The Southern African Development Community (SADC) SADC is a regional organization[1] that was created in 1992 to replace the erstwhile Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC had been created by a number of Southern African countries known as the Frontline States, the raison d'être of which was an abjuration of South African apartheid policies.[2] It is also believed that SADCC was formed to specifically counter the strategy of President P. Botha to create a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS).[3] The members of SADC include a variety of middle income and least developed countries (LDCs).[4] South Africa is the largest and dominant member state and its involvement in the group is critical.[5] SADC is undergoing important institutional changes. Its relations with other international actors are also unfolding. The organization is equally adapting to some of the changes. Although there are many developments that have marked the organization in recent years, this essay dwells of one of them: the ongoing negotiations of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between a group of SADC member states on the one hand, and the European Community (EC) on the other. The negotiations are indicative of a number of issues that are likely to significantly affect SADC as a single active entity. The main problems include the lack of money; the possibility that SADC could split; the apparent and intermittent signs indicative of an absence of real interest in the negotiation process by the EC negotiators; frequency in the changes of SADC lead negotiators and certain institutional concerns. SADC covers an area of about 9,859,000 km sq. It has a population of 230 million people, the majority of whom are rural. SADC's combined GDP is US$ 230 billion.[6] Based in Gaborone (capital of Botswana) SADC's main vision is that of "[A] common future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa."[7] The main principles of SADC are enumerated in the Treaty of Windhoek that sanctioned the birth of the organization. Amongst these are respect for equality, solidarity, democracy, equity and peaceful settlement of disputes.[8] The objectives of SADC are legion and ambitious. They include the promotion of sustainable development; the attainment of complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; the fight against HIV/AIDS and other deadly communicable diseases; and poverty eradication.[9] Strides have been made in reaching some of the set objectives. However, challenges abound which highlight the point that regional integration is not only about making treaty pledges but also arriving at clear results.[10] SADC has experienced many challenges not least of which is the recent overhaul of its structures and it still has to overcome many hurdles to reach its goals.[11] One of such hurdles is the lack of sufficient funds.[12] In order to overcome its myriad of challenges SADC designed a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003. Alongside with the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) the RISDP epitomizes the path SADC will take for a fifteen year period.[13] As outlined in the RISDP SADC hopes to become a free trade area (FTA) in 2008 and a customs union in 2012. A common market and an economic union are also envisaged. SADC's legal status is that of an international organization which has the legal capacity and power "[T]o enter into contract, acquire, own, dispose of movable or immovable property and to sue and be sued."[14] As an international organization it has conventional organs such as the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation; the Council of Ministers; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Standing Committee of Officials; the Secretariat; the Tribunal; and SADC National Committees.[15] The main policy making organ is the Summit of Heads of State and Government.[16] The policies are implemented through decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers.[17] The implementation of the RISDP is the preserve of the Integrated Committee of Ministers.[18] While the institutions are broadly guided by the Windhoek Treaty, there are 22 protocols to the Treaty[19] and others are under preparation.[20] Until 2001, the areas covered by the protocols were under the aegis of specific countries. In other words, SADC member states had the competence to oversee given areas of cooperation. They hosted sector coordinating units (SCUs) of the various areas of cooperation. In 2001, the structural reform of the institution started in earnest. All the SCUs have been swamped into five directorates housed at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.[21] SADC has also issued vital declarations and memoranda in key areas of cooperation.