The editors of International Legal Materials and International
Law In Brief have compiled special selections of court decisions
by institution, topic, jurisdiction, or geography.
International Court
of Justice (ICJ): Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America,
No. 90 (November 6, 2003)
The International Court of Justice (the
“Court”) found, by 14 votes to 2, that the action of the United
States of America against Iranian oil platforms
on October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988 could not be justified as
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of
the United States of America.
However, the Court held that those actions did not constitute a
violation of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights between the United States and Iran (the “Treaty”) (Tehran
August 15, 1955).
Click here
for the document. Click here
for the ASIL Insight.
International Court of Justice (ICJ): Case
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico/United
States of America), No. 128 (March
31, 2004)
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") or (the "Court")
found by fourteen votes to one that the United
States breached its obligations under Article
36, paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
of April 24, 1963 (the "Convention"). It concluded, inter
alia, that the United States
failed to inform without delay 51 Mexican nationals of their rights
under the Convention upon their detention.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory
Opinion: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, No.
131 (July 9, 2004)
The ICJ concluded
that "... from the material available to it, is not convinced
that the specific course Israel
has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives.
The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely
infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory
occupied by Israel, and
the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified
by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security
or public order. The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes
breaches by Israel of various
of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian
law and human rights instruments.”
United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court:
Torres v. Mullin, Warden, 124 S. Ct. 562 (November 17, 2003)
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Torres’ application to review the
Court of Appeals’ determination dismissing his claims for violation
of diplomatic protection by consular notification under Article
36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Mr. Torres argued that the Court of Appeals’ determination was
in conflict with International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) decisions
that authoritatively interpret the Convention. Mexico
filed an amicus curiae brief at the Supreme Court
supporting Torres’s request, pointing out that it has brought a
case against the United States
before the ICJ which claims, inter alia, that this court
must apply the Vienna Convention to domestic law in Torres’s case.
Mexico further asked the
Supreme Court to defer consideration of Torres’ case until the ICJ
issued a decision.
Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens dissented from denial of certiorari.
Justice Breyer stated in his dissent that Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations required United
States authorities (1) to tell an arrested
foreign national, without delay, that he may have his nation’s consul
informed of the arrest, and (2) to tell the consul about the arrest.
Justice Breyer added that “this case raises important questions
concerning the relation between, on the one hand, the domestic law
of the United States, and,
on the other, decisions of the International Court of Justice interpreting
the Convention.” He also stated that “Depending on how the ICJ decides
Mexico’s related case against
the United States, and
subject to further briefing in light of the decision, I may well
vote to grant (review) in this case. Consequently I would defer
consideration of this petition.”
Click here
for the dissent of Justice Breyer. Both Justice Breyer and Justice
Steven’s dissents are available on Lexis.
United States (U.S.) Supreme Court: Olympic
Airways v. Husain, individually, and as personal representative
for the Estate of Hanson, deceased, et al., No.
02-1348 (February 24, 2004)
United States (U.S.) Supreme Court: Republic
of Austria et al. v Altmann, No. 03-13 (June 7, 2004)
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act applies to conduct that occurred prior to the Act's 1976 enactment
and prior to the United States' adoption of the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity.
The Respondent, Maria Altmann, filed an action in a United Stated
District Court (“District Court”) to recover six of her uncle’s
Gustav Klimt paintings that had been seized by the Nazis or had
been expropriated by Austria
and its instrumentality, the Austrian Gallery, after World War II.
Altmann asserted jurisdiction under § 2 of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a). She further asserted that the petitioners,
Austria and the Austrian
Gallery, were not entitled to immunity under the FSIA’s “expropriation
exception,” § 1605(a)(3), which expressly exempts immunity from
certain cases involving “rights in property taken in violation of
international law.” The District Court determined that the expropriation
exception covered the case and the United States Court of Appeals
(“Court of Appeals”) affirmed the finding. The Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the lower courts, though on more limited grounds.
Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he principal purpose of foreign
sovereign immunity has never been to permit foreign states and their
instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise
of future immunity from suit in United States
courts.”
(Click here
for a summary and link to Ninth Circuit decision in ILIB).
United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court: Rasul
et al. v. Bush, President of the United
States, No. 03-334 (June 28, 2004)
The U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction
to hear petitions challenging the legality of detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with armed conflict and
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The U.S. Supreme Court also held that U.S. District Courts have
jurisdiction to receive the complaint in Al
Odah et al. v. USA, (Summary available on ILIB) in which the petitioner
invoked 28
U.S.C. §1350, the Alien Tort Statute.
United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court: Hamdi
et al. v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., No. 03–6696
(June 28, 2004)
On June 28, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the “Fourth Circuit”)
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice O’Connor,
delivering the opinion of the Court joined by the Chief Justice,
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, concluded that under due process
a citizen detained by the U.S. government in the U.S. as an “enemy
combatant” had to be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge
that detention before a neutral decision-maker, even though Congress
authorized such a detention in the circumstances alleged in this
case.
United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court: Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain et al., Nos. 03-339 and 03-485 (June 29,
2004)
The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the “Ninth Circuit”)
decision, thereby dismissing Alvarez-Machain's claims against U.S.
Drug Enforcement officials pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"), 28
U.S.C. §1346, and the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),
28
U.S.C. §1350.
The Ninth Circuit, previously held that “the unilateral, nonconsensual
extraterritorial arrest and detention of Alvarez were arbitrary
and in violation of the law of nations under the [ATCA].” The court
held that Alvarez could seek a remedy in federal courts pursuant
to the ATCA and the FTCA for violations of the law of nations.
In regard to Alvarez-Machain's claim under the ATCA, the Supreme
Court also reversed, finding that "[a]lthough we agree the
statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time
of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims
in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized
at common law. We do not believe, however, that the limited, implicit
sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum
common law claims understood in 1789 should be taken as authority
to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez here."
United States
(U.S.) Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit: Flores et al. v. Southern Peru Copper
Corporation, No. 02-9008 (August 29, 2003)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”)
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),
28
U.S.C. §1350, thereby affirming the judgment of the District
Court. The Second Circuit held that the instruments relied upon
by the plaintiffs contained vague standards and "no limitation
as to how or by whom these rights may be violated." It concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a customary
international law "right to life" or "right to health."
The Second Circuit noted that the only treaty relied on by plaintiffs
that the United States has ratified is the non-self-executing International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966 (999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 ILM 368), but found that the
ICCPR's provision that "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life" was insufficiently definite to give rise to
a rule of customary international law.
United States
(U.S.) Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit: Cheema and Kaur v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, No. 02-71311 (December 1, 2003)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the "Ninth
Circuit") found that no evidence supported the Board of Immigration
Appeals' decision that the petitioners posed dangers to the national
security of the United States, thereby granting their petitions
for withholding of deportation, and remanding their petitions for
political asylum to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board").
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioners' acts within
the United States could be qualified as terrorist activity and therefore
upheld the Board's decision to deny mandatory relief on the basis
of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment.
United States (U.S.) Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Gherebi v. Bush and Rumsfeld,
No. 03-55785 District Court No. V-03-01267-AHM (December 18, 2003)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the "Ninth
Circuit") concluded that the United States
exercises sole jurisdiction and all of the basic attributes of full
territorial sovereignty over the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba.
It held that under Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 768 (1950), the U.S. district courts
may exercise jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition brought
by the brother of one of the Guantanamo Bay detainees, and remanded
the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California.
Available on Lexis and at 43 ILM
381 (2004).
United States (U.S.)
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: Furnes v. Reeves,
No. 03-12826 District Court No. 02-02998-CV-TWT-1 (March 10, 2004)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
(the "Eleventh Circuit") concluded that a child was wrongfully
removed or retained from Norway by the defendant in violation of
the plaintiff’s rights of custody under the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention”).
