Treaties as Binding
International Obligation
By Frederic L. Kirgis May 1997
On April 9, 1997, John R. Bolton,
a former Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs in the Bush Administration,
testified before the House International Relations
Committee. In his written statement he asserted,
"Treaties are 'law' only for U.S. domestic purposes.
In their international operation, treaties are simply
'political,' and not legally binding." In support
of this assertion, he relied on several old Supreme
Court cases dealing with with the effect of treaties
in U.S. law or with reasons a government might put
forward for declining to execute a treaty.
Contrary to Mr. Bolton's assertion,
it is clear that treaties are legally binding in
their internal operation. The members of the United
Nations, including the United States, have said
as much when they established the U.N.'s principal
judicial organ, the International Court of Justice.
They have agreed to the Court's Statute, which provides
in article 38, "The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply [among
other sources] international conventions [i.e. treaties],
whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states."
The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, article 2(1)(a), defines a treaty
as "an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international
law...." This provision defines "treaty" for international
law purposes, except that-- as the U.S. Restatement
Third of Foreign Relations Law says--"under customary
international law oral agreements are no less binding
although their terms may not be readily susceptible
of proof." Restatement Third, § 301, Comment
b. The point is that by any widely accepted definition,
treaties are binding internationally.
The definition of treaty for
international law purposes is broader than one finds
in the U.S. Constitution, where treaties are defined
in domestic law as international agreements entered
into with the advice and consent of two-thirds of
the Senate. It is widely accepted that the United
States may enter into some international agreements
that are treaties in the international sense but
not in the U.S. constitutional sense. Some of those
agreements are entered into by the Executive Branch
on its own authority and some by the Executive with
the concurrence of both Houses of Congress.
The Vienna Convention is in
force for 81 nation-states, not including the United
States. The reason it is not in force for the United
States is that a stalemate exists between Congress
and the Executive Branch over the allocation of
authority between the two branches to enter into
and terminate international agreements (treaties
in the international sense) on behalf of the United
States. The stalemate would not exist if such agreements
were not regarded as binding on the United States
internationally. It is precisely because they are
regarded as binding that so much is at stake between
the two branches of government.
The United States government
has frequently demonstrated that it regards treaties
(including treaties for U.S. constitutional purposes
as well as other international agreements) as binding
instruments under international law. For example,
when France breached the 1946 Air Service Agreement
between itself and the United States, our government
asserted a breach of an international obligation
and applied counter-measures to induce France to
rectify its breach. The U.S. counter-measures were
upheld by an international arbitral tribunal. 54
Int'l Law Reports 304 (Award of Dec.9, 1979).
Many of Mr. Bolton's assertions
have to do with the effect of treaties in domestic
(U.S.) law. As a matter of U.S. law, Congress does
have the power to override a pre-existing treaty
obligation that is binding upon the United States
under international law. The effect would be that
courts and other decision-makers within the United
States would follow the Congressional directive,
but the United States would be in violation of its
international obligation to its other treaty partner(s)
unless there is some valid reason under international
treaty law to excuse U.S. performance.
The valid reasons are much like
those recognized in American contract law relating
to agreements between private parties, including
(in international law) such things as unforeseen,
fundamentally changed circumstances or material
breach by the other party to the treaty. The fact
that there may valid excuses for nonperformance
does not mean that treaties are not binding under
international law, any more than valid excuses for
nonperformance of contracts means that they are
not binding under domestic law.
One of Mr. Bolton's assertions
is that "even if the players could agree on a baseline
of what 'international law' was, there is no accepted
way of adjudicating disputes arising under that
law." In fact, however, the United States is a party
to many treaties containing compromissory clauses
that provide for submission of disputes over interpretation
or application of the treaties to the International
Court of Justice or to some other third-party international
dispute-settlement mechanism.
In the context of the obligation
to pay U.N. dues stemming from article 19 of the
U.N. Charter, Mr. Bolton says that "no purpose is
served by pounding on the idea that the U.S. is
acting 'illegally' by not paying the assessments
decided by the General Assembly or other governing
bodies." He then asserts that Bruno Simma, an eminent
treatise writer on the U.N. Charter, concedes that
"[in] principle, a right to refuse payment of assessed
contributions should be recognized within certain
limits." Professor Simma was not actually the author
of that statement, but in any case Mr. Bolton has
taken it out of context. In context, it refers to
a specific situation: whether member states are
required to contribute to the financing of activities
that may be inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.
See Christian Tomuschat, Article 19, in The Charter
of the United Nations: A Commentary 327, 329 (Bruno
Simma, editor, 1994). Those in Congress who support
partial withholding do not argue that the withholding
is limited to amounts that otherwise would go toward
financing activities that are inconsistent with
the Charter.
Treaties, including the United
Nations Charter, are binding instruments under international
law, subject to limited grounds much like those
in domestic contract law for invalidating or terminating
them.
Frederic L. Kirgis
Law School Association Alumni Professor
Washington and Lee University School of Law;
Chair, ASIL Insight Committee
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