The Legal Background
on the Use of Force
to Induce Iraq to Comply with Security Council Resolutions
By Frederic L. Kirgis
November 1997
Iraq's well-publicized refusal
to allow Americans to participate in on-site
inspections of Iraq's chemical, biological and
missile capabilities led the United Nations
Security Council on November 12 to adopt Resolution
1137 (1997). Acting under its enforcement authority
in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council
condemned Iraq for its continued violations
of its obligations, under the relevant Security
Council resolutions, to cooperate fully with
the UN Special Commission appointed pursuant
to Resolution 687 to carry out the on-site inspections,
and imposed mandatory travel restrictions on
Iraqi officials and armed forces members who
were responsible for the violations or participated
in them. Resolution 1137 also expressed "the
firm intention to take further measures as may
be required for the implementation of this resolution."
The United States government has said that Iraq
must comply or face the consequences, including
possible use of the military option. The United
States and the United Kingdom have asserted
that they already have adequate authority from
the Security Council to use the military option.
The governments of several other UN member states,
including China, France and Russia, have disputed
that assertion.
The U.S. assertion appears to rest primarily
on Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), which
authorized member states to use "all necessary
means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security
in the area." Resolution 660, adopted the day
after Iraq invaded Kuwait, demanded that Iraq
withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. Resolution
678 became the UN's authorizing instrument for
Operation Desert Storm. It has never been rescinded.
Iraq's attempt to dictate the composition of
UN inspection teams has raised suspicions that
Iraq is buying time to cover up its remaining
chemical, biological and/or missile capabilities,
posing a renewed threat to peace and security
in the Persian Gulf area. Taken literally, the
pre-Desert Storm Resolution 678 could be said
to authorize not only the one-time use of armed
force, but also whatever subsequent use of armed
force might be needed to restore international
peace and security in the area. The U.S. and
U.K. could argue that a renewed use of armed
force is now needed if peace in the area is
to be permanently restored.
After Desert Storm, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 687 (1990), again acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter. Resolution 687 imposed several
obligations on Iraq, including the obligation
to accept the neutralization under international
supervision of its chemical, biological and
medium- or long-range missile capabilities.
It went on to say that upon notification by
Iraq of its acceptance of the provisions in
Resolution 687 (which Iraq grudgingly accepted),
a formal cease-fire was effective. Finally,
the Council decided to remain seized of the
matter "and to take such further steps as may
be required for the implementation of the present
resolution and to secure peace and security
in the area." Resolution 687 remains in force
and was one of the key resolutions the Security
Council mentioned in Resolution 1137.
Again taking the earlier Resolution 678 literally,
it might be said to authorize member states
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 687, since Resolution 678 gave member
states the authority to uphold all "relevant
resolutions" subsequent to Resolution 660, and
Resolution 687 is such a resolution.
Member states opposing the U.S. assertion of
authority to use armed force under the current
circumstances rely on the fact that a formal
cease-fire is in effect, thus significantly
changing the circumstances under which the Security
Council authorized "all necessary measures"
in pre-Desert Storm Resolution 678. Thus, they
would say, Resolution 678 could no longer reasonably
be used as an ongoing authority to use force.
They also argue that the Council's retention
of authority in Resolution 687 to take further
steps should be read to preclude individual
member states from taking steps on their own
to secure peace and security in the area. Finally,
they would argue that the reference in Resolution
678 to upholding and implementing "relevant
resolutions" subsequent to Resolution 660 could
only have been intended to mean resolutions
adopted between the dates of Resolutions 660
and 678. That, of course, would exclude Resolution
687.
As has been noted above, Resolution 1137 expressed
the firm intention to take further measures
(in addition to travel restrictions) as may
be required for its implementation. According
to news reports, the U.S. and British governments
rely on this provision as further support for
the view that the use of force is already authorized.
The opposing argument would be that the body
expressing the firm intention in Resolution
1137 to take further measures is the Security
Council and only the Security Council, which
remains seized of the matter. Under this view,
the Security Council might take a further measure
in the form of a new authorization to member
states to use force, but Resolution 1137 itself
would not supply such an authorization.
About the author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law School Association
Alumni Professor at Washington and Lee University
School of Law. He has written a book and several
articles on United Nations law, and is a member
of the Board of Editors of the American Journal
of International Law.
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