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International Law In Brief

June 14 - 18, 1999
Developments in international law, prepared by the
Attorney-Editors of
International Legal Materials
The American Society of International Law

About International Law In Brief




Treaties and Other International Agreements

ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted at Geneva, and Recommendation, June 17, 1999

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization ("ILO") underlined in the Preamble to its Convention that child labor is to a great extent caused by poverty, and that the long-term solution "lies in sustained economic growth leading to social progress, in particular poverty alleviation and universal education."

According to the Convention, the worst forms of child labor include:  (i) all forms of slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom, and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (ii) child prostitution and pornography; (iii) the use of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; and (iv) work which is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.  Article 3.

Harmful types of work will be defined by national laws or regulations, and periodically revised by the competent authorities.  Article 4.  The Convention also calls upon each Member to establish and designate appropriate mechanisms and programs to monitor the implementation of its provisions.  Articles 5-6.  Finally, the Convention stressed the importance of education in eliminating child labor, the need for adequate assistance for the rehabilitation of children that participated in the worst forms of child labor, and the special situation of girls in this respect.  Article 7.

In the accompanying Recommendation, the General Conference stressed that the programs under Article 6 of the Convention should aim at:  (i) identifying and denouncing the worst forms of child labor; (ii) preventing the engagement of children in or removing them from the worst forms of child labor; (iii) giving special attention to younger children, with special distinction to girls, the problem of hidden work situations, and other groups of children with special vulnerabilities or needs; (iv) working with communities where children are at special risk; and (v) informing, sensitizing and mobilizing public opinion and concerned groups, including children and their families.  Article 2

The Recommendation provides guidelines for determining hazardous types of work.  Article 3.  The Recommendation also suggests that, for the purpose of implementing the Convention, detailed information and statistical data on the nature and extent of child labor should be compiled and kept up to date to serve as a basis for determining priorities for national action for the abolition of child labor.  Article 5.

In addition, Members should cooperate by gathering and exhanging information concerning criminal offences, as well as detecting, registering, and prosecuting those involved and responsible for the worst forms of child labor.  Article 11.  Finally, enhanced international cooperation should include:  (i) mobilization of resources for national or international programs; (ii) mutual legal and technical assistance; and (iii) support for social and economic development, poverty eradication programs, and universal education.  Article 16.  BM
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/child/conventions/ilo_conv/conv.htm
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/child/conventions/ilo_conv/rec.htm

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Judicial and Other Decisions

US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: Government of Guam v. USA, No. 97-17140 (June 4, 1999)

The Government of Guam brought an action against the United States to recover 24,000 acres of land.  Guam had been ceded by Spain in 1898 and, except for a three year occupation by the Japanese during World War II, has been administered by the Department of the Navy.  Guam relied on the 1950 Organic Act of Guam, the Territorial Submerged Lands Act, and the doctrine of aboriginal title to support its claim that it was entitled to lands no longer needed for military purposes.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States.

Guam first asserted that the language of the Organic Act indicated a congressional intent that lands not used for a military purpose were to be returned to Guam, and that such an interpretation would allow them to acquire additional lands under the Territorial Submerged Lands Act.  It also asserted that the act should be construed as a continuing grant, because in general federal land grants are interpreted in favor of native inhabitants.  The Ninth Circuit, in its de novo review, responded that reading this intent into the Act would have rendered subsequent language superfluous, and that the doctrine of interpreting land grants in favor of native inhabitants would require an ambiguity in the text of the statute.  The court rejected Guam's arguments and held that the language of the statute gave a clear indication of Congress' intent that the Organic Act was a one-time land grant, and further refused to read it in a fashion that would render any language superfluous.  The court also stated that since the Organic Act did not constitute a continuing land grant, the Territorial Submerged Lands Act would not apply.