[22] The institution is undergoing many changes and witnessing a number of developments that could determine the form that the organization will take for decades to come. The internal institutional changes and its responses to the political situation in Zimbabwe are some of the salient elements with potential patent fallout for the region. Yet what stands out as a critical development that could effectively make or mar positive prospects in the region is the negotiation of the EPA between the EC and a select group of SADC countries. What makes EPA negotiations very peculiar is the fact that they can still be directed in a manner that does not hamstring the regional integration agenda of the region. Recent Development: The Situation in Zimbabwe Since the end of the 1990s the political crisis in Zimbabwe has assumed an improbable dimension. President Robert Mugabe decided to robustly pursue the implementation of Article 16A of the Zimbabwean Constitution. The article stipulates that should the former colonial power (the United Kingdom) fall short of providing money for the payment of compensation to the majority white owners of land set aside for purposes of resettlement, such land shall be taken without payment of compensation.[23] In following through on this commitment, drones of white farmers who owned the greater part of the fertile lands in Zimbabwe left the country abandoning their commercial farms leaving the country in an economic tailspin. While some observers may not take issue with the principle of resettlement, they do criticize the fact that parts of the resettled land have simply been handed to Mugabe's supporters (especially to the military and war veterans) rather than to the despondent who demonstrably need the lands.[24] The most obvious symptoms of the poor state of the Zimbabwean economy are hyperinflation[25] and the cold relations between the government and big business.[26] It has been argued that the struggling economy, rather than any kind of political stalemate, will be the ultimate undoing of the Mugabe government.[27] Formerly a booming economy and a model for other African countries,[28] the conditions of life in Zimbabwe have plummeted, and now has the highest number of citizens living on aid of any country.[29] United Nations estimates reveal that about half of Zimbabwe's population will face starvation by the end of 2008 due to poor harvests.[30] The situation has had important political and social effects on the lives of Zimbabweans and the SADC region. The economic malaise has offered the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a platform on which to rally internal, regional, and international discontent with President Mugabe's policies. The current political impasse between the Zimbabwean African National Union (Popular Front) (ZANU-PF) and the MDC has been transformed of late into a battle of turf wars between President Mugabe of the ZANU-PF and Morgan Richard Tsvangirai of the MDC. The MDC claimed 110 seats during the March elections while the ZANU-PF claimed 99. Since that time, the MDC has revealed that about 100 of its supporters have been killed since the first round of elections in March 2008.[31] As a result of the MDC decision to abstain from the June run-off, Robert Mugabe, whose party was defeated during the March 2008 elections claimed 85 per cent of the votes cast. Many international and regional leaders condemned the results of the elections that crowned Mugabe as president. Both parties agreed to ease tensions by endorsing a memorandum of understanding on July, 21 2008.[32] Negotiations to end the stalemate have culminated in a power-sharing deal whose contours are still to be well defined. What has been the regional dimension to the situation? Under the auspices of SADC Thabo Mbeki has been leading the negotiations between the main actors in an effort to reach a power-sharing deal. However, the various parties have been quite inflexible in their demands. The MDC wanted an arrangement whereby Mugabe will remain as a ceremonial president. They hoped for a deal that would accord executive powers to Tsvangirai as the prime minister. However, Mugabe's stalwarts rejected such proposals. Instead, they proposed to have Tsvangirai as the third vice president. The problems of Zimbabwe have exposed important differences in the opinions of some of the leaders of SADC.[33] Thabo Mbeki alongside the leaders of countries like Mozambique and Namibia have been cautious in their response to the crisis in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, President Ian Khama and the late Levy Mwanawassa of Zambia have been very critical of President Mugabe. In a region whose leaders have always been reputed for sticking together as liberation heroes it is remarkable that some leaders have adopted such an outspoken approach against the president of Zimbabwe. There are several factors that have led to this departure. First, the region has been experiencing the advent of new leaders. The election of helmsmen such as Presidents Ian Khama (Botswana), the late Levy Mwanawassa (Zambia) and Jakaya Kikwete (Tanzania) has marked an important transitional phase from resistance to economic and democratic reform. This new brand of leaders are wont to follow the letter of rules and principles of the SADC treaty, declarations and protocols which invariably make provisions for better political and economic governance. For instance, the SADC Treaty states that one of its principles is that SADC states act in accordance with the principles of democracy and the rule of law.