UNITED STATES RECONNAISSANCE
AIRCRAFT
COLLISION WITH CHINESE JET By Frederic L. Kirgis
April 2001
On April 1, 2001, a U.S. reconnaissance
turboprop aircraft flying over the ocean
at least 50 miles southeast of China's Hainan
Island collided with a Chinese jet fighter
that had been tracking its movements.
The U.S. aircraft made an emergency landing
in China, while the Chinese jet crashed.
Apparently the pilot of the U.S. aircraft
did not obtain verbal permission from China
to land. All crew members on board
the U.S. aircraft survived the incident
in good condition. The Chinese pilot
has not been found and is presumed dead
at sea.
Apparently the U.S. aircraft was on a routine
surveillance mission. It was capable
not only of surveillance, but also of intercepting
electronic signals from Chinese land-based
military units. Chinese authorities
asserted that the U.S. aircraft swerved
and hit the Chinese jet. American
authorities asserted that Chinese jets that
track the movements of U.S. surveillance
planes fly too close to them for safe aerial
operations, and that the jet in this incident
was at fault.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation
(the Chicago Convention),
[1] to which the United States and China
are parties, authorizes the International
Civil Aviation Organization to establish
rules of the air for international civil
aircraft, but not for noncommercial state
aircraft. The Convention does say
in article 3(c), however, "No state aircraft
of a contracting State shall fly over the
territory of another State or land thereon
without authorization by special agreement
or otherwise, and in accordance with the
terms thereof." Since the U.S. aircraft
was flying over the ocean beyond the recognized
12-mile limit of a coastal state's territorial
seas, it could not be said to have been
flying over the territory of China even
if it was within an air defense zone claimed
by China. Although the U.S. aircraft
then landed on Chinese territory without
verbal clearance, it did so in distress.
Customary international law recognizes that
ships at sea have a right to enter another
state's port in distress. By analogy
a similar right probably extends to aircraft
in distress, including state aircraft, although
the Chicago Convention does not contain
an express exception to article 3(c) for
state aircraft in distress. Article
25, which applies to civil aircraft rather
than to noncommercial state aircraft, says
that "Each contracting State undertakes
to provide such measures of assistance to
aircraft in distress as it may find practicable
. . . ."
China apparently claims a right to control
or prohibit aerial surveillance over the
South China sea area where the collision
occurred. The United States at times
has itself claimed special control areas
("defensive sea areas") extending beyond
its territorial sea in time of war or declared
national emergency.
[2] But the exact nature
of the Chinese claim over the South China
sea area is unclear, and in any event it
appears not to have been recognized by other
governments. Aerial surveillance conducted
without using the airspace of the country
being observed is a common practice for
the United States and other countries with
the technology and equipment to do so.
Although the use of aircraft for surveillance
is regarded by observed countries as an
unfriendly act, and it probably would be
in violation of international law if done
over the observed country's territorial
sea, such surveillance is not an armed attack
or an act of aggression that would trigger
a right of self defense to prevent it by
armed force.
Chinese officials boarded the aircraft after
it landed. According to news reports,
it is probable that they examined its equipment.
They removed the crew members and they may
have removed some of the equipment.
Eleven days later, after the United States
said that it was very sorry for the loss
suffered by the Chinese pilot's family and
for entering Chinese airspace and landing
without verbal clearance, China agreed to
release the crew.
The aircraft would not be entitled to diplomatic
immunity in the same sense as the U.S. embassy
in China would. Consequently the World
Court's judgment against Iran in the case
arising out of the 1979 occupation of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran would not be directly
relevant.
[3] Nevertheless, the aircraft
is the equipment of the United States Navy
and was on official duty when the accident
and the landing occurred. The United
States has a reasonably strong claim that
the aircraft was entitled to immunity from
acts of dominion over it by Chinese authorities
under the customary international law doctrine
of sovereign immunity (which is similar
in some respects to diplomatic immunity)---at
least if the landing at the Chinese air
field was permissible under international
law, as it would be if it was an emergency
landing in distress. An old United
States Supreme Court case, The Schooner
Exchange,
[4] decided in 1812, has been thought
to reflect the international law standard
that a foreign military vessel in port is
immune from the jurisdiction of the port
state. In that case two Americans
filed a libel (a proceeding) in admiralty
against a French naval vessel that had come
into a U.S. port in distress as a result
of a storm at sea. The Supreme Court
held the vessel immune under principles
of international law. The same principles
should apply in the case of aircraft, and
they would extend to immunity from any exercise
of dominion over the equipment aboard the
aircraft.
The U.S. claim of sovereign immunity for
the aircraft and its equipment is strengthened
somewhat by some provisions in the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
[5] The United States is not a party
to the Convention, but most of its provisions
are thought to represent customary international
law. Under article 95 of the Convention,
a warship on the high seas has complete
immunity from the jurisdiction of any state
other than the flag state. Under article
32 of the Convention, a warship is entitled
to immunity from boarding even if it is
within the territorial sea of another country.
These articles are thought to reflect customary
international law. Accordingly, in
1968 when North Korea seized the USS Pueblo
about 15 miles at sea, the United States
protested on the ground that the Pueblo
was immune from seizure under international
law.
[6]
A ship need not be armed to be classified
as a warship. A military aircraft,
even if unarmed, would be like a warship.
But the Chinese authorities boarded the
aircraft at an airport on Chinese territory.
They have asserted that the aircraft had
no right to be there, and thus would not
be immune. The question then would
come down to whether the aircraft did have
a right to be there under the doctrine of
permissible entry into foreign territory
in distress, mentioned above.
Endnotes
[1]
15 U.N. Treaty Series 295.
[2]
See 1981-88 (II) Cumulative Digest of
United States Practice in International
Law 1751.
[3]
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J.
Reports 3, 19 I.L.M. 553 (1980).
[4]
11 U.S. 116 (1812).
[5]
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
[6]
See Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 62 AJIL 756 (1968).
About the Author
Frederic L.
Kirgis is Law School Association Alumni
Professor at Washington and Lee University
School of Law. He has written a
book and several articles on United Nations
law, and is a member of the Board of Editors
of the American Journal of International
Law.
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