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International Law In Brief

February 22 - 27, 1999
Developments in international law, prepared by the
Attorney-Editors of
International Legal Materials
The American Society of International Law

About International Law In Brief




From the Editors

The Executive Committee of the American Society of International Law by consensus has decided to continue International Law In Brief.  The Committee was informed in its decision by the large number of comments submitted by ILIB readers.  We appreciate your support.

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Judicial Decisions

European Court of Human Rights: Buscarini v. San Marino, No. 24645/94 (Feb. 4, 1999)

Buscarini, Della Balda, and Manzaroli were elected to the General Grand Council (the parliament) of San Marino and omitted required references to the "Holy Gospels" in their verbal oaths.  The form of the applicant's oaths was declared invalid by the General Grand Council and the applicants were given the choice of taking the oath on the Gospels or forfeiting their parliamentary seats. The applicants retook the oath including the references to the Gospels, but argued that their rights to religious freedom and conscience had been infringed pursuant to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, inter alia. paras. 9, 12-13.  Prior to submission of the applicant's claim to the Commission, and four months after the applicant's oath was sworn, San Marino passed Law no. 115 granting new members of the General Grand Council the choice of substituting the words "on my honour" for the words "Holy Gospels" in General Grand Council oaths, although the traditional wording was still mandatory for other offices. para. 16.

San Marino argued that the oath did not limit the applicant's religious freedom, asserting that the wording of the oath was not religious, but maintained traditional social and historical significance, and that the form of words "had lost its original character." para. 32.  San Marino sought to justify the use of the oath by contending that the religious significance of the oath had been replaced by "the need to preserve public order, in the form of social cohesion and the citizens' trust in their traditional institutions." para. 36. The Court noted that freedom of religion is "one of the foundations of a democratic society" and and held that the oath was contrary to Article 9 in that it "required [the applicants] to swear allegiance to a particular religion on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary seats." para. 34.   The Court rejected San Marino's claims based on necessity, holding that "it would be contradictory to make the exercise of a mandate intended to represent different views of society within Parliament subject to a prior declaration of commitment to a particular set of beliefs." para. 39. TT
http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/Judgments.htm

Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal: Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, FACV No. 14/1998 (Jan. 29, 1999)

Ng, Tsui, and Cheung, who were mainland-born Chinese children with at least one parent with the right of abode in Hong Kong, brought a suit in the Hong Kong courts challenging the validity  of the Bejing government's Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance.  This ordinance provided that for persons seeking permanent resident status, the right of abode can only be established by their holding a valid travel document affixed with a valid certificate of entitlement. In contrast, Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Hong King Special Administrative Region provides that children born outside of Hong Kong, whose Chinese-national parent was born in Hong Kong or resided there continually for seven years, have the right of abode in Hong Kong and have the right to obtain identity cards stating their right of abode.  The Director of Immigration acknowledged that Ng and Tsui were permanent residents under Article 24, but that Cheung was not, pursuant to Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance  as she was born out of wedlock to a permanent resident father.  The Director also asserted that the applicants were subject to the No. 3 Ordinance and therefore did not have the right of abode.

As an initial matter, the Court of Final Appeal noted that the Basic Law is the constitution of the Region and the courts of the Region have jurisdiction to determine if legislative acts of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee are inconsistent with the Basic Law and "indeed [have] the duty to declare invalidity if inconsistency is found."  The Court further noted that the purpose of the Basic Law was to accord Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy within the "one country, two systems" approach, and that the constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms "lie at the heart of Hong Kong's separate system." Moreover, the Court stated that "courts should give a generous interpretation to the provisions ... that contain these constitutional guarantees in order to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so constitutionally guaranteed."  The Court held that since the primary provision to be interpreted is Article 24 of the Basic Law, which is concerned with the right of abode of a permanent resident, there was no need to seek an interpretation from the Standing Committee under Article 158.  (Article 158 of the Basic Law requires the Court to seek interpretations of the Basic Law from the Standing Committee only if (1) the provisions of the Basic Law in question (a) concern affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or (b) concern the relationship of the Central Authorities and the Region; and (2) it is necessary to interpret the provisions to adjudicate the case.)

On the merits, the Court held that the No 3 Ordinance was unconstitutional as it required permanent residents of the Hong Kong SAR residing on the Mainland to obtain a permit before they are able to exercise their constitutional right of abode.  The Court further held that differentiating between persons born out of wedlock for the purposes of permanent residency was unconstitutional as it violated the principle of equality contained in both the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which remains in force for Hong Kong pursuant to Art. 39 of the Basic Law.  DL
http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/whatsnew/index.htm

Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal: Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, FACV No. 14/1998 (Feb. 26, 1999)

In response to the decision of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region sought a "clarification of certain parts of its decision ... because of these very exceptional circumstances and public interest that has been generated in the relevant issues and their constitutional importance."

In a unanimous judgment the Court noted that "[a]fter a judgment is given, it is for the public and the legal profession to consider that judgment", and stated:

"The courts' judicial power is derived from the Basic Law.  Article 158(1) vests the power of interpretation of the Basic Law in the Standing Committee.  The courts' jurisdiction to interpret the Basic Law in adjudicating cases is derived by authorization from the Standing Committee under Articles 158(2) and 158(3).  In our judgment on 29 January 1999, we said that the Court's jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the Basic Law is derived from and is subject to the provisions of the Basic Law which provisions include the foregoing.