Adopting a de novo standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit
overruled the District Court’s decision which denied the plaintiff’s
petition for the return of his child to Norway.
At issue was whether the plaintiff’s rights to his child under Norwegian
law were the type of rights that entitled him to the return of his
child under the express terms of the Hague Convention.
Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals: Osbaldo Torres v. the State of Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (May 13, 2004)
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (the “Court”), after consideration
of Torres’s latest application for post-conviction relief and other
pleadings, ordered his execution date to be stayed pending further
order of the Court. The Court granted Torres’s request for an evidentiary
hearing and remanded to the District Court of Oklahoma County for
such a hearing on the following issues: “(a) whether Torres was
prejudiced by the State’s violation of his Vienna Convention rights
in failing to inform Torres, after he was detained, that he had
the right to contact the Mexican consulate; and (b) ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
Referring to the Avenadecision, Judge Chapel noted that “Avena directs the
Unites States to review and reconsider Torres’s conviction and sentence
in light of the consequences of the treaty violation. That review
and reconsideration falls to this Court. This is the first state
pleading in which Torres has raised his Vienna Convention claim,
and normally this Court would consider it procedurally barred. However,
while leaving the particular method of review and reconsideration
up to the United States,
Avena states that a complete application of procedural bar
will not fulfill the mandate to review and reconsider the conviction,
if procedural bar prevents the Vienna Convention claim from being
heard. In order to give full effect to Avena, we are bound by its
holding to review Torres’s conviction and sentence in light of the
Vienna Convention violation, without recourse to procedural bar.
... Torres’s Vienna Convention claim was generated by the State
of Oklahoma’s initial failure to comply with a treaty. I believe
we cannot fulfill the goal of a fair and just review of Torres’s
case if we refuse to look at his Vienna Convention claims on the
merits.”
Document provided to the ILM Office.
Courts in Other
Countries
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Spain:
Judgment on the Guatemalan Genocide Case, Judgment No. 327/2003
(February 25, 2003)
Spain’s
Tribunal Supremo held that Spanish courts could exercise jurisdiction
over the investigation of acts of torture committed in Guatemala
in 1980 by former Guatemalan officials against Spanish citizens.
The Court limited the scope of its jurisdiction to acts of genocide
in which Spanish nationals were victims, noting recent decisions
by both German and Belgium
courts in support of its conclusion. The Court observed: “[T]oday
there is significant support in doctrine for the idea that no particular
State is in the position to unilaterally establish order, through
resort to criminal law, against everyone and the entire world, without
their being some point of connection that renders legitimate the
extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”
Supreme Court of Israel:
BeitSourikVillage Council
v. The Government of Israel,
HCJ 2056/04 (June 30, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Israel ordered that the route of sections
of a wall in the area of Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank")
be changed in order to avoid unnecessary hardship to the local Palestinian
population. President A. Barak delivered the opinion of the Court.
Supreme Court of Argentina:
Judgment in the case of Enrique Lautaro Arancibia Clavel confirming
the non-applicability of statutory limitations to crimes against
humanity (August 24, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Argentina, in a 5-3 vote, held that crimes
against humanity, including genocide, torture, executions and forced
disappearances, are not subject to statutes of limitation.
Enrique Lautaro Arancibia Clavel (“Arancibia Clavel”) was convicted
by an Argentine federal court (Tribunal Oral Federal n16) of homicide
by use of explosives and for participation in a criminal association,
the group DINA Exterior (“DINA”), a secret police force under the
Pinochet regime. DINA operated under Chile’s
Director of National Intelligence both within Chile
and Argentina. Members
of DINA engaged in kidnapping, murder, torture and forced disappearance
of those considered to be political opponents.
The Supreme Court noted that the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
became part of the Argentine constitution in 2003 by means of Argentine
law no. 25.778. The Court also observed that the notion that such
crimes were not subject to statutory limitations was part of customary
international law even before the ratification of this Convention.