[34] In addition, the fundamental document of the organization also provides that one of its goals shall be to consolidate, defend and maintain democracy.[35] These are principles that the new leaders take very seriously. They advocate that the March elections in Zimbabwe proved that the majority of the population had sided with the MDC[36] and that the ZANU-PF should have adhered to the provisions as well as to the clauses of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.[37] These Guidelines call on participants in elections to respect electoral results.[38] Second, and more importantly, Botswana and Zambia share long borders with Zimbabwe. The leaders there have had to deal with the internal political and social pressures that come along with the inflow of Zimbabweans into their countries. The nature of the tensions that such inflow of Zimbabweans may generate was recently demonstrated in the attacks on foreigners that erupted in South Africa. This issue is further considered below. Recent Development: SADC and Social Cohesion: The Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa The attacks that took place in South Africa in the first half of 2008 constituted the acme of a situation that has been in gestation with the increased influx of Africans into South Africa following the end of apartheid. While the attacks were aimed generally at all foreigners accused of stealing South African jobs and social benefits, the main victims were those from neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The attacks on citizens from other SADC countries exposed contradictions that belie the aspirations of SADC as a region on the one hand, and the realities on the ground, on the other. The events revealed deep social scleroses both at the national and at the regional levels. At the national level in Zimbabwe, the domestic political crisis detailed above has motivated people to migrate to South Africa and other countries like Botswana. With high rates of unemployment (estimated at 80 percent), soaring hyperinflation (approximately 11.2 million percent inflation at the time of writing), acute shortage of food (an estimate of 5.1 million people are expected to face starvation by the end of 2008)[39] and energy sources, Zimbabweans face many hardships. With a dearth of opportunity at home, some have taken serious risks to escape to South Africa. The economic and social conditions in South Africa, however, are not much better. The unemployment rate is about 38 percent and the inflation rate has also been on the rise. Increasing food and fuel prices have dovetailed producing an apparent economic recession that the government increasingly appears unable to address.[40] With the shortage of economic opportunities and social services, most South Africans have looked on with scorn at the rising numbers of non-South Africans who come into the country and are often ready to perform some of the tasks that South Africans are unwilling to do. Although some of the foreigners from Zimbabwe are more trained than their South African counterparts, most are more desperate and are often inclined to accept low-paying jobs that South Africans, even if they are duly qualified and skilled, will not want to do. So, despite programs such as the Black Emancipation Program, many young South Africans have felt left out in the post-apartheid era economy. Rather than addressing the problem in a more reasoned manner, some of the South African youths have targeted foreigners from neighboring countries as the cause of their own problems arising from unemployment related despondency.[41] The killing of over 65 foreigners by South Africans based on the pretext that they were stealing South African jobs and women was the apotheosis of the failures of national socio-political policies projected across borders.[42] The violence, (which was intense in Ramaphosa Informal Settlement around Johannesburg) led to the displacement of between 35000 and 100,000 people. South African leaders were evidently overtaken by the events. While President Mbeki declared it a national disgrace, ANC leader Jacob Zuma noted that "I think it is a very sad situation indeed. I don't think that many of us ever thought we could have this kind of situation happening in our communities given the nature of our people who have been living with foreigners for centuries."