Finally, Guam invoked the doctrine of aboriginal title in asserting its right to the land in question.  "Aboriginal title refers to the right of original inhabitants of the United States to use and occupy their aboriginal territory."  Guam argued that it was the trustee for the aboriginal inhabitants of Guam.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the Government of Guam was neither a tribe nor a member of a tribe, and that only Congress had the power to delegate trusteeship of land.  Since Congress had not delegated trust responsibility to the Government of Guam, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it had no right to occupy the tribal land of Guam, and affirmed the district court's summary judgment. AH
http://laws.findlaw.com/9th/9717140.html

WTO Panel Report: Turkey - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999)

In this dispute, India alleged that Turkey unilaterally imposed quantitative restrictions ("QRs") on 19 categories of Indian exports. Paras. 1.1; 9.32.  India claimed that the QRs violated Turkey's obligations under Articles XI:1 and XIII of GATT, and Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("ATC"). Para. 1.3.  Article XI calls for the elimination of QRs specifically where Article XIII prohibits discriminatory administration of QRs to WTO members. Paras. 9.61-9.62.  Article 2.4 of the ATC prevents new restrictions on products unless specific provision is made in GATT 1994.  Turkey defended its measures as lex specialis under Article XXIV:5-9, which is designed to exempt customs unions from WTO provisions. Paras. 9.26, 9.88

The Panel, rejecting Turkey's defense, held that the 19 measures were inconsistent with both GATT and ATC provisions. Para. 10.1.  The Panel recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") request Turkey to align its policy with its WTO obligations. Para. 10.3.

The Panel first noted its September, 1998 procedural rulings. Para. 9.1.  The Panel rejected Turkey's claim that India failed to specify the measures at issue and the products affected by the measures, holding that under Article 6.2 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), India had satisfied the requirement for a request for WTO dispute settlement, namely the identification of: 1) the controversial measures by type; 2) the date of entry into force; and 3) the product coverage. Para. 9.3.  Second, the Panel rejected Turkey's objection that India's claims were only against Turkey, rather than including the EC, when the measures at issue were taken pursuant to a regional trade agreement ("RTA") between Turkey and the EC. Para. 9.4.  The Panel found that it had no authority to make the EC a third party to the process, and moreover found no general rule prohibiting a Member from initiating a dispute settlement proceeding against one party to a bilateral or multilateral agreement from which the disputed measure arose. Para. 9.5.  Third, the Panel ruled that since India did not claim a violation of the ATC beyond the scope of GATT 1994, the DSB was the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. Para. 9.15.

The Panel held that India did not breach the GATT Article XXII consultation requirement.  First noting the decision in EC - Bananas III, which concluded that panels are not normally in a position to evaluate the consultation process, the Panel found that its only function was to ascertain: 1) whether consultations were properly requested; 2) that the complainant was ready to consult with the defendant; and 3) that the 60 day period had lapsed before the establishment of a panel was requested by the complainant. Para. 9.24.

The Panel found Turkey in prima facie violation of Articles XI:1 and XIII. Paras. 9.32; 9.26.  The Panel disagreed with Turkey's claim that the QRs at issue were justified under Article XXIV of the GATT because they were adopted as part of its customs union with the EC.  The Panel found that the measures were "new" because Turkey did not have restrictions that it could change on January 1, 1995, and the QRs went into effect with the Turkey-EC joint communication of November 7, 1997. Para. 9.76.  The measures were Turkish because they did not impose an obligation on another national or supranational authority. Para. 9.36.  The Panel noted that while Turkey and the EC maintained similar policies, the Ankara Agreement establishing their customs union created no legislative body that could bind both Turkey and the EC. Paras. 9.36-9.40.  The Panel also noted that the Turkey-EC customs union was not a WTO Member and therefore had no legal standing. Para. 9.41.

The Panel rejected the claim that Article XXIV "shields" Turkey from "all other WTO obligations" once a customs union is formed. Para. 9.27.  The Panel stated that the DSB and DSU procedures can be used on "any matters arising from [Members'] . . . regional trade arrangements." Paras. 9.48; 9.51.  Rejecting Turkey's claim that Article XXIV creates lex specialis distinct from the GATT's commercial law, the Panel cited specific language in Article XXIV:4 limiting the function of prospective customs unions: "the purpose of a customs union . . . should be to facilitate trade . . . and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members. . . ." Para. 9.101.

Although Turkey argued that Article XXIV:5(a) should be read as permitting such barriers so long as the overall incidence of duties and other commercial regulations did not increase, the Panel found that it neither authorizes nor prohibits import restrictions otherwise incompatible with GATT/WTO. Paras. 9.116 - 9.125.  The Panel agreed with Turkey that Article XXIV:8(a) may include QRs under its definition of "restrictive regulations of commerce," but found the article does not establish whether measures adopted in furtherance of customs unions are compatible with the GATT/WTO.  At the request of the parties, the Panel specifically refrained from ruling on whether the Turkey-EC customs union's provisions are consistent with the WTO. Para. 9.208.  Accordingly, the Panel found no lex specialis and that Turkey's measures violated GATT Articles XI, XIII, and Article 2.4 of the ATC.  MC
Download in Adobe pdf format  http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/1229d.pdf