Therefore the Court concluded that holding Arrancibia Clavel criminally
liable for such crimes would not result in a retroactive application
of the law.
The Supreme Court of Chile:
Decision Lifting the Immunity of General Augusto Pinochet (August
26, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Chile, in a 9-8 vote, upheld the decision
of the Santiago Court of Appeals, holding that General Augusto Pinochet
was not immune from prosecution for crimes against humanity committed
30 years ago.
One factor leading to the Court’s decision to strip General Pinochet
of his immunity for involvement in “Operation Condor” was the U.S.
Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report released
last month. This report provided details concerning Pinochet's financial
operations with Riggs National Bank from 1996 to 2002. Chilean Prosecutors
contended that although General Pinochet was declared officially
demented in 2001, he has nevertheless conducted several financial
transactions through offshore corporations in the Bahamas
involving assets at the Riggs National Bank.
Supreme Court of Chile: Case of Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez (November 17, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Chile confirmed the prison sentence of Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda and others in a case of forced disappearance occurring in 1975. It unanimously upheld the principle that forced disappearance is a crime against humanity, not subject to statutes of limitation. It further found that because forced disappearance is an ongoing crime until proof of the victim's death has been established, the 1978 amnesty decree issued by the Chilean military government that covered human rights crimes committed between from 1973 to 1978 does not apply.
Available (in Spanish): http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/krassnoff.html
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Spain: Judgment in the Case of General Hernán Julio Brady Roche, Judgment No. 319/2004 (March 8, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Spain upheld jurisdiction over claims for torture of Spanish nationals allegedly committed by Chilean former Defense Minister Hernan Julio Brady Roche.
The Audiencia Nacional having declined to exercise jurisdiction over the claims, an appeal was brought by Laura González Vera, the widow of the Spanish diplomat Don Carmelo Soria, in addition to other individuals and a group called "Izquierda Unida" ("United Left"). Don Carmelo Soria, who was in Chile at the end of the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War, was kidnapped on July 14, 1976, and his body, showing signs of torture, was later found in Santiago.
At issue was the scope of jurisdiction under Article 23.4 of Spain’s Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Law on Judicial Power), which provides that Spanish courts shall have jurisdiction over international crimes including genocide and terrorism, committed by Spanish or foreign citizens, outside of Spain. The appellants claimed that by virtue of the above-mentioned law, Spanish courts could exercise jurisdiction over their claims for torture.
The Supreme Court noted the reasoning of the Guatemalan Genocide Case (42 ILM 683) and upheld jurisdiction over the claims connected to Spanish nationals.
Chile-Santiago Court of Appeals: Sentencing of Fernando Laureani Maturana and Miguel Krassnoff Marchenko (January 5, 2004)
The Santiago Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") denied amnesty to members of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), for the kidnapping, detention and torture of victims at Villa Grimaldi during Pinochet's dictatorship.
The defendants contended that they were entitled to protection under Chile's 1978 amnesty law (Decreto ley 2.121) since the crimes of which they are accused took place and ended between the period of September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978.
The Court of Appeals referred to international human rights law, to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and to recent jurisprudence of the Criminal Division of the Chilean Supreme Court and found that Chile's sovereignty is limited by the obligations of international treaties which protect fundamental human rights, in accordance with section, 2, Article 5 of the 1980 Constitution, amended in 1989.
By a majority vote of two-to-one, the Court of Appeals held that amnesty could not apply to kidnapping when the kidnapped victim remains missing, for this becomes a continuous crime and therefore exceeds the limit of the amnesty between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978. The Court of Appeals noted that until this day the whereabouts of one of the missing victims, Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez, are unknown, without any news of his death or discovery of his body. The Court of Appeals referred to the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons signed by Chile, noting that forced disappearance through agents of the State is a grave crime that has a continuous or permanent nature.