[43] Many African states including the Frontline States and Nigeria made very substantial contributions in support of the ANC during the apartheid years. Former President Mandela himself explains in his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, how countries like Ghana and Tanzania played crucial roles in the liberation struggle against the racist apartheid system in South Africa. It is regrettable, therefore, that other Africans should be treated in such a manner by the free South Africa. The events in South Africa exposed deep seated roots of xenophobia and racism: this time not against whites but against other blacks.[44] As the issue had a cross-border regional dimension, SADC leaders included it in their agenda for the August 2008 summit. Although SADC has developed important rules on migration and the facilitation of the movement of people, the reception of foreigners in the majority of receiving countries remains a difficult issue.[45] Receiving nations in the region such as Botswana, Namibia and South African remain reticent on more liberal migration rules.[46] The events that have unfolded in South Africa have been a far cry from the aspirations and rules in SADC. For instance, the SADC Treaty espouses the goal of consolidating cultural affinities across member states.[47] The founding document also states that one of the goals of SADC shall be the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of labor between the member states.[48] In the same regard the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights provides that states have to ensure the right to adequate social protection to all citizens regardless of the type of job they perform and their location within the region.[49] The main provisions regarding free movement of the citizens of the region from one country to another are contained in the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons.[50] The text was signed in 2005 and is still to be ratified by the requisite number of SADC states. The Protocol allows SADC citizens to establish permanent and temporary residence in other SADC states.[51] It also allows citizens of the region to move to any Member State for purposes of work.[52] The urge for better and more fluid labor movement across the borders in the region has a long history of support Dating back to when the organization was still a coordinating conference (SADCC).[53] However, the negotiation of aspects of services provision that also impacts the labor movement has been difficult within the framework of the negotiations of the Trade Protocol.[54] Nevertheless, it is hoped that with the advent of the Free Trade Area (FTA) there will be better accommodation for the interests of foreign regional workers in other SADC countries. For this to come to pass, rules will not be enough. Countries can sign protocols and readily sign or ratify the same as SADC states often do, but there is no enforcement mechanism. Before the grand ideas of the FTA will be implemented, there will be a crucial need for a marked change in the mentalities of the citizens in SADC countries. Regional integration needs to be fostered persistently through grass-roots efforts between all fourteen SADC states. Exchange programs between schools and twining initiatives between businesses, universities, traditional communities and local governments cannot be over-emphasized. Stephen S. Kingah LLD candidate, Institute for European Studies (IES) Vrije Universiteit Brussel Stefaan Smis Professor of International Law Vrije Universiteit Brussel 1 December 2008 Footnotes: 1 The term regional organization is used here to refer to an international inter-governmental organization made up of a close knit group of states held together by geographic proximity as well as shared goals. See Jean Salmon, Organisation régionale, DICTIONAIRES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, (2001) at 793. 2 ASSOCIATION OF WEST EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID (AWEPAA), THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: LOOKING TOWARDS LOMÉ IV 1 (1989). 3 GABRIEL H. OOSTHUIZEN, THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY: THE ORGANIZATION, ITS POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 60 (2006). 4 Members include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 5 SANUSHA NAIDU & BENJAMIN ROBERTS, CONFRONTING THE REGION: A PROFILE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 41 (2004). 6 SADC, SADC ANNUAL REPORT, 2004/2005, 10 (2005). available at http://www.sadc.int 7 Id. at 13. 8 Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community as Amended in August 2001, Art. 4. at http://www.sadc.int/key_documents/treaties/sadc_treaty_amended.php. (accessed on August 31, 2007). 9 Id., Art. 5. 10 WALTER MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 12 (1999); Margaret Lee, Regionalism in Africa: A Part of Problem or a Part of Solution, POLIS/R.C.S.P/ C.P.S.R Vol. IX (2002); Phineas Kadenge, Regionalism: Lessons the SADC can Learn From the EU, in SADC-EU TRADE RELATIONS 57, 53-58 (Trudi Hartzenberg ed., 2000). 11 Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, SADC and the EU: A Brief Overview, in SADC-EU RELATIONS: LOOKING BACK AND MOVING AHEAD 22, 7-23 (2002). 12 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, REPORT OF THE REVIEW OF OPERATIONS OF SADC INSTITUTIONS: TOWARDS A COMMON FUTURE 5 (March, 2001).
