WTO Arbitration
Decision on Retaliation Against the US
over the Byrd Amendment
By Eliza Patterson
September 2004
Eight related World Trade Organization
(WTO) arbitration decisions issued on August
31, 2004, [1] set the amount of retaliation eight US trading
partners (the "Requesting Parties") may
impose against the United States for its
failure to comply with a prior WTO Appellate
Body ruling that the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) -- commonly known
as the "Byrd Amendment" -- violated WTO
rules.
[2] In that ruling, the Appellate Body,
largely upholding a prior panel decision,
held that the CDSOA violated the Antidumping
Agreement Article 18.4, the Subsidy and
Countervailing Measures Agreement Article
32.5, and the WTO Agreement Article XVI:4.
[3] The reason for the violation was
that the CDSOA provides that duties assessed
pursuant to a countervailing duty order
or an antidumping duty order are to be distributed
on an annual basis to the affected domestic
petitioners in the case and to those who
supported the successful petition, rather
than being retained by the US government.
As a result of the US failure
to bring the CDSOA into compliance, eight
of the eleven complainants in the dispute
requested authorization under WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding Article 22.2 to
suspend concessions or other obligations
(in common parlance, to retaliate) with
respect to their trade with the United States.
Their requests led to the August decision,
which is important for several reasons.
First, the decision confirmed
the long-standing WTO norm that retaliation
must be based on the amount of trade damage
caused by the law found to be in violation
of WTO rules, and not on the extent or nature
of the illegality.
[4] Specifically, the arbitrator rejected
the Requesting Parties' argument that because
each disbursement under CDSOA violated the
WTO, the total amount of disbursements,
rather than the trade impact, should be
used to determine the level of retaliation.
Second, the decision held that
the relevant trade damage for establishing
retaliation rights is not the total global
trade effects of the illegal measure, but
rather the more limited impact on the trade
of the requesting party. In other words,
countries are only entitled to retaliate
in amounts equal to the trade effects of
the illegal measure on their own exports
regardless of the global effects of the
illegal measure. This is so even if less
than 100% of the adverse trade effects are
countered by retaliation. Specifically,
the arbitrator rejected the complainants'
claims that they should be allowed to consider
not only the trade damage suffered by their
own exporters, but should additionally be
allowed to allocate among themselves the
trade damage suffered by countries that
did not participate in the case.
[5]
The decision is perhaps most
important for its use of economic modeling
and its discussion of the particular methodology
used in this case for quantifying the trade
damage that determines the level of retaliation.
By setting a precedent for the use of sophisticated
economic modeling, the arbitrator may have
opened a Pandora's box. In future cases,
parties are as likely to disagree over the
appropriate economic model as they are over
the correct legal interpretation of the
WTO. In fact, the arbitrator implied that
the model chosen was somewhat at random. [6] On the other hand, the arbitrator's
detailed discussion of the formula may provide
guidance to future Requesting Parties and
arbitrators in crafting and evaluating retaliation
requests.
In order to quantify the trade
impact on each of the Requesting Parties
of the Byrd Amendment's illegality under
the WTO, the arbitrator constructed a complex
formula based on the theory that such impact
would flow from the displacement of imported
products by US goods whose price had been
reduced as a result of the WTO-illegal payments,
and that therefore the extent of trade damage
would depend on (1) the amount by which
the distributions would be "passed-through"
to consumers in the form of lower prices
and (2) the extent to which such price reductions
would cause consumers to switch from imports
to domestic products (the "elasticity of
substitution"). [7]
Using that formula, the Arbitrator
determined that the level of retaliation
for each Requesting Party was equal to the
amount of duties collected by the United
States on that country's exports and distributed
to US petitioners under CDSOA for the most
recent year for which figures were available,
multiplied by 0.72. [8]
The arbitrator acknowledged
that the level of retaliation would vary
from year-to-year, but said this was not
prohibitedunder the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding. The arbitrator noted that
if the level of retaliation did not increase
as CDSOA distributions increased, the United
States might not have sufficient incentive
to repeal the offending provision -- the
ultimate goal of any retaliation.
Application of the formula
using fiscal 2003 figures for the amount
of CDSOA distributions would result in retaliation
valued at approximately $76 million by Japan,
$18 million by the European Union, $3.1
million by Canada, $2.9 million by Mexico,
$1.44 million by India, $1 million by Brazil,
and $576,000 by Chile. None of the countries
has specified when it will begin to implement
retaliation. Many of them remain hopeful
that the United States will comply with
the earlier ruling and repeal the CDSOA,
thereby obviating the need, and the right,
to retaliate.
The Bush administration has
said it intends to comply with the earlier
ruling against the Byrd Amendment, but has
given no indication that compliance would
be expedited as a result of the ruling on
retaliation. In fact, opposition in the
US Congress to repeal of the Byrd Amendment
seems to have intensified following the
decision.
About
the author:
Eliza Patterson is a trade attorney practicing
in Washington DC. She is currently an adjunct
professor at George Washington University
Law School. She graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1972. She can be contacted at
erpatterson@Msn.com.
[2] The Requesting Parties were the European Union,
Japan, Brazil, Canada, Chile, India, Mexico
and South Korea. The arbitrations on the
eight requests were carried out jointly.
However, separate decisions were issued
for each Requesting Party. The decisions
were substantially identical and are analyzed
as a unit in this Insight piece.
[4] Report paras 3.53-56. Article 22.4 of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding provides
that the level of suspension of concessions
(i.e. retaliation) authorized by the Dispute
Settlement Body shall be equivalent to the
level of the nullification or impairment.
[8] Para. 3.80.
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