This is the first decision of a Chilean court that applies the jurisprudence of international law human rights law to prosecute those responsible for "the disappeared" during the Pinochet dictatorship. The decision awaits confirmation by the Supreme Court of Chile.
Supreme Court of Mexico: Decision on the extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo (June 10, 2003) (42 ILM 884)
The Supreme Court of Mexico upheld Spain’s request for extradition of former Argentine navy captain, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, thereby dismissing Cavallo’s appeal.
In late August 2000, Cavallo was captured in Mexico pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by Judge Baltasar Garzón of Spain who charged Carvallo with, inter alia, torture, terrorism and genocide committed during Argentina’s military dictatorship in the years 1976-1983.
On appeal Cavallo challenged the constitutionality of the 1978 extradition treaty and its protocol between Mexico and Spain, on several grounds, inter alia, that the treaty violated the guarantees of equality, security and protection of the law under Articles 1, 14, 16 and 19 of the Mexican Constitution. Cavallo argued that by requiring the requesting State to present facts giving only reasonable indication of the commission of a crime as opposed to finding probable cause, the extradition treaty violated the protections granted to criminal defendants under the Mexican Constitution. Cavallo also claimed that the acts of which he was accused were political crimes or military crimes, and that as a former member of the military, he was immune from prosecution by virtue of Argentina’s 1987 amnesty law. Cavallo further argued that Mexico could not interfere with the sovereignty of Argentina by extraditing him for crimes for which he was granted amnesty.
The Supreme Court of Mexico disagreed, finding that the extradition treaty and its protocol were duly ratified by the Mexican authorities and did not violate any provision of the Mexican Constitution. The Supreme Court found that pursuant to the 1978 extradition treaty, Mexico was under an obligation to extradite Cavallo and was without power to judge the competence of Spain’s criminal courts to try and sentence him. The Court observed that the only condition that Mexico could impose prior to extradition to Spain was that the Spanish courts afford the accused due process.
As to Cavallo’s claim that the acts were political crimes, the Court held that under Article 144 of the Mexican Federal Criminal Code, only acts such as sedition, insurrection, rebellion and conspiracy could fall under the category of political crimes. Moreover, the Court observed that acts of genocide were clearly prohibited under Article 149 of the Federal Criminal Code. The Court also found that the crimes for which Cavallo was accused could not be classified as military crimes, pursuant to Article 13 of the Magna Carta, because the crimes were not subject to military law, nor would Cavallo be judged before any military tribunal. In regard to Cavallo’s amnesty argument, the Court upheld the lower court’s reasoning that the Argentine amnesty law invoked by Cavallo was not applicable to the crimes subject to the extradition request. The Court observed that one State’s decision not to prosecute crimes of genocide did not prevent another State from prosecuting such crimes in accordance with international law and its domestic legislation.
The Mexican Supreme Court granted Cavallo’s extradition on the grounds of terrorism and genocide, but not on the grounds of torture, due to the fact that under Mexican law, the statute of limitations for prosecuting crimes of torture had passed.
On June 28, 2003 Cavallo was extradited to Spain.
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Spain: Judgment on the Guatemalan Genocide Case, Judgment No. 327/2003 (February 25, 2003) (42 ILM 683)
Spain’s Tribunal Supremo held that Spanish courts could exercise jurisdiction over the investigation of acts of torture committed in Guatemala in 1980 by former Guatemalan officials against Spanish citizens.
The appeal to the Tribunal Supremo was brought by Nobel Peace Laureate, Rigoberta Menchú Tum, among other Latin American and Spanish human rights organizations. At issue was the scope of jurisdiction under Article 23.4 of Spain’s Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Law on Judicial Power), which provides that Spanish courts shall have jurisdiction over international crimes including genocide and terrorism, committed by Spanish or foreign citizens, outside of Spain.
