U.S.-British Air
Strikes on Targets in Iraq
By Frederic L. Kirgis
February 2001
On February 16, 2001, U.S. and British
aircraft conducted strikes against radar
stations and air defense command centers
in Iraq, including some targets near Baghdad.
There were five sets of targets in all.
The strikes came after military commanders
reported that Iraqi air defense had become
increasingly effective in targeting U.S.
and British air patrols over the southern
no-fly zone in Iraq. Some of the air defense
facilities, including four of the five hit
on February 16, are outside the no-fly zones
that the United States and United Kingdom
imposed over areas of northern and southern
Iraq in 1991 and 1992 in an effort to protect
Kurds in the north and Shiite Muslims in
the south. Iraqi air defense forces have
often fired on the U.S. and British patrols
over the no-fly zones, and Iraq appears
recently to have stepped up its targeting
of the patrols.
The reason given for the strikes outside
the no-fly zones is that they were needed
in order to enforce the zones and to protect
U.S. and British pilots and aircraft patrolling
the zones. The legal justification would
be self-defense, based on a right that has
consistently been asserted by the United
States and United Kingdom to establish and
enforce safe zones for the Kurds in northern
Iraq and the Shiites in southern Iraq pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolution 688
(1991). In that resolution, adopted in the
aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the Security
Council found that the consequences of Iraqi
repression of the civilian population in
many parts of Iraq threaten international
peace and security in the region, and demanded
that Iraq end the repression. The resolution
expressly mentioned only the Kurds, but
it was understood at the time that the Shiite
Muslims in the south were included.
Before the Gulf War the Security Council
adopted Resolution 678, which authorized
U.N. member states to use all necessary
means to restore international peace and
security in the area. It served as the legal
authorization for the use of force against
Iraq in the Gulf War. Resolutions 678 and
688 have not been revoked, although Security
Council Resolution 687 declared a cease-fire
after the war. Iraqi non-cooperation with
the United Nations, particularly in connection
with U.N. efforts to inspect Iraq's weapons
facilities, has given rise to an argument
that the cease-fire is no longer in effect
because the conditions underlying it are
not being met.
Normally it would be an encroachment on
another state's sovereignty to send military
aircraft over its territory without permission,
even if the aircraft do not fire on anything.
But if the no-fly zones are lawful means
of implementing Resolutions 678 and 688
(taken in combination with each other),
the United States and United Kingdom would
have a legal justification for sending military
aircraft over the zones in an attempt to
protect the Kurds and Shiites. They would
also have a right of self-defense for their
pilots and aircraft patrolling the zones,
at least if their aircraft have been subjected
to an armed attack. U.N. Charter Article
51 recognizes such an inherent right, "if
an armed attack occurs" against a U.N. member
state, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.
The right of self-defense could extend
even to air strikes outside the zones, if
the use of force in the exercise of the
right is necessary under the circumstances
and proportionate to the use or threat of
force being defended against. Under a 19th-century
formulation by the U.S. Secretary of State
in what is known as the Caroline incident,
reaffirmed by the Nuremberg Tribunal after
World War II, the necessity must be "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation." In the
absence of access to classified information,
it is not possible to assess how immediate
or great a threat the Iraqi air defense
facilities posed to the aircraft patrolling
the southern zone. The immediacy and magnitude
of the threat would affect both the necessity
and the proportionality of the February
16 air strikes. If both of those tests are
met, and if the enforcement of no-fly zones
in Iraq is permissible under U.N. Security
Council resolutions, the self-defense argument
is strong. About the Author
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law School Association
Alumni Professor at Washington and Lee University
School of Law. He has written a book and
several articles on United Nations law,
and is a member of the Board of Editors
of the American Journal of International
Law.
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