The Kosovo Situation
and NATO Military Action
By Frederic L. Kirgis
March 1999
When the Yugoslav government refused
to sign the American-drafted peace accord for
Kosovo, and after repeated warnings to Yugoslavia,
NATO forces have begun an aerial bombing campaign
against Yugoslav military targets. The question
arises whether international law permits the use
of armed force against Yugoslavia under these
circumstances.
Kosovo is a province of Yugoslavia,
not an independent state. Even though about 90
percent of its population is ethnic Albanian,
the international community has not supported
a right of secession for Kosovo. Since Kosovo
remains a part of Yugoslavia in fact and in law,
the current military action raises questions of
external intervention in civil strife. In this
case, though, the civil strife is likely to endanger
peace and security in neighboring states and has
already created large refugee flows into those
states.
Until the advent of the United Nations,
international law had little to say about what
a government did regarding its own citizens in
its own territory. In the U.N. era, it has become
well established that governments do not have
a free rein to mistreat their own citizens, and
a wide range of international human rights standards
has been established to prevent or rectify such
mistreatment. The right of self-determination
is one of the currently-recognized human rights,
but it has not normally been regarded as a right
of an ethnic or other minority to secede. It does,
however, protect certain civil and political rights
of ethnic groups as well as of individuals. The
international community has treated it as applicable
to the Kosovo situation, in the form of a right
to increased autonomy within the Yugoslav state.
But even if a central government, such as the
government in Belgrade, is depriving a group of
its right of self-determination, that alone does
not permit intervention by external armed forces.
The United Nations Charter provides
a mechanism for legitimating NATO armed intervention.
Regional arrangements, such as NATO, are expressly
permitted under Chapter VIII of the Charter. But
Chapter VIII, Article 53, prohibits enforcement
action (as distinguished from action in self-defense)
by regional agencies without the authorization
of the U.N. Security Council. In 1962 the International
Court of Justice said that enforcement action
is coercive action in the context of Chapter VII,
which deals with threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace and acts of aggression. If the NATO
action is designed to coerce the Yugoslav government
to accept the allied peace plan for Kosovo, it
would require Security Council authorization under
Article 53. On the other hand, if the NATO action
is designed to ensure humanitarian relief for
the people of Kosovo or merely to help them to
repel armed aggression, one could argue that Security
Council authorization may not be necessary.
In 1998, Security Council resolution
1199 expressed deep concern for the deterioration
of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo, including
reports of violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law, and emphasized the need to ensure
that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo were
respected. By invoking Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, the Council implicitly found that there
was a threat to the peace, breach of the peace
or act of aggression of an international character.
It demanded (among other things) that Yugoslavia
withdraw its security units used for civilian
repression, enable effective international monitoring
to be done in Kosovo, facilitate the safe return
of refugees and displaced persons, and make rapid
progress toward a political situation in Kosovo.
The Council also called upon U.N. member states
to provide adequate resources for humanitarian
assistance in the region.
Resolution 1199 thus expressly acknowledged
that there is a situation in Kosovo of the nature
covered by Chapter VII and recognized the role
Yugoslav forces have played in creating the humanitarian
crisis in the province, but it did not expressly
authorize forceful intervention. The U.N. Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, has said that in his view
only the Security Council has the authority to
decide that the internal situation in any state
is so grave as to justify forceful intervention.
The clear implication is that if any state or
alliance, such as NATO, could intervene on its
own, the U.N. system of collective security could
be endangered or destroyed.
There are two possible arguments
for intervention without Security Council authorization,
but they both require an extension of recognized
principles beyond the limits heretofore applied
to them. The first is based on a limited right
of humanitarian intervention to aid groups held
captive or subjected to grave physical danger.
The justification for humanitarian intervention
is strongest when the intervening states are acting
to protect their own nationals, as in the case
of Israel's 1976 raid to release its nationals
being held hostage at the airport in Entebbe,
Uganda. The extended argument would be that in
exceptional cases where peaceful means of alleviating
a humanitarian crisis inflicted by a state on
its own nationals have failed, and where the Security
Council has recognized a threat to international
peace, forceful intervention would be lawful so
long as it is proportional to the situation.
The second argument is based on
an extension of the right of collective self-defense.
That right is recognized by Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, if the Security Council has not
acted to deal with an armed attack. The right
of self-defense, though, has traditionally been
regarded as legitimate only in the case of an
armed attack on a state. Even if the Kosovo authorities
have requested self-defense help from NATO, since
Kosovo is not a state under international law,
the right of collective self-defense would have
to be stretched to apply here. The argument for
stretching it would stress the international community's
recognition of the Kosovars as an entity entitled
to a substantial measure of autonomy (and thus
entitled not only to defend itself, but also to
request others to help, so long as the help is
proportional to the situation).
About the Author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law School Association Alumni
Professor at Washington and Lee University School
of Law. He has written a book and several articles
on United Nations law, and is a member of the
Board of Editors of the American Journal of
International Law.
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