Israel's Targeted
Killings of Hamas Leaders
By Mayur Patel
May 2004
The April 18th killing
in Gaza of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi,
following on the heels of the killing of his
predecessor, Sheik Yassin, provoked an international
outcry about Israel's policy of targeted killing.
Such tactics have been widely condemned as unlawful
under international law. In contrast, the United
States, while occasionally uncomfortable with
Israel's policy, has acknowledged that Israel
has a right to self- defense that could be used
in some circumstances to target leaders of terrorist
groups -- much as the United States has asserted
its own right to target Osama Bin Laden. From
a legal standpoint, there are three critical
issues that determine the validity of this policy:
the law of self-defense; international humanitarian
law; and the principle of proportionality.
A good faith analysis can lead to differing
conclusions on the legality of Israel's policy.
I. Self-Defense
A key determinant in assessing
Israeli policy is whether it is for the purpose
of self-defense or whether it is a reprisal.
Armed reprisals are illegal under international
law, which prohibits the use of armed force
for the purpose of revenge.
The concept of self-defense in
international law has two primary sources.
First, there is an explicit reference to self-defense
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
Those who argue in favor of Israel's right
to self-defense in this situation hold that
Hamas's numerous suicide bombings against Israel
constitute an armed attack, much as the United
States has argued that the use of civilian airliners
to destroy the World Trade Center constituted
an armed attack. Furthermore, they note that
Hamas has openly declared its intention to strike
Israel again. Israel faces an ongoing threat
and the Security Council has not yet acted.
Consequently, they argue that Article 51 provides
Israel with a right to employ military force
against Hamas's leaders.
Those who dispute Article 51's
applicability generally do not dispute that
the number of Israeli casualties is substantial.
However, the issue for them is that an armed
attack within the meaning of Article 51 is an
armed attack from a state. Hamas is not a state.
It cannot even be argued to constitute a de-facto
state. Although other states provide aid and
support to Hamas, it is not accepted that Hamas
is the organ of a state or under the direct
control of another state. According to this
view, Hamas's attacks are more akin to the acts
of a violent gang, which must be dealt with
as a law enforcement problem. Consequently,
Article 51 would be inapplicable and the targeted
killings would be unlawful reprisals or extrajudicial
acts of homicide.
The other legal source of self-defense
is customary international law. In particular,
many scholars cite the Caroline doctrine, which
sets forth the standard for anticipatory self-defense
in customary international law. The Caroline
doctrine arises from an incident in the 1840s
where British soldiers crossed into the United
States to destroy a ship ferrying arms to insurgents
in Canada. Both the United Kingdom and the
United States agreed that anticipatory action
was allowed only when the "[n]ecessity of that
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
[1] After World War II, the Nuremberg
Tribunal reaffirmed the Caroline doctrine.
It should be noted that after the
advent of the United Nations Charter, the Caroline
doctrine is not universally accepted; many reputable
scholars have argued that Article 51 of the
UN Charter supercedes it. Even conceding its
validity, though, reasonable individuals can
come to differing conclusions on its applicability
in various situations.
For example, most would agree that
missiles being fueled for launch are an imminent
threat under the Caroline Doctrine. Few would
concede, however, that mere discussions on the
construction of such weapons constitute a threat
under this standard. However, reasonable people
could come to differing conclusions about whether
the actual shipment and emplacement of such
weapons, for example during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, gives rise to a right of self-defense.
In that instance, the United States chose not
to justify its interdiction of Soviet missiles
bound for Cuba as a measure of anticipatory
self-defense.
In the present situation, some
of the recently targeted individuals such as
Rantissi and Sheik Yassin were not killed while
in the process of carrying out an attack. However,
they were presumed to be in a position to order
future attacks at short notice and Hamas had
previously carried out attacks. Whether there
was time to deliberate and to consider other
means is uncertain. The more one agrees with
Israel's assessment that the targeted individuals
were "ticking bombs," the more one would believe
that a right under the Caroline doctrine arises.