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Reports and Other Documents

Security Council Resolution 1246 (June 11, 1999)

In the Preamble, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General's report on the Question of East Timor, dated May 22, 1999 (S/1999/595).  The Security Council decided to establish until August 31, 1999 the UN Mission in East Timor ("UNAMET") to organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for August 8, 1999.  The consultation is to be based on a direct, secret, and universal ballot, and it will determine whether the people of East Timor accept the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia").  The rejection of special autonomy would lead to East Timor's separation from Indonesia. Para. 1.

The Security Council authorized the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police officers and 50 military liaison officers, to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police at the time of consultation, and to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces to allow the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibilities under the General Agreement and the Security Agreement. Paras. 2-3.  Furthermore, UNAMET will incorporate: (i) a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment; (ii) an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting; and (iii) an information component responsible for explaining to the people of East Timor the terms of the General Agreement and the proposed autonomy agreement. Para. 4.  The Security Council also noted the intention of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the phases of the consultation process, both inside and outside of East Timor. Para. 5.  Finally, the Security Council stressed the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way, and to ensure the safety and security of UN and other international staff and observers in East Timor. Para. 9.  BM
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm

European Commission: Report on the Application of EC State Aid by the Member State Courts

Commission rapporteurs identified cases before national courts in which Article 92 and/or Article 93 of the EC Treaty were discussed.  The main aim of the report was to determine which cases were brought by the competitors of beneficiaries receiving state aid, and if there should be a general harmonization of national court procedures to secure the enforcement of EC State aid rules.  The information was compiled into two tables showing available remedies and an analysis of decisions.

The report discussed the various types of cases and remedies occurring among the 116 involving Articles 92 and 93.  The first type of case involved recovery of aid by national authorities after a European Commission finding that the aid in question was inconsistent with Articles 92 and 93.  Beneficiaries of the aid typically challenged the recovery actions by invoking national law principles.  Although national authorities usually prevailed, the report stated that complications can arise when private intermediaries such as banks are involved. Para. 4.1.1.

The most frequent type of case involved plaintiffs who challenged tax or similar legislation financially burdening them by identifying companies exempted in alleged violation of Articles 92 and 93.  Para. 4.1.2.   The report stated that this particular category does not give rise to concerns or suggestions. Id.

The remaining types of cases were brought less often, and involved actions either between different levels of administrative bodies within a government, or brought by competitors. Paras. 4.1.3 - 4.2.  Among cases brought by competitors, various types of remedies have been made available by member states.  Most states have mechanisms for injunctive relief, recovery of the aid granted, or recovery of damages from the member state itself. Para. 4.2.1.  Most national courts also have liberal rules for standing, and in some cases allow actions to be brought by parties that are not active members of the domestic market in question. Id.

Analysis of these cases led to the report's primary recommendation that the transparency of substantive and procedural rules should be improved at the EC level. Para. 4.2.1.  Most national courts are hesitant to grant injunctive relief because of the difficulties in adjudicating complex EC law, and often require a prima facie violation before an adjudication would be considered.  Id.  However, while not all types of actions are available in all Member States, para. 4.3.4, most rapporteurs believed that their home country's legal system worked satisfactorily, and did not see a need to propose a general harmonization of national court procedures to secure the enforcement of EC State aid rules. Para. 4.3.7.  AH
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/app_by_member_states/index.htm

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Briefly Noted

The States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on May 24, 1999 elected seven judges to the Law of the Sea Tribunal.  The judges elected to a second, nine-year term included Joseph Akl (Lebanon), Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon), P. Chandrasekhara Rao (India), Anatoly Lazarevich Kolodkin (Russian Federation), Vincente Marotta Rangel (Brazil), and Rudiger Wolfrum (Germany).  The seventh judge, Jose Luis Jesus of Cape Verde, was newly elected to the Tribunal.  http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_22.htm

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International Law In Brief - Copyright 2000 - The American Society of International Law
Editors:  Elizabeth J. Fabrizio, Esq., Peter C. Hansen, Esq., David A. Levy, Esq.
Interns:  Matthew Casebolt, Adam Hill, Branislav Maric, Adv.
To comment on this publication, send an e.mail message to David A. Levy, Interim Editor at
david.levy@his.com
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