The original complaint alleged acts of genocide and torture committed by various Guatemalan officials from 1962-1996 that claimed victims of both Guatemalan and Spanish nationality. In particular, the complaint focused on the 1981 arson of Guatemala’s Spanish Embassy in which four Spanish priests were killed. The appellants sought annulment of a judgment declining jurisdiction issued on December 13, 2000 by Spain’s highest criminal court, the Audiencia Nacional. The appellants challenged, inter alia, the Audiencia Nacional’s interpretation of Article 6 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Repression of the Crimes of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”). In particular, the appellants challenged the Audiencia Nacional’s application of a principle of subsidiary jurisdiction, which provides that extraterritorial jurisdiction should only be exercised as a default to the exercise of jurisdiction of national courts in whose territory the acts occurred.
The Tribunal Supremo found that the Audiencia Nacional’s application of the subsidiarity principle was erroneous, observing that such a principle was not found in the 1948 Genocide Convention.
The Court limited the scope of its jurisdiction to acts of genocide in which Spanish nationals were victims, noting recent decisions by both German and Belgium courts in support of its conclusion. The Court observed: “[T]oday there is significant support in doctrine for the idea that no particular State is in the position to unilaterally establish order, through resort to criminal law, against everyone and the entire world, without their being some point of connection that renders legitimate the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”
Human Rights in Latin America, 2003 - 2004
Supreme Court of Chile: Case of Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez (November 17, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Chile confirmed the prison sentence of Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda and others in a case of forced disappearance occurring in 1975. It unanimously upheld the principle that forced disappearance is a crime against humanity, not subject to statutes of limitation. It further found that because forced disappearance is an ongoing crime until proof of the victim's death has been established, the 1978 amnesty decree issued by the Chilean military government that covered human rights crimes committed between from 1973 to 1978 does not apply.
Available (in Spanish): http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/krassnoff.html
The Supreme Court of Chile: Decision Lifting the Immunity of General Augusto Pinochet (August 26, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Chile, in a 9-8 vote, upheld the decision of the Santiago Court of Appeals, holding that General Augusto Pinochet was not immune from prosecution for crimes against humanity committed 30 years ago.
One factor leading to the Court’s decision to strip General Pinochet of his immunity for involvement in “Operation Condor” was the U.S. Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report released in July 2004. This report provided details concerning Pinochet's financial operations with Riggs National Bank from 1996 to 2002. Chilean Prosecutors contended that although General Pinochet was declared officially demented in 2001, he has nevertheless conducted several financial transactions through offshore corporations in the Bahamas involving assets at the Riggs National Bank.
Supreme Court of Argentina: Judgment in the case of Enrique Lautaro Arancibia Clavel confirming the non-applicability of statutory limitations to crimes against humanity (August 24, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Argentina, in a 5-3 vote, held that crimes against humanity, including genocide, torture, executions and forced disappearances, are not subject to statutes of limitation.
Enrique Lautaro Arancibia Clavel (“Arancibia Clavel”) was convicted by an Argentine federal court (Tribunal Oral Federal n16) of homicide by use of explosives and for participation in a criminal association, the group DINA Exterior (“DINA”), a secret police force under the Pinochet regime. DINA operated under Chile’s Director of National Intelligence both within Chile and Argentina. Members of DINA engaged in kidnapping, murder, torture and forced disappearance of those considered to be political opponents. Arancibia Clavel was accused of being involved, inter alia, in the car-bombing which killed the Chilean General Carlos Prats and his wife, Sofia Cuthbert, in Buenos Aires in 1974. The Argentine Criminal Court of Appeals (la Cámara Nacional de Casación Penal) declared that the criminal association sentence for participating in DINA was barred by statutory limitations. The representative of the government of Chile appealed the decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Argentina.
The Supreme Court of Argentina found that the crimes of the accused have been considered crimes against humanity since the end of World War II, as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among other international human rights instruments. It also observed that such crimes constitute crimes against humanity in accordance with Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
The Supreme Court also concluded that the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity became part of the Argentine constitution in 2003 by means of Argentine law no. 25.778.
