Alleged Monitoring
of United Nations Telephone Calls
By Frederic L. Kirgis
March 2004
A former member of British Prime
Minister Tony Blair's cabinet has asserted that
British intelligence services monitored United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's telephone
conversations in the period leading up to the
war in Iraq in 2003. Allegedly, this was done
by placing bugging devices in Mr. Annan's office. [1] In addition, Richard Butler,
the former U.N. chief weapons inspector for
Iraq, has said that while he was serving in
that position his calls from the U.N. were monitored
by the United States, the United Kingdom, France
and Russia. He said that when he wanted to
make unmonitored calls, he would leave the U.N.
building to do so.
[2]
This Insight sets out the basic
provisions of international agreements that
might bear on the legality of such monitoring,
without attempting to reach a legal conclusion.
The United Nations Charter does not deal specifically
with this issue, but it does require all member
states to give the U.N. "every assistance
in any action it takes in accordance with the
present Charter" (Article 2(5)), and it
provides in Article 100(2):
Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusive international
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General
and the staff and not to seek to influence
them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
Moreover, Article 105(1) of the U.N. Charter
says:
The Organization shall enjoy
in the territory of each of its Members such
privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the fulfilment of its purposes.
The primary reason for endowing
the United Nations (and other intergovernmental
organizations) with privileges and immunities
is to ensure the organization's independence
by protecting it from interference by governments.
[3] Article 105(1) does not define the
privileges and immunities needed for this purpose,
but they are fleshed out by other treaties.
Particularly significant is the General Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, [4] a multilateral treaty dating from 1946. It currently has 148
states parties, including the United States,
United Kingdom, France and Russia. It provides
in Article II, Section 3:
The premises of the United Nations
shall be inviolable. The property and assets
of the United Nations, wherever located and
by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and
any other form of interference, whether by
executive, administrative, judicial or legislative
action.
Fred Eckhard, the spokesperson for the U.N.
Secretary-General, relied primarily on this
provision when he asserted that the practice
of monitoring the Secretary-General was illegal.
[5]
The General Convention does not
specifically mention interception or monitoring
of telephone calls, but it does reflect a recognition
of the United Nations' need for private communications
when it says in Article III, Section 10, "The
United Nations shall have the right to use codes
and to despatch and receive its correspondence
by courier or in bags, which shall have the
same immunities and privileges as diplomatic
couriers and bags." The Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, another multilateral
treaty, sets out the privileges and immunities
of diplomats and diplomatic property. Article
27(1) says, "The receiving State shall
permit and protect free communication on the
part of the mission for all official purposes."
It allows the use of code or cipher. Article
27(2) provides, "The official correspondence
of the mission shall be inviolable." Article
27(3) prohibits the opening of the diplomatic
bag.
The General Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations also gives
the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General
"the privileges and immunities, exemptions
and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys,
in accordance with international law."
(Article V, Section 19.) Similar privileges
and immunities are given to resident representatives
of U.N. member states under Article V, Section
15 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement,
[6] which is a bilateral agreement between
the U.N. and the United States. The Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides
in Article 31(1) that a diplomatic agent shall
"enjoy immunity from [the receiving state's]
civil and administrative jurisdiction,"
except in certain cases unrelated to the present
situation.
The Vienna Convention also provides
in Article 22(1) that the premises of the diplomatic
mission are inviolable, and the agents of the
receiving state may not enter them without consent.
The same principle applies directly to U.N.
headquarters. The United Nations Headquarters
Agreement provides in Article III, Section 9(a):
The headquarters district [in
New York City] shall be inviolable. Federal,
state or local officers or officials of the
United States, whether administrative, judicial,
military or police, shall not enter the headquarters
district to perform any official duties therein
except with the consent of and under conditions
agreed to by the Secretary-General.
The U.N. General Assembly (or the
Security Council, if no permanent member casts
a veto) could refer any differences regarding
the interpretation or application of the General
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations to the International Court
of Justice for an advisory opinion. Unlike
most ICJ advisory opinions, in this type of
case "The opinion given by the Court shall
be accepted as decisive by the parties."
(General Convention Article VIII, Section 30.)
In other words, the opinion would be binding
on the parties.
The Headquarters Agreement contains
its own dispute-settlement provision. It calls
for arbitration by a three-member tribunal.
The decision of the tribunal is "final."
(Headquarters Agreement Article VIII, Section
21.) The Headquarters Agreement in Article
III, Section 8, also gives the United Nations
the power to make regulations for the Headquarters
District in New York "for the purpose of
establishing therein conditions in all respects
necessary for the full execution of its functions."
Presumably, the U.N. General Assembly could
use this authority to prohibit future attempts
to monitor telephone calls to or from the Headquarters
District.
Finally, when the United States
communicated its consent to the Headquarters
Agreement in 1947, it did so subject to the
provisions of U.S. Public Law 357.
[7] Section 6 of Public Law 357 provides
in part, "Nothing in the [Headquarters
Agreement] shall be construed as in any way
diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right
of the United States to safeguard its own security
. . . ." The context for this provision
was the U.S. desire to control the movement
of U.N.-related persons and visitors to destinations
outside the U.N. headquarters district and its
immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, the quoted
language might be construed broadly to contemplate
even U.S. security measures within the headquarters
district.
Even so, the U.N.'s privileges
and immunities under the United Nations Charter
and the General Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations would remain
in force, since the Charter and the General
Convention are separate legal instruments not
governed by the Headquarters Agreement. Moreover,
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter says, "In
the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail."
About the Author:
Frederic L. Kirgis is Law Alumni Association
Professor at Washington and Lee University School
of Law. He has written books and articles on
international law, and is an honorary editor
of the American Journal of International Law.
The author is grateful to Professor José Alvarez
for his very helpful comments on a draft of
this Insight. Any errors or omissions are the
author's own.
[7] 61 Stat. 756 (1947).
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