NATO Interdiction
of Oil Tankers
Bound for Yugoslavia
By Frederic L. Kirgis
April 1999
NATO is preparing to interdict
deliveries by sea of refined oil bound for Yugoslavia,
as a means of ensuring that NATO's bombing of
Serbian oil refineries will not be neutralized
by the supply of refined oil from other sources.
France and Italy have raised a question whether
such interdiction at sea would violate international
law.
International law provides that ships
on the high seas are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state, with very few
exceptions. Ships passing through territorial
waters are also entitled to be left alone, so
long as they are in innocent passage.
Delivery of oil and other goods on merchant
ships would normally be an exercise of the right
of innocent passage. Even if passage were
not innocent in a particular instance, only
the coastal state would normally have the right
to interrupt it in its territorial waters.
Traditionally, these rules have been
subject to some exceptions in time of war.
The navy of a combatant state could blockade
the ports of an enemy state, if the blockade
was applied to all ships and was effective.
NATO does not contemplate a blockade of all
ships.
A combatant could also interdict contraband
at sea, even without a full-scale blockade.
The clearest form of contraband, "absolute contraband,"
consists of arms, ammunition and other purely
military equipment. These items could
be interdicted in wartime. "Conditional
contraband" includes oil and other items that
could have civilian as well as military uses,
and could be interdicted only if destined for
the military. Pentagon officials reportedly
are relying on the right to intercept contraband
in time of armed conflict, as one of the legal
justifications for the planned NATO action at
sea.
The traditional law of blockade and contraband
developed in a time when international law had
little to say about the circumstances under
which the use of armed force was or was not
justifiable. With the advent of the United
Nations Charter in 1945, the use of armed force
became legally justifiable only under certain
circumstances, such as proportional self-defense
(individual or collective) against armed attack,
enforcement action if authorized by the U.N.
Security Council, and perhaps limited forms
of humanitarian intervention. It is doubtful
that the traditional right of blockade or seizure
of contraband from ships flying the flag of
a noncombatant state survived into the U.N.
era, unless the use of armed force is itself
legally justifiable under the circumstances
just mentioned. The principal legal arguments
in support of NATO's use of armed force against
Serbia are based on extensions of collective
self-defense and humanitarian intervention.
(For fuller exposition of the legal issues regarding
NATO's use of armed force against Serbia, see
the ASIL Flash Insight of March 25, 1999, and
the responses thereto on the ASIL web site,
<www.asil.org>.)
In March 1998 the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, imposed
an embargo on the supply to Yugoslavia of "arms
and related matériel of all types, such
as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles
and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned."
S.C. Res. 1160. The Council called on
all states and regional organizations to act
strictly in conformity with the resolution and
created a committee to monitor compliance, but
did not expressly authorize NATO or any states
to enforce it. Like other legal instruments,
however, the resolution is subject to interpretation.
Pentagon officials reportedly are relying on
it, as well as on the law relating to contraband,
as authority for NATO interdiction of oil supplies
bound for Serbia.
In recent years the Security Council
has imposed comprehensive trade embargoes on
Iraq, and on Serbia-Montenegro during the Bosnian
conflict, and has later expressly authorized
states to take the necessary measures to make
the embargoes effective. Those authorizations
under the Council's Chapter VII powers have
trumped the rights of flag states to have their
merchant ships be free from boarding at sea,
so long as the interdicting ships were simply
acting to enforce the Council's embargoes.
It was not necessary to rely on traditional
rights of blockade or seizure of contraband,
since the Council had legitimated the interdictions.
The questions France and Italy have raised about
the current plan to interdict oil shipments
to Serbia are that the Council has not expressly
embargoed such oil shipments and has not expressly
authorized interdiction, so the planned NATO
action may be vulnerable on international law
grounds insofar as it is to be carried out against
ships flying the flags of non-NATO countries
that object to the interdiction.
The purpose of ASIL Insight is to provide
concise and informed background for developments
of interest to the international community. The
American Society of International Law does not
take positions on substantive issues, including
the ones discussed in this Insight.
About the Author: Frederic
L. Kirgis is Law School Association Alumni Professor
at Washington and Lee University School of Law.
He has written a book and several articles on
United Nations law, and is a member of the Board
of Editors of the American Journal of International
Law.