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Spain: Judgment in the Case of General Hernán Julio Brady Roche, Judgment No. 319/2004 (March 8, 2004)
The Supreme Court of Spain upheld jurisdiction over claims for torture of Spanish nationals allegedly committed by Chilean former Defense Minister Hernan Julio Brady Roche.
The Audiencia Nacional having declined to exercise jurisdiction over the claims, an appeal was brought by Laura González Vera, the widow of the Spanish diplomat Don Carmelo Soria, in addition to other individuals and a group called "Izquierda Unida" ("United Left"). Don Carmelo Soria, who was in Chile at the end of the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War, was kidnapped on July 14, 1976, and his body, showing signs of torture, was later found in Santiago.
At issue was the scope of jurisdiction under Article 23.4 of Spain’s Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Law on Judicial Power), which provides that Spanish courts shall have jurisdiction over international crimes including genocide and terrorism, committed by Spanish or foreign citizens, outside of Spain. The appellants claimed that by virtue of the above-mentioned law, Spanish courts could exercise jurisdiction over their claims for torture.
The Supreme Court noted the reasoning of the Guatemalan Genocide Case (42 ILM 683) and upheld jurisdiction over the claims connected to Spanish nationals.
Chile-Santiago Court of Appeals: Sentencing of Fernando Laureani Maturana and Miguel Krassnoff Marchenko (January 5, 2004)
The Santiago Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") denied amnesty to members of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), for the kidnapping, detention and torture of victims at Villa Grimaldi during Pinochet's dictatorship.
The defendants contended that they were entitled to protection under Chile's 1978 amnesty law (Decreto ley 2.121) since the crimes of which they are accused took place and ended between the period of September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978.
The Court of Appeals referred to international human rights law, to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and to recent jurisprudence of the Criminal Division of the Chilean Supreme Court and found that Chile's sovereignty is limited by the obligations of international treaties which protect fundamental human rights, in accordance with section, 2, Article 5 of the 1980 Constitution, amended in 1989.
By a majority vote of two-to-one, the Court of Appeals held that amnesty could not apply to kidnapping when the kidnapped victim remains missing, for this becomes a continuous crime and therefore exceeds the limit of the amnesty between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978. The Court of Appeals noted that until this day the whereabouts of one of the missing victims, Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez, are unknown, without any news of his death or discovery of his body. The Court of Appeals referred to the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons signed by Chile, noting that forced disappearance through agents of the State is a grave crime that has a continuous or permanent nature.
This is the first decision of a Chilean court that applies the jurisprudence of international law human rights law to prosecute those responsible for "the disappeared" during the Pinochet dictatorship. The decision awaits confirmation by the Supreme Court of Chile.
Supreme Court of Mexico: Decision on the extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo (June 10, 2003) (42 ILM 884)
The Supreme Court of Mexico upheld Spain’s request for extradition of former Argentine navy captain, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, thereby dismissing Cavallo’s appeal.
In late August 2000, Cavallo was captured in Mexico pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by Judge Baltasar Garzón of Spain who charged Carvallo with, inter alia, torture, terrorism and genocide committed during Argentina’s military dictatorship in the years 1976-1983.
On appeal Cavallo challenged the constitutionality of the 1978 extradition treaty and its protocol between Mexico and Spain, on several grounds, inter alia, that the treaty violated the guarantees of equality, security and protection of the law under Articles 1, 14, 16 and 19 of the Mexican Constitution. Cavallo argued that by requiring the requesting State to present facts giving only reasonable indication of the commission of a crime as opposed to finding probable cause, the extradition treaty violated the protections granted to criminal defendants under the Mexican Constitution. Cavallo also claimed that the acts of which he was accused were political crimes or military crimes, and that as a former member of the military, he was immune from prosecution by virtue of Argentina’s 1987 amnesty law. Cavallo further argued that Mexico could not interfere with the sovereignty of Argentina by extraditing him for crimes for which he was granted amnesty.