One could also argue that since Hamas has already
carried out attacks, the Caroline doctrine is
inapplicable in a strict sense, even though
it remains relevant to show that customary international
law recognizes a right of self-defense.
II. International Humanitarian Law
Another legal issue about Israel's
policy is whether it comports with international
humanitarian law. International humanitarian
law comprises the rules that govern the conduct
of armed conflict. Under international humanitarian
law, one question that needs to be resolved
is whether those targeted are combatants. The
Geneva Conventions on the Law of War, particularly
common Article 3, prohibit the intentional killing
of civilians. Common Article 3 prohibits:
"(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;" and "(d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples."
Other international human rights instruments,
such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, state that arbitrary execution
is unlawful.
Individuals who belong to the military
wing of Hamas, such as Rantissi, are likely
to be considered combatants. Individuals like
Sheik Yassin, who was a quadriplegic and supposedly
a spiritual rather than military leader, may
be subject to more debate on their status as
a combatants.
Targeted killings also implicate
the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention
of 1907, which are widely viewed as customary
international law. It is believed that most
targeted individuals have been killed in helicopter
strikes. The Hague Regulations prohibit the
killing or wounding treacherously of individuals
belonging to a hostile nation or army. [2] Killing or targeting particular individuals
during an armed conflict is not illegal in itself
under international law, nor is it accurately
described as assassination, if the individuals
are members of a hostile force. For example,
the United States' targeted attack on Admiral
Yamamoto during the Second World War was widely
considered to be legitimate.
The key issue
in deciding legality in such cases is whether
or not perfidy or treacherous means were employed.
The employment of treachery is what distinguishes
assassination from a traditional killing. Killing
individuals by a helicopter strike is generally
an accepted tactic of warfare. More stealthy
means, however, could be considered as acts
of treachery. Some would also argue that persons
at mosques or in prayer have no means of defense
and thus are impermissible targets. The question
becomes murkier, though, if such individuals
are inciting followers or giving orders at those
facilities for hostile acts against an enemy.
III. Proportionality
The last key issue regarding Israel's
policy is whether it violates the basic international
law principle of proportionality. Proportionality
holds that any given action by a state must
be substantially proportional to the given threat
or wrong. This principle also finds support
in the Hague Regulations of 1907 which prohibit
the use of arms, projectiles, or material calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering.
Israel's policy of targeted killing
has resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians.
Were those deaths avoidable if different tactics
were utilized? Proportionality analysis depends
upon the circumstances and the situation. Many
have suggested that Israel had a less violent
option at its disposal: an arrest. As the occupying
power, Israel could potentially deploy troops
or police to arrest these individuals.
Proportionality is an important
rule that could distinguish Israel's policy
from the American attack on terrorists in Yemen
last year via a predator drone. An arrest may
be infeasible in the middle of a lawless dessert
in Yemen. Civilians are also unlikely to be
wounded in such an attack; thus the attack is
likely to be proportional under the circumstances.
Whether Israel's policy is proportional
is not an open and shut case. Deploying soldiers
or police to apprehend suspects in hostile urban
areas is a dangerous affair. Whether more lives
are put at danger through an attempted arrest
or a helicopter strike is debatable; hence the
proportionality of Israel's policy is unclear.
IV. Conclusion
Israel's policy of targeted
killings raises serious questions of international
law, but the answers are not obvious. Although
many observers view the policy as contravening
international law, there is a substantial amount
of uncertainty regarding the application of
the relevant law to the situation at hand.
Thus, good faith analysis could lead to starkly
different conclusions on the legality of any
such policy.
About the Author:
Mayur Patel will be joining the law firm of
Dewey Ballantine LLP this fall.
[1] The Caroline (exchange of diplomatic notes between
Great Britain, Ashburton , and the United
States, Webster 1842), 2 J. Moore, Digest
of International Law 409, 412 (1906).
[2] Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV (18
October 1907), Art. 23.
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