The Court's judgment on 29 January 1999 did not question the authority of the Standing Committee to make an interpretation under Article 158 which would have to be followed by the courts of the Region.  The Court accepts that it cannot question that authority.  Nor did the Court's judgment question, and the Court accepts that it cannot question, the authority of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein."  DL
transcript of statement by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa  http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199902/26/0226244.htm
judgment by the Court of Final Appeal  http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/whatsnew/index.htm

U.S. Supreme Court: Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, No. 97-1252 (Feb. 24, 1999)

The respondents, Amer and others belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, challenged the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deport them, alleging that the INS was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments.  The Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against the INS and Congress subsequently passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which contains a provision restricting judicial review of decisions or actions to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." 8 U.S.C. sect. 1252(g). The Ninth Circuit again found jurisdiction and upheld the District Court on appeal of the denial of the subsequent motion to dismiss.

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that section 1252(g) barred judicial review of the decision to commence deportation proceedings against the aliens.  Scalia further rejected the right of the Respondents to raise selective prosecution claims, noting that "[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."  Scalia noted that inquiring into the motives behind a deportation decision would potentially create judicial interference with the foreign policy decisions of the Executive branch:  "What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law-enforcement priorities and techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques.  The Executive should not have to disclose its 'real' reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat -- or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationals -- and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy." DL
http://laws.findlaw.com/US/000/97-1252.html

U.S. District Court (C.D. California): Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, No. CV 98-5605 (C.D. Cal.), Order

Hawkins was convicted of felony burglary and theft.  Later, the court ordered the Los Angeles County Sheriff to place a "stun belt" on Hawkins during the sentencing hearing.  Judge Comparet-Cassani ordered the belt to be activated and Hawkins received a 50,000 volt electric shock in the courtroom.  Subsequently, Hawkins sought injunctions and compensation alleging that the placement and use of the stun belt violated his rights under the US Constitution and as derived from international law.  The court dismissed certain complaints as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Regarding claims based on jus cogens, the court noted although that there is a recognized right of action against foreign officials engaging in acts of torture, there have been no courts recognizing a similar cause of actions against US state officials in relation to US citizens.  The court noted that although federal courts may imply a personal cause of action for violations of jus cogens norms, it declined to do so because (1) domestic remedies existed, (2) Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 which addressed actions of foreign officials and omitted domestic acts, and (3) the court was hesitant to interfere with the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches, "which must interpret what international obligations the United States will undertake and how to implement them domestically."

Similarly, the court rejected claims based on treaty-based international law.  As an initial matter, the court noted that treaty-based rights are only enforceable in US courts if the treaty is self-executing or if Congress has passed implementing legislation.  The court held that although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture are intended to represent customary international law, they were not meant to be legally binding and do not create self-executing rights like treaties.  The court noted that the US has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, therefore it is not binding on the US, and that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not bind the US as the US neither signed nor ratified the Convention.  Moreover, the court held that two instruments signed and ratified by the US, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment do not create private rights of action because the Senate ratified the treaties with the express proviso that they were not self-executing and Congress has not passed implementing legislation.

Under domestic law, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss Hawkins' count seeking a permanent injunction, granted a motion for class action certification, and granted a preliminary injunction against the use of stun belts.  The court stated that the stun belts, even if unactivated, had a "chilling effect" on the conduct of defendants in court, who may elect to forgo active participation in the trial out of fear of receiving a 50,000 volt electric shock.  "A pain infliction device that has the potential to compromise an individual's ability to participate in his or her own defense does not belong in a court of law." DL
Download in Adobe pdf format:
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/cacd/CourtInformation.nsf/04023f04c914e7338825656900691c26/ 04f3cd56d59da28288256708005e946d/$FILE/hawkins.PDF

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Reports and Other Documents

OECD: Draft Principles on Corporate Governance, SG/GC(99)1 (Feb. 8, 1999)

The OECD is seeking public comments on the working draft of its suggested Principles of Corporate Governance.  The Guidelines are intended to aid governments in improving and evaluating their present frameworks for corporate governance.

The Draft Principles suggest no single model of good corporate governance nor does it seek to establish a global standard, but instead highlights common foundational elements such as the prohibition on insider trading, the maintenance of equitable voting rights, and disclosures of conflicts of interest.  The draft is divided into two parts.  The first part contains a "blackletter" set of principles under the headings (I) the rights of shareholders, (II) the equitable treatment of shareholders, (III) the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (IV) disclosure and transparency, and (V) the role of the board.  (Note that the functions of the "board" may be applied to a single board of directors or the two-tier system of management and supervisory boards.)  The second part of the document consists of annotations and commentary.  TT
http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.htm

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News and Notes

The State Department Shipping Coordinating Committee will hold a meeting on Tuesday afternoon , March 30th at the State Department from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. to obtain public comment on issues to be addressed at the April 19-24 UNESCO meeting of governmental experts on the draft Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage.  For further information, contact Mr. Robert Blumberg, Office of Ocean Affairs at (202) 647-4971.

The Hague Conference reports that on February 9, 1999 Belgium ratified the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and on February 3, 1999 Israel ratified the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.  The conventions will enter into force for those states on May 1, 1999 and June 1, 1999 respectively.  http://www.hcch.net/e/events/events.html

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has sworn in three new judges for its new third Trial Chamber.  The three judges are Lloyd George Williams QC, (Jamaica and Saint Kitts and Nevis); Dionysios Kondylis, (Greece); and Pavel Dolenc, (Slovenia).   http://www.ictr.org/english/pressrel/164.htm

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction entered into force on March 1, 1999. http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty

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International Law In Brief - Copyright 2000 - The American Society of International Law
Editors:  Elizabeth J. Fabrizio, David A. Levy
Interns:  Alice Epler, Fredrick Mudenda, Teresa Taylor
To comment on this publication, send an e.mail message to David A. Levy, Interim Editor at
david.levy@his.com
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