The Supreme Court of Mexico disagreed, finding that the extradition treaty and its protocol were duly ratified by the Mexican authorities and did not violate any provision of the Mexican Constitution. The Supreme Court found that pursuant to the 1978 extradition treaty, Mexico was under an obligation to extradite Cavallo and was without power to judge the competence of Spain’s criminal courts to try and sentence him. The Court observed that the only condition that Mexico could impose prior to extradition to Spain was that the Spanish courts afford the accused due process.
As to Cavallo’s claim that the acts were political crimes, the Court held that under Article 144 of the Mexican Federal Criminal Code, only acts such as sedition, insurrection, rebellion and conspiracy could fall under the category of political crimes. Moreover, the Court observed that acts of genocide were clearly prohibited under Article 149 of the Federal Criminal Code. The Court also found that the crimes for which Cavallo was accused could not be classified as military crimes, pursuant to Article 13 of the Magna Carta, because the crimes were not subject to military law, nor would Cavallo be judged before any military tribunal. In regard to Cavallo’s amnesty argument, the Court upheld the lower court’s reasoning that the Argentine amnesty law invoked by Cavallo was not applicable to the crimes subject to the extradition request. The Court observed that one State’s decision not to prosecute crimes of genocide did not prevent another State from prosecuting such crimes in accordance with international law and its domestic legislation.
The Mexican Supreme Court granted Cavallo’s extradition on the grounds of terrorism and genocide, but not on the grounds of torture, due to the fact that under Mexican law, the statute of limitations for prosecuting crimes of torture had passed.
On June 28, 2003 Cavallo was extradited to Spain.
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Spain: Judgment on the Guatemalan Genocide Case, Judgment No. 327/2003 (February 25, 2003) (42 ILM 683)
Spain’s Tribunal Supremo held that Spanish courts could exercise jurisdiction over the investigation of acts of torture committed in Guatemala in 1980 by former Guatemalan officials against Spanish citizens.
The appeal to the Tribunal Supremo was brought by Nobel Peace Laureate, Rigoberta Menchú Tum, among other Latin American and Spanish human rights organizations. At issue was the scope of jurisdiction under Article 23.4 of Spain’s Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Law on Judicial Power), which provides that Spanish courts shall have jurisdiction over international crimes including genocide and terrorism, committed by Spanish or foreign citizens, outside of Spain.
The original complaint alleged acts of genocide and torture committed by various Guatemalan officials from 1962-1996 that claimed victims of both Guatemalan and Spanish nationality. In particular, the complaint focused on the 1981 arson of Guatemala’s Spanish Embassy in which four Spanish priests were killed. The appellants sought annulment of a judgment declining jurisdiction issued on December 13, 2000 by Spain’s highest criminal court, the Audiencia Nacional. The appellants challenged, inter alia, the Audiencia Nacional’s interpretation of Article 6 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Repression of the Crimes of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”). In particular, the appellants challenged the Audiencia Nacional’s application of a principle of subsidiary jurisdiction, which provides that extraterritorial jurisdiction should only be exercised as a default to the exercise of jurisdiction of national courts in whose territory the acts occurred.
The Tribunal Supremo found that the Audiencia Nacional’s application of the subsidiarity principle was erroneous, observing that such a principle was not found in the 1948 Genocide Convention.
The Court limited the scope of its jurisdiction to acts of genocide in which Spanish nationals were victims, noting recent decisions by both German and Belgium courts in support of its conclusion. The Court observed: “[T]oday there is significant support in doctrine for the idea that no particular State is in the position to unilaterally establish order, through resort to criminal law, against everyone and the entire world, without their being some point of connection that renders legitimate the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”
"Of
course we are interpreting our own Constitution, not
those of other nations, and there may be relevant political
and structural differences between their systems, systems
elsewhere, and our own. But their experience outside
this country may nonetheless cast an empirical light
on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem."