "by
any state against an American state," and Article
6 refers to "an aggression which is not an armed
attack." They then argue that Article 3 is not
useful here because the suspect terrorist organization
that attacked US soil is not a state and, furthermore,
Article 6 is not applicable as the aggression was in
fact an armed attack.
One must also consider Article 9, bestowing the Organ
of Consultation with the competence to characterize
what constitutes an act of aggression. Therefore, one
may conclude that RC 24, adopted under the Rio Treaty,
exercises such competence in response to what the Meeting
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Organ of Consultation,
considered to be an attack to all American States.
Concerning the other issue, the preparation of the
draft Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism to
be presented to the next session of the OAS General
Assembly, the Permanent Council established a Working
Group to comply with the mandate noted above. The real
challenge in this regard consists not only in adopting
an effective instrument for legal cooperation, but to
contribute to the progressive development of international
law-in particular, to face squarely the question whether
wide spread and systematic acts of terrorism are crimes
against humanity and, consequently, should not be condoned
or even explained by any circumstance.
That is how the sword and the shield of the Inter-American
System can prevail.
Andres E. Montalvo
LL.M. Georgetown University, Alternate Representative
of Ecuador to the OAS. Affiliation for identification
purposes only. The opinions expressed are those of the
author alone and are not to be attributed to the Government
of Ecuador.
1. Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation
to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism,/Ser.F/23.
RC.23/RES.1/01, September 21, 2001. 2. Terrorist Threat to the Americas,
OEA/Ser.F/RC.24/RES.1/01, September 21, 2001. 3. Support for the Measures of Individual
and collective self-defense established in Resolution
RC.24/Res.1/01, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, CS/TIAR/RES.1/01, 16
October 2001
Addendum: Security Council
Resolutions 1377 (2001) and 1378 (2001) By Carsten Stahn
December 1, 2001
Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001)
have been interpreted in different ways. Some commentators
have argued that the Council has formally approved the
existence of a case of self-defense
[1] or authorized the exercise of self-defense
under Chapter VII of the Charter,
[2] while others have taken a more restrictive
view, making reference to the Council's own preparedness
to take measures for the maintenance of international
peace and security [3] or questioning whether the Council has gone
so far as to declare Art 51 of the Charter applicable
to the US-led strikes. [4] Security Council Resolutions
1377 (2001) and 1378 (2001) bring some further clarification.
The Council refrains once more from explicitly determining
whether and how the 11 September attacks may be linked
to the right of self-defense. The Council stresses that
"acts of international terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the Charter" (see paragraph
5 of the preamble of SC Resolution 1377), but does not
specify whether they may amount to an "armed attack."
The Representative of Norway has recently taken the
view that Resolution 1368 (2001) "triggered the right
to self-defense." [5] However, the language in Resolution 1368 ("Recognizing the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
in accordance with the Charter") does not appear in
Resolutions 1377 (2001) and 1378 (2001).
The Council expresses its support for the "international
efforts to root out terrorism" in paragraph two of the
preamble of Resolution 1378 (2001). But following the
example of paragraph five of Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001), this passage is neither framed in the operative
part of the resolution nor directly linked to Chapter
VII of the Charter. The continued absence of an explicit
authorization distinguishes the strikes against Afghanistan
from the military operations against Korea and Iraq.
Lacking a formal anchorage in the context of collective
security, they must rather be conceived as measures
of self-defense carried out under the framework of Art.
51 of the Charter.
There have been some uncertainties as to whether paragraph
4 of SC Resolution 1368 (the Council "expresses its
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001") and paragraph
8 SC Resolution 1373 (the Council "expresses its determination
to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full
implementation of this resolution, in accordance with
its responsibilities under the Charter") could be interpreted
as precluding the use of force against Afghanistan in
the light of the limitation contained in Art. 51, second
sentence, of the Charter. [6] That sentence states that the exercise of
self-defense"shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council . . . to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
security." Given the Council's express support for "international
efforts to root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter
of the United Nations" in paragraph 2 of the preamble
to resolution 1378 (2001), it has now become apparent
that the quoted paragraphs from resolutions 1368 and
1373 were not intended to suspend the right of self-defense.
At the same time, it is questionable whether the Council
has gone so far as to formally recognize the lawfulness
of the manner in which the strikes have been carried
out. The meaning of the terms "in keeping with the
Charter of the United Nations" is ambiguous. It may
be interpreted as a general approval of the resort to
the use of force. However, another plausible reading
is that the Council did not pass a final judgment on
the lawfulness of the measures against Afghanistan,
but made its approval dependent on the compatibility
of such action with the Charter of the United Nations.
The second reading receives some backing from the deliberations
held within the Council. There was widespread support
for the military operations within the Council. In particular,
many Western countries such as the Member states of
the European Union and several Central and Eastern European
countries have openly stated that they regard the strikes
against Afghanistan as being "legitimate and in accordance
with the terms of the Charter and Security Council resolution
1368 (2001)."
[7] But some members of the Security Council have
expressed concerns that could be relevant to an evaluation
of the proportionality of the attacks. One example is
the statement of the representative of Malaysia, who
noted on the day before the adoption of SC Resolution
1378 (2001):
"[T]he use of military force is a legitimate course
of action as an act of self-defense, but it is not
the only course of action, the most effective or politically
wise. It is unfortunate that, in the move to punish
a group of people who are believed to be behind the
terrorist attacks and their protectors, the poor,
long-suffering people of Afghanistan have to suffer.
(p. 23) . . . As in all such bombings, we are seriously
concerned at the so-called collateral damage, in spite
of the much-touted precision bombings which are supposed
to have taken place. We are therefore concerned at
the rather high margin of targeting error in the current
military campaign, which has led to the reportedly
high death toll of civilians. We therefore appeal
for an end to the bombing so as to spare the long-suffering
people of Afghanistan further hardship and travail
and to allow them to return to their villages and
homes for the fast-approaching winter season and Ramadan"
(p. 24).
[8]
The statement of the representative of Egypt went in
a similar direction, noting that "Egypt understands
the motives and justifications that impelled the United
States to resort to military force against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan," while stressing "the importance
of a serious and committed effort to avoid any harm
to innocent Afghan civilians." [9]
Carsten Stahn, LL.M (Köln-Paris)
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law
Im Neuenheimer Feld 535
D-69120 Heidelberg Germany
E-Mail: cstahn@mpiv-hd.mpg.de
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