13
RISDP, at http://www.sadc.int/content/english/ 14 SADC Treaty, supra note 8, Art. 3(1). 15 Id., Art. 9(1). The Troika system was introduced in the 2001 Amendment of the SADC Treaty: Art. 9A. 16 Id., Art. 10(2). 17 Id., Art. 11(2)(b). 18 Id., Art. 12(2). 19 See http://www.sadc.int/key_documents/protocols/index.php. Examples include the Protocol on Trade (August 24, 1996) and Protocol on Health (August 18, 1999). For a more exhaustive list see SADC, MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES:25TH ANNIVERSARY 1980-2005 34-35 (2005). 20 For instance, Protocol on Sexually Transmitted Infections (expected to be adopted by the end of 2007) and a Draft Protocol on Piracy and Protection of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK, VOL. I, 362 (Joanne Maher ed., 2006) and THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK, VOL. I, 376 (Joanne Maher ed., 2007). 21 The five directorates include trade, industry, finance and investment; food, agriculture and natural resources; infrastructure and services; social and human development and special programmes; and politics, defense, and security. 22 E.g., Declaration on Gender and Development (Sept. 8, 1997) and Declaration on HIV/AIDS (July 4, 2003). 23 The Constitution of Zimbabwe as Amended, N° 16 of 20 April 2000 art. 16. 24 Au Zimbabwe, l'armée confisque le pouvoir, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (June 23, 2008), http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2008-06-24-Zimbabwe, 25 Zimbabwe Inflation Rockets Higher, BBC WORLD SERVICE, Aug. 19, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7569894.stm. 26 Manufacturers hit out at Mugabe, Gono, THE ZIMBABWE TIMES, Jul. 23, 2008. 27 Richard Dowden, If the People Want Power, they Must Fight for it, THE INDEPENDENT.CO.UK, June, 24 2008. 28 Liisa Laakso, The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000, 40 J. MODERN AFR. STUDIES 442, 437-464 (2002). 29 Int'l Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: In Search of a New Strategy, AFRICA REPORT N°78 Apr. 2004. 30 Tom Burgis, Mugabe Defies African Leaders' Pleas to Give Way, FINANCIAL TIMES, 3, Aug. 18, 2008. 31 After the Storm, the Stalemate: A Negotiated end of the Power Struggle Looks Far Off, ECONOMIST, Jul. 10, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11707876 32 They Agree to Talk, but Nobody Knows Where it Will Lead, ECONOMIST 44, July 26, 2008. 33 See Simba Musiiwa, Beware of Outside Interference, HERALD, Aug. 11, 2008. 34 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 4, Aug. 17 1992, 32 ILM 116 [hereinafter SADC]. 35 Id. at art. 5. 36 See Edward Robert, Botswana Shuns Summit, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20080818. 37 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/117 38 Id. at Clause 2.1.9. 39 Red Cross, Zimbabwe: Food Insecurity Emergency Appeal, ZIMONLINE Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=3511 40 Tom Nevin, Looming Spectre of Recession, AFRICAN BUSINESS 62, June 2008. 41 Philippe Rivière, Violences Urbaines en Afrique de Sud, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE May 2008. 42 Pusch Commey, A National Disgrace! Poverty is no Excuse for Murder. And Apartheid Cannot Always be Blamed for Everything, NEW AFRICAN 10, 12 July 2008. 43 Id. at 16. 44 ROBERT CALDERISI THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA: WHY FOREIGN AID ISN'T WORKING 94, Palgrave MacMillan 2006. 45 OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (ODI), REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ACP: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2-4 London: ODI, June 2008. 46 Id. at 33. 47 SADC supra arts. 1(h), 2(b). 48 SADC supra, art. 2(d). 49 SADC, Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/171. 50 Protocol on the Facilitation on the Movement of Persons, Gaborone, 18 August 2005. 51 Id. at art. 3(1)(b). 52 Id. at art. 3(1)(c). 53 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Record of the Council of Ministers, Maputo, 27 January 1992, SADCC/CM/1/92/0, paragraph 2.1.16. 54 Paul Kalenga, Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol: A Preliminary Review, MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK, Volume 4: 17, 18 Dirk Hansohm, Willie Breytenbach and Trudi Hartzenberg eds., Windhoek: Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, 2004. |
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