Security Council
Resolution on Multinational Interim Force in Haiti
By Frederic L. Kirgis
March 2004
On February 29, 2004, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1529, authorizing
the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force
in Haiti after former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, facing insurrection and public disorder,
resigned and left the country. Acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council has empowered the Multinational Force
to contribute to a secure and stable environment
in Haiti, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian
assistance, to facilitate international assistance
to the Haitian police and Coast Guard for purposes
of establishing and maintaining public safety
and protecting human rights, to support establishment
of conditions for international organizations
to assist the Haitian people, and to coordinate
with others to prevent further deterioration
of the humanitarian situation.
Chapter VII of the Charter empowers
the Security Council to determine the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace
or act of aggression, and to take measures to
maintain or restore international peace and
security. Security Council decisions under
Chapter VII are binding on all U.N. member states.
Resolution 1529 calls on member
states to contribute personnel, equipment and
other resources to the Multinational Force.
Two of its provisions are particularly significant.
Paragraph 6 "[a]uthorizes the Member States
participating in the Multinational Interim Force
in Haiti to take all necessary measures to fulfil
its mandate." Paragraph 7 "[d]emands
that all the parties to the conflict in Haiti
cease using violent means, and reiterates that
all parties must respect international law,
including with respect to human rights and that
there will be individual accountability and
no impunity for violators."
Paragraph 7 could be read to preclude
the use of a process like the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission that was established in South Africa
after the demise of the apartheid government.
The goal there was to try to heal the country's
deep wounds by providing amnesty to perpetrators
of human rights abuses who admitted what they
had done and disclosed the facts fully. But
the South African procedure also provided for
criminal sanctions against those who refused
to cooperate, so it did not offer unconditional
impunity. Perhaps something similar in Haiti
would satisfy Paragraph 7. Moreover, it is
not entirely clear that U.N. member states,
including Haiti, would be legally bound under
the U.N. Charter to deny impunity under paragraph
7. Even though decisions under Chapter VII
of the Charter are binding, it is not clear
that a "reiteration" that there will
be no impunity is a "decision" within
the meaning of U.N. Charter Articles 25 and
48 (the Charter articles that obligate member
states to carry out the "decisions"
of the Security Council).
The language in paragraph 6 of
Resolution 1529 is reminiscent of language the
Security Council has used in other resolutions
to authorize the use of force. For example,
in Resolution 678 (1990), the Council -- acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter -- authorized
member states to use "all necessary means"
to restore international peace and security
in the Persian Gulf area. It was understood
that Resolution 678 authorized the use of force
against Iraq in what became Operation Desert
Storm. Nevertheless, the authorization of "all
necessary measures" under Resolution 1529
probably is not exactly the same as the authorization
of "all necessary means" under other
resolutions, such as Resolution 678, where the
focus was on armed force. That was the focus
when -- just two days before the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1529 -- it authorized French
forces in Côte D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) to use
"all necessary means" to support a
U.N. peacekeeping mission, including intervention
against belligerents (Resolution 1528 (2004)).
It was also the focus in 1994 when the Security
Council adopted Resolution 940, authorizing
a multinational force to use "all necessary
means" to restore democracy in Haiti (an
operation that ironically restored Aristide's
presidency after he had been in exile).
The slight difference in terminology
between the previous resolutions and Resolution
1529 presumably reflects a difference in purpose.
Under Resolution 1529 the primary purposes are
not only to restore order in a single country,
Haiti, but also to facilitate humanitarian assistance
in that country. Under Resolution 678 the purpose
was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and restore
international peace in the area. In Resolution
1528 the Council was authorizing France to use
force if necessary in Côte d'Ivoire. An authorization
in Resolution 1529 to use "all necessary
means" might be interpreted simply as an
authorization to use force. The authorization
to use "all necessary measures" apparently
would include not only an authorization to use
force if it is necessary to achieve the Council's
goals in Haiti, including restoring and maintaining
public order, but also to take other measures
that would be appropriate to achieve the Council's
humanitarian goals. The breadth of the Council's
use of the term "measures" is indicated
in several anti-terrorism resolutions, where
the Council has authorized or imposed "measures"
such as background checks of asylum-seekers,
freezing of assets of members of terrorist groups
and travel restrictions on them. [1]
The principal purpose of the United
Nations, stated in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter,
is to maintain international peace and
security, for which the Security Council has
the primary responsibility (Article 24(1)).
