Alien Tort Claims
Act Proceeding Against Robert Mugabe By Frederic
L. Kirgis
September, 2000
According to news reports, Robert Mugabe,
the head of state of Zimbabwe, was served with process while
he was in New York City for the United Nations Millennium
Summit, in a suit brought by Zimbabwean nationals seeking
civil damages under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).
The suit alleges that Mugabe orchestrated violence by his
political party against its opponents, including beating
and burning the plaintiffs or, in one case, the husband
of a plaintiff, in order to stay in power at the time of
Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections in June.
The ATCA gives federal courts in the United
States jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."(1)
The violence alleged in the suit, if proved and if committed
by state officials acting as such, or if committed under
color of law, would almost certainly be a tort (i.e. a civil
wrong) in violation of the law of nations. International
law prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
at the hands of public officials, even when the victims
are citizens of the state in which the treatment occurs.(2)
The definition of torture in the international Convention
Against Torture includes not only the infliction of severe
pain or suffering for purposes of eliciting information,
but also for purposes of intimidating or coercing an individual
or a third person for some other reason.(3)
Torture, however, would not necessarily have to be proved,
since cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would also suffice
for potential liability.
Nevertheless, Mugabe could assert in defense
to the suit that, as the current head of state of Zimbabwe,
he is entitled to head-of-state immunity from suit in a
U.S. court. In 1994 a federal court held that Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, then the recognized head of state of Haiti, was
immune from suit in a U.S. court in a case involving an
alleged political assassination.(4)
In 1995 an ATCA suit against Radovan Karadi, the president
of the self-proclaimed republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
was allowed to proceed, but the United States had never
recognized the legitimacy of a state of Srpska and the case
thus would be distinguishable from the current one.(5)
In 1999 the British House of Lords denied head-of-state
immunity to Augusto Pinochet of Chile, but he was no longer
the head of state at the time of the British proceedings,
so his case could be distinguished as well.(6)
Some cases in federal courts also allow individual
high-ranking foreign government officials to claim sovereign
immunity from suit.(7) Sovereign
immunity is based on a federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA),(8) which
applies primarily to governments themselves and their instrumentalities,
rather than to heads of state. It is not clear that all
federal courts would consider someone like Mugabe eligible
for sovereign immunity (as distinguished from head-of-state
immunity). If the court in the Mugabe case did so, it would
probably provide Mugabe with another successful defense.
Even though the FSIA contains a limited exception to immunity
for cases involving torture, it applies only to sovereigns
that are on the U.S. State Department's terrorist list (Zimbabwe
is not) and it applies only in favor of persons who were
U.S. nationals at the time of the alleged torture.(9)
Mugabe could also argue that the alleged
violence was not "official," since it was conducted by a
political party or persons in the service of a political
party, rather than by the government as such. If it was
not official, there would be doubt whether it constituted
a violation of international law. An answer could be that
if Mugabe, the head of state, orchestrated the violence
for purposes of remaining in power, that would supply the
"official" element.
Mugabe might argue, further, that international
law is not incorporated into federal law in the United States
in the absence of a specific Congressional act adopting
a particular rule of international law as a rule of federal
law, so a federal court relying on the constitutional grant
of jurisdiction over federal questions could not constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over an international law claim without
such a Congressional statute. The ATCA, however, is a Congressional
act. Most federal courts that have applied the ATCA have
treated it as incorporating rules of international law as
federal rules of decision on which plaintiffs may base their
claims for monetary damages. In addition, there is a line
of federal cases to the effect that some rules of customary
international law have the status of federal common law
in the United States. The rules most likely to have that
status would be specific rules protecting basic human rights,
such as the rule against torture of the rule against cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.(10)
Another argument might be based on the federal
act of state doctrine, which precludes courts in this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a
recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory.
There is a question, mentioned above, whether the acts of
a political party, even one in power, are the acts of the
sovereign. Even if they are, one Supreme Court precedent
on the act of state doctrine suggests that U.S. courts may
review acts of foreign sovereigns when there is a great
degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law.(11)
There is a high degree of consensus regarding the international
law prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment of individuals by government officials (leaving
aside procedural defenses such as head-of-state immunity
which could apply in a domestic court, though not in an
international criminal court).
Questions could be raised about the propriety
of serving process on Mugabe while he was in New York for
a U.N. meeting. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the U.N., a multilateral treaty to which the United States
is a party, gives "representatives" to the U.N. immunity
from arrest (Mugabe was not arrested) and from legal process
of any kind "in respect of words spoken or written and all
acts done by them in their capacity as representatives."(12)
Mugabe probably would be considered a representative of
Zimbabwe to the U.N. during his brief visit to New York,
but the legal process served on him did not relate to anything
done by him in that capacity. Under the Convention, he would
also be entitled to "such other privileges, immunities and
facilities not inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic
envoys enjoy."(13) This
could give him immunity from suit (just as head-of-state
immunity would), but would not necessarily invalidate the
service of process on him.
There is also a Headquarters Agreement between
the United States and the United Nations. It gives diplomatic
immunity to "resident representatives" of members to the
U.N. But Mugabe would not be a "resident" representative.(14)
The strongest defense, judging from the facts
available so far, would appear to be head-of-state immunity.
_____________ Endnotes: 1. 28 U.S. Code § 1350. 2. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 7, 999 United Nations Treaty Series
171. 3. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art.
1, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). 4. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 Fed. Supp.
128 (Eastern Dist. N.Y. 1994). 5. Kadic v. Karadi, 70 Fed.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995). 6. Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
7. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank,
912 Fed.2d 1095, 1099-1103 (9th Cir. 1990); El-Fadl
v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 Fed.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir.
1996). 8. 28 U.S. Code §§ 1330, 1332,
1602 and following. 9. 28 U.S.Code § 1605(a)(7). 10. For the debate on whether international
human rights law is part of federal law, compare Bradley
& Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997),
with Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harvard
L. Rev. 1824 (1998). 11. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 12. Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, art. 4, 21 U.S. Treaties
1418, 1 United Nations Treaty Series 16. 13. Id. 14. Headquarters Agreement between the
United States of America and the United Nations, art. 5,
61 Statutes at Large 3416, 11 United Nations Treaty Series
12.
About the Author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law School Association Alumni Professor
at Washington and Lee University School of Law. He has written
a book and several articles on United Nations
law, and is a member of the Board of Editors of the American
Journal of International Law.
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