Some observers have questioned whether, in situations
of domestic chaos, where the unrest seems to
be localized within a particular country, the
Council is staying within its mandate under
the U.N. Charter when it authorizes the use
of force or imposes other sanctions under Chapter
VII. One answer that has been given is that
armed chaos within one country may well have
spillover effects outside its borders or may
beckon outsiders to enter the country and contribute
to the disorder there. The preamble to Resolution
1529 cites a threat to "stability in the
Caribbean especially through the potential outflow
of people to other States in the subregion."
It does not elaborate on how the outflow would
amount to a threat to the peace of the subregion.
In any event, there are precedents for Security
Council action in situations of domestic unrest,
in addition to the recent action on Haiti and
Côte D'Ivoire. The generally accepted practice
of U.N. organs over time can establish the law
of the organization.
[2]
The Security Council faced a chaotic,
dangerous situation when the Congo became independent
in 1960. At the request of the fragile, new
government of the Congo, the Security Council
established a peacekeeping force known by its
French acronym, ONUC, to maintain order and
protect lives. The Council did not expressly
act under Chapter VII, but it did authorize
the U.N. Secretary-General to "take all
necessary action" to effectuate the withdrawal
of Belgian troops from the Congo (Resolution
145 (1960)), while reaffirming that ONUC would
not intervene in the outcome of any internal
conflict (Resolution 146 (1960)). Later, the
Council expanded the mandate to include not
only assistance in maintaining law and order,
but also prevention of civil war and apprehension
of all foreign military personnel not under
U.N. command (Resolution 169 (1961)). The U.N.
Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had great
difficulty carrying out the mandate, which he
initially interpreted as authorizing the use
of force by U.N. troops only in self-defense. [3] The situation, which included an attempt to secede by Katanga
province, was not stabilized until 1964. The
U.N.'s attempt to restore order and keep the
peace had been both controversial and largely
ineffective.
When the Ian Smith government of
Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence
(UDI) from the United Kingdom in 1965, the Security
Council rejected UDI, found that there was a
threat to international peace and security,
and imposed economic sanctions under Chapter
VII (Resolution 232 (1966)). Former U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Acheson and some others argued
that the Security Council was improperly intervening
in Rhodesia's internal matters, [4] but the Council's action was accepted by almost all U.N. member
states. The sanctions were maintained, and
the Smith government eventually backed down.
Rhodesia became the independent state of Zimbabwe
in 1980.
When anarchy prevailed in Somalia
in the early 1990s, the Security Council invoked
Chapter VII to authorize the Secretary-General
and cooperating member states to "use all
necessary means" to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations
(Resolution 794 (1992)). The Resolution also
contained forceful language demanding that all
factions in Somalia cooperate with the U.N.
and desist from all breaches of international
humanitarian law. It was the first time the
Security Council had used Chapter VII for humanitarian
relief purposes. Despite a substantial United
States military presence and a renewed mandate
from the Security Council in Resolution 923
(1994), chaos and clan warfare persisted. The
last U.N. troops left Somalia in 1995, without
having stabilized the situation.
In Somalia the Security Council
did what it had failed to do in the Congo:
it used the now-familiar code words ("all
necessary means") to authorize the use
of armed force to inject order into the domestic
chaos. It invoked Chapter VII in a situation
that seemed to be entirely domestic, as seems
to be the case today in Haiti. In the case
of Somalia, as in the current Resolution 1529
regarding Haiti, the Council gave the U.N.-mandated
force authority to do what may be necessary
to restore order and facilitate humanitarian
relief. In Somalia the effort failed. The
question today is not so much whether the Security
Council may lawfully use Chapter VII in a situation
of domestic chaos or whether the Council in
Resolution 1529 has given a clear and legally
adequate mandate; instead, it is whether, as
a practical matter, Chapter VII can be used
effectively in such a situation. Perhaps events
in Haiti will provide an answer.
About the Author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law Alumni Association
Professor at Washington and Lee University School
of Law. He has written books and articles on
international law, and is an honorary editor
of the American Journal of International Law.
The author is grateful to Professor José Alvarez
for his continuing willingness to vet Insight
drafts such as this one. Any errors or omissions
are the author's own.
[1] See, for example, Security Council Resolution
1373, para. 3(f) (2001); Security Council
Resolution 1526, para. 1 (2004).
[2] See, in another context, Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (International Court
of Justice Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reports
16, at para. 22).
[4] See Statement of Dean Acheson, in Hearings on
U.N. Sanctions Against Rhodesia - Chrome